

The Crisis in Human History

JOHN DEWEY

A Palestinian's Solution

MOSCHE SMELANSKY

The People Vs. Discrimination

FELIX S. COHEN

On Being of the B'nai B'rith

SIGMUND FREUD

Rumania: Equality with Reservations

HAL LEHRMAN

**Nasty Kupperman and the Ku Klux
Klan—A Story**

LOUIS BERG

The Inner World of the Hasid

HAROLD ROSENBERG

Clem Has Been Here

KARL FRUCHT

The Freedom of the Chessboard

MILTON FINKELSTEIN

The Arab League: Tool or Power?

BERNARD D. WEINRYB

**From the American Scene—
The Jewish Delicatessen**

RUTH GLAZER

The Study of Man—

Dice, Dr. Hayek and the Consumer

BEN B. SELIGMAN

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Isaac Rosenfeld

Theodor H. Gaster

Daniel Bell

Sidney Morgenbesser

Joshua Starr

Israel Knox

THE MONTH IN HISTORY

LETTERS

CEDARS OF LEBANON



Let your HEAD take you

(The average American today has a choice of just going where "his feet take him", or choosing wisely the course to follow. Let's skip ahead 10 years, and take a look at John Jones—and listen to him . . .)

SOMETIMES I feel so good it almost scares me. "This house—I wouldn't swap a shingle off its roof for any other house on earth. This little valley, with the pond down in the hollow at the back, is the spot I like best in all the world."

"And they're mine. I own 'em. Nobody can take 'em away from me."

"I've got a little money coming in, regularly. Not much—but enough. And I tell you, when you can go to bed every night with nothing on your mind except the fun you're going to have tomorrow—that's as near Heaven as man gets on this earth!"

"It wasn't always so."

"Back in '46—that was right after the war and sometimes the going wasn't too easy—I needed cash. Taxes were tough, and then Ellen got sick."

Like almost everybody else, I was buying Bonds through the Payroll Plan—and I figured on cashing some of them in. But sick as she was, it was Ellen who talked me out of it.

"Don't do it, John!" she said. "Please don't! For the first time in our lives, we're really saving money. It's wonderful to know that every single payday we have more money put aside! John, if we can only keep up this saving, think what it can mean! Maybe some day you won't have to work. Maybe we can own a home. And oh, how good it would feel to know that we need never worry about money when we're old!"

"Well, even after she got better, I stayed away from the weekly poker game—quit dropping a little cash at the hot spots now and then—gave up some of the things a man feels he has a right to. We didn't have as much fun for a while but we paid our taxes and the doctor and—we didn't touch the Bonds."

"What's more, we kept right on putting our extra cash into U. S. Savings Bonds. And the pay-off is making the world a pretty swell place today!"

This space made available through the cooperation of Paper Novelty Manufacturing Co.—manufacturers of greeting cards—200 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

This is an official U. S. Treasury advertisement—prepared under auspices of Treasury Department and War Advertising Council

COMMENTARY

INCORPORATING CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RECORD

MARCH 1946 VOLUME I, NUMBER 5

The Crisis in Human History	John Dewey	1
A Palestinian's Solution	Mosche Smelansky	10
The People Vs. Discrimination	Felix S. Cohen	17
On Being of the B'nai B'rith	Sigmund Freud	23
Rumania: Equality with Reservations	Hal Lehrman	25
Nasty Kupperman and the Ku Klux Klan A Story	Louis Berg	30
The Inner World of the Hasid	Harold Rosenberg	35
Clem Has Been Here	Karl Frucht	39
The Freedom of the Chessboard	Milton Finkelstein	46
The Arab League: Tool or Power?	Bernard D. Weinryb	50
From the American Scene		
The Jewish Delicatessen	Ruth Glazer	58
The Month in History	Sidney Hertzberg	64
Cedars of Lebanon		
A New Conception of Jewish History	Simon M. Dubnow	72
The Study of Man		
Dice, Dr. Hayek and the Consumer	Ben B. Seligman	80
Letters from Readers		85
Books in Review		
Wasteland, by Jo Sinclair	Isaac Rosenfeld	89
One Destiny, by Sholem Asch	Theodor H. Gaster	90
Reveille for Radicals, by Saul D. Alinsky	Daniel Bell	92
The Rise of the Jew in the Western World, by Uriah Zevi Engelman	Joshua Starr	94
Puritanism and Democracy, by Ralph Barton Perry	Sidney Morgenbesser	95
Continuity: Anthology of American Yiddish Poetry, edited by Moshe Starkman	Israel Knox	96

Associate Editor
CLEMENT GREENBERG

Editor
ELLIOT E. COHEN

Managing Editor
HANNA F. DESSER

Editorial Assistant
NATHAN GLAZER

Business Manager
FRANCES GREEN

Contributing Editors

SALO W. BARON, SIDNEY HOOK, H. L. LURIE, JACOB R. MARCUS, SHALOM SPIEGEL

COMMENTARY, incorporating *Contemporary Jewish Record*: Published monthly by the American Jewish Committee: Commentary Publication Committee, Ralph E. Samuel, Chairman; David Sher, John Slawson, Alan H. Stroock, Ira M. Younger. 40c a copy; \$4.00 a year; 2 years, \$7.50; 3 years, \$10.00. Canadian and Foreign \$1.00 a year additional. Offices, 425 Fourth Avenue, New York 16. Reentered as second-class matter October 30, 1945, at the post office in New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879. Copyright, 1945, by COMMENTARY. All rights, including translation into other languages, reserved by the publisher in the United States, Great Britain, Mexico, and all countries participating in the International Copyright Convention and the Pan-American Copyright Convention. Indexed in International Index to Periodicals, Magazine Subject Index, and Public Affairs Information Service.

Four weeks' advance notice, and old address as well as the new are necessary for change of subscriber's address.

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary world issues. Its pages will be hospitable to diverse points of view and belief, and it hopes to encourage original creative endeavor in the various fields of culture. The opinions and views expressed by COMMENTARY's contributors and editors are their own, and do not necessarily express the Committee's viewpoint or position. Its sponsorship of COMMENTARY is in line with its general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Jewish concern, to fight bigotry and protect human rights, and to promote Jewish cultural interest and creative achievement in America.

IN FORTHCOMING ISSUES OF COMMENTARY

The Solitary

Pearl S. Buck

The Nobel prize novelist discusses the plight of the lone individual in the world of 1946, with a diagnosis and prognosis—including a somewhat astonishing request to the Jews. A contribution to the series on "The Crisis of the Individual."

Cesar Tiempo: Argentine Poet

Donald D. Walsh

"When the Zeitlin family, emigrating to America, had passport trouble in the United States, they went on to Buenos Aires, and thereby we lost and Argentina gained a Jewish and a national poet." An evaluation of an important figure in Latin-American letters, with some translations of his poetry, by the head of the Spanish Department of The Choate School.

Pages From a Balkan Diary

Hal Lehrman

A day-book, recording impressions of people and places in the postwar Balkans, by the correspondent who contributed the much-discussed "Hungary: Liberation's Bitter Fruit" to the pages of COMMENTARY, as well as "Rumania: Equality with Reservations" in the current issue.

Chronicles of the Lost: American Series

Charles Reznikoff

The poet and novelist sets down, from first-hand historical sources, a portrait gallery of Jewish notables and near-notables from the early Spanish-Portuguese immigration who played a role in America's history and lost their Jewish identity in the process. The author draws no moral.

Build on Palestine Realities

Ahad Ha'am

A prophetic admonition, timely for our day, by the great Zionist thinker—written in 1920, published here for the first time in the United States—cautioning Jews as to the real problems involved in the Balfour Declaration and in Arab-Jewish relations.

Implementing International Rights

Hersch Lauterpacht

The author of the now historic work, "The International Bill of the Rights of Man," which played an important role in initiating the movement for the charter of the U. N. O., appraises progress.

No Hope Except Exodus

Shlomo Katz

Has the hour struck for the wholesale exodus of Jewry from Europe? Will the hour some day strike in the United States, too? An eloquent statement of the thesis that the Jews in the Western world are doomed by history's verdict—a thesis held by many influential leaders and thinkers within the Zionist orbit.

My War With Sol Bloom

Solomon F. Bloom

The strange, inescapable entanglements of the lives of a professor of history and the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, ruefully described by the former.

COMMENTARY

INCORPORATING CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RECORD

THE CRISIS IN HUMAN HISTORY

The Danger of the Retreat to Individualism

JOHN DEWEY

THIS article is the fourth in a series which aims to bring to bear the minds of a number of leading men of thought in America and Europe on a basic issue of our times, "The Crisis of the Individual."

The problem is stated as follows: "In our time the individual human being has been more violently debased than in many centuries. Every aspect of the human personality—his civil rights, his individuality, his status, the dignity accorded him—all have been violated. Millions have been tortured and murdered. . . . Yet the inviolability of the individual human being has been so much a part of Western civilization that it has been taken for granted. Whatever advances we hoped for in our culture were based on this ideal. . . ."

"It is not alone that this ideal has been crushed by tyrannical rulers, but it is feared

that it is dying in the hearts of men. But this would mean an ominous lowering of the level of political and moral life."

The series seeks answers to questions such as these: "Why is this happening to us?" "Where did our Western civilization go wrong?" "Is this merely a transition to a new society with better values?" "Is the contemporary crisis due to technology and large-scale planning, or their present-day misuse; or to a distortion of basic ideals which would require a renaissance of religious belief or some other inner revaluation of values?"

Following Dr. Dewey's article, the following are among those who will contribute to the series: Leo S. Baeck, Martin Buber, Pearl S. Buck, Irwin Edman, Waldo Frank, Louis Finkelstein, André Gide, Sidney Hook, Hans Kohn, William Orton.—EDITOR.

NO QUESTION is more urgent than that raised by the editor of COMMENTARY. Answers given in discussion are momentous in practice. For the attitude expressed and developed in public inquiry is inevitably a genuine part of the practical answer that will emerge. It is the initial stage of what appears later as more tangible and seemingly more overt activities. The preliminary phase in which belief-attitudes take shape is too commonly dismissed as if it were merely theoretical and contrasted with something else labelled practical. But nothing is of more practical importance than

that the question constituting the issue to be dealt with be rightly put. If we get off on the wrong foot, our behavior in later phases is compromised in advance.

These considerations are pertinent because they are not made in empty air. There is already evidence of danger that the issue is wrongly put—and so may confuse, not direct, action. The danger consists in splitting "individual" and "social" from each other at the very start, and then ending with the discovery that they are in opposition to each other. This overlooks the obvious fact that *the debasement which is going on is of the human*

being in his entirety, and not of the person in isolation or of society in abstraction.

At the very best, *individual* and *social* stand for traits of unitary human beings; traits, moreover, which are so integral that they are but two aspects of man in his actual existence. Traits which are differential, singular, or individual, in the constitution of human beings have, undoubtedly, been degraded and violated. But the events forming this debasement are aspects of the degradation and violation of the associative ties that hold human beings together. These "social" ties do not inhere in "individuals"; they inhere integrally in human beings in their very humanity. Their connection with the traits that mark one human being off from the other is so pervasive and intimate that what happens to the latter cannot be either understood nor effectively dealt with save as the former are held in full view.

This substitution of "human being" for "individual" is in effect one-half of what I have to say about the question before us. "Individual" is as truly but an adjective as is "social." Each word is a name for what is intrinsic in the constitution and development of human beings. That "social" is an adjectival word is commonly recognized, at least as a grammatical fact. But, "individual" is commonly treated as it were a noun, standing

JOHN DEWEY, one of America's great men, celebrated his eighty-sixth birthday in October. Philosopher, educator, political thinker, and fighter for justice and truth and freedom his whole life long, the modern world owes much to him for his diffusion into our broad culture and into many fields of practical endeavor of a sense of what the scientific spirit, human intelligence and social responsibility can and should mean. Of the New England tradition, he graduated from the University of Vermont in 1879, and published his first book sixty years ago. He was professor of philosophy at Columbia University from 1904 until his retirement in 1930, and from this chair he exercised a world-wide influence. He has been for many years honorary president of the League for Industrial Democracy. Some of his books are: *School and Society*, *How We Think*, *Democracy and Education*, *Human Nature and Conduct*, *The Quest for Certainty*, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* and *Culture and Freedom*.

for an entity complete in itself. If one asks for proof of this statement one has only to note how often the phrase "the individual" occurs in current discussion, and then note what would happen if the word "human being" were put in its place. Its substitution would not of itself ensure the right way of putting of the issue. But it would at least permit recognition that traits which are "social," in that they are due to the ways in which human beings are associated, have to be taken into the reckoning.

The difference between stating the issue as one concerning what is happening to human beings in their full human capacity, rather than to "individuals" (or to "the individual") is not verbal. Think of any human being you please. If he is thought of in the concrete not in the abstract, there comes into view a creature born so helpless as to be dependent upon others for his very existence. One is almost ashamed to cite facts which are so obvious that it does not seem possible that they could be systematically neglected. I cite but one. Omit language and other means of inter-communication from the account, and no intellectual development of human beings, even in their differential or individual capacities, is conceivable. Think of any human adult in a concrete way, and at once you must place him in some "social" context and functional relationship—parent, citizen, employer, wage-earner, farmer, merchant, teacher, lawyer, good citizen, criminal—and so on indefinitely. Escape from dealing in empty verbal abstractions (of which Individuality and Society, spelled openly or covertly with capitals, are samples), cease converting them into entities, and it becomes glaringly evident that "social" stands for properties which are intrinsic to every human being. Extend reflection beyond what is immediately obvious, and it is clear that the variety and scope of the connections for which the word *social* is a shorthand expression, are the determining conditions of the kind of actuality achieved by capacities that are individual or differential.

Nothing that has been said indicates a doubt that there is a serious—an even tragic—

crisis of human beings in their status as "individuals." It asserts that there is *equally* a crisis in their status as caught up in a complicated meshwork of associations, and that one crisis cannot be viewed in separation from the other. And I would go further than this generality. The very habit of introducing a separation between them has been a powerful factor in justifying and intensifying the factors of which the present crisis is the overt public manifestation. Put in the language of common use, the movement that goes by the name of *Individualism* is very largely responsible for the chaos now found in human associations—the chaos which is at the root of the present debasement of human beings.

THESE remarks implicitly contain the other half of what I have to say. Separation and opposition of *individual* and *social* has its roots far back in history. It was initiated when man was linked to "the next world" instead of to his fellows in this world. But it would not have culminated in the crisis of our time had it not been reinforced by newer historical factors. The crisis is the overt manifestation of the conjunction of factors that have been working under cover. It is the cumulative expression of converging forces that had been operating piecemeal for a long time. We can not grasp the significance of the crisis without a long look backward into the abyss of time. We cannot judge how to meet it without a long look ahead. My complementary point, in fine, is that we can understand the crisis only as we take it out of its narrow geographical and temporal setting and view it in long historical perspective.

Otherwise we shall deal only with symptoms. We shall allow what is immediately and urgently before our eyes to block vision of the world-wide and centuries-old scene that gives these only too-present events their significance. I have called the two points made here halves of the same whole. What has been called Individualism and Socialism, and then put in opposition to one another, must also be placed in *their* long historical

perspective. The individualistic movement which preceded the socialistic and which provoked the latter by reaction is itself an illustration of the necessity of paying heed to a long course of events. This statement is true whether we take account of its earlier beneficent liberalizing aspect or its later bankruptcy.

Viewed in this way, individualism in its earlier phase appears as a movement of release. It freed conditions and factors of human life that arose with the insurgence of new forces from control by oppressive institutions—Church and State. The emerging state of human life was not seen, however, as a new system of *social* arrangements in which individual or differential proclivities and interests obtained a release. Old traditions and institutions, which had so largely been oppressive, instead of being supports of organized life, were identified with "social." Freedom was regarded largely as the cutting loose of "the individual" from the "social." This tendency was most marked at first in the development of the new physical science and in the efforts made by agencies of belief-attitudes embodied in old institutions to suppress it by force. Subsequent events in politics and in the industrial and commercial aspects of life continued and intensified the belief that social organization was the enemy of human enlightenment and progress. Something called *the Individual* was made absolute.

For the time being the emancipating release that was taking place in many areas concealed the disintegration that was going on. In particular the executives and administrators of the new movements in production and distribution of goods assumed and effectively taught that they were the chief and indispensable agents of all that was liberating. They were aided and abetted by the restrictive consequences of the perpetuation of feudal customs in industry, politics, and religion. But in noting the historic course of the rise and bankruptcy of the individualistic movement, no mistake is greater than to overlook the substantial *moral* support given to Individualism in its *laissez-faire*

Liberal career by the heritage bequeathed from certain religious traditions. These taught that men as inherently singular or individual souls have *intrinsic* connection only with a supernatural being, while they have connection *with one another* only through the extraneous medium of this supernatural relationship.

There took place a peculiar conjunction of conflict between the new conditions and the old tradition and an alliance between them. In this conjunction, the moral and religious features of the old tradition were so deployed as to give support to the more inhuman of the new conditions, especially in industry. The ambivalence of what is called "the individual" cannot be understood without taking into account the underlying alliance as well as the open conflict of old and new. The conflict was exhibited in gradual undermining of old institutional arrangements in religion, industry, and politics. But the translation of the antagonisms within a particular kind of "social" organization into inherent separation of "social" and "individual," and the assignment of superiority, authority and prestige in this opposition to "the individual," could not have taken place unless the latter had absorbed into itself the substance of the moral individualism contained in the accepted religious tradition.

II

THE upheavals in church and state, which were conditions and consequences of the breakdown of long established institutional forms of human association, would not have taken the form they did take apart from the events constituting the Industrial Revolution. An incidental, yet significant, illustration of this fact is found in the disruption of old ties that resulted from extensive migrations of peoples from old lands. The immediate occasion was a combination of religious and political factors, to which, later, desire for economic betterment was added. The net effect presented itself as a creative release of personal freedom. But the change, with its breaking off of old institutional ties, could not have taken place without new scientific

developments and new technical agencies. In the fusion of scientific, religious, political and industrial motivations and movements, the industrial finally gained the upper hand. It gained it, moreover, in a peculiar *economic* form in which the feudal pattern of superior and subordinate reappeared in the disguise of voluntary "individual" agreements between employer and employed, without the stabilizing features of feudalism. A century ago Carlyle gave this particular aspect of social arrangement the apt name of "cash-nexus." But at the same time his magnification of the hero and his contempt for the masses as literally a mass in the sense in which the mass is an inert lump, is a vivid illustration of union of the old repressive institutionalism with the new "individualism." The ironic upshot was that the merely cash-nexus was to be brought into a state of enduring stability by means of the Captain of Industry in his capacity of conquering hero.

That the new individualism was marked by release of powers of discovery and invention (which are genuine traits of human beings in their severalty or "individuality") is undoubted. But the thing needing explanation is the large part played by them in promoting the conflicts, uncertainties and fears that operated to create a "social" reaction in a totalitarian form. For it cannot be said too often in the present state of opinion that this seemingly sudden outbreak of totalitarian collectivism was in fact the breaking *through* the surface, into overt manifestation, of underlying phases of the previous individualism.

A volume, not a few paragraphs, would be needed to tell in adequate detail how the one-sided "individualistic" passed over into an equally one-sided "socialistic" movement. I have learned more on this matter from Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* than from any other source. It shows in detail how policies that had been justified by the prevailing doctrines of "individualism" created, one by one, evils that demanded special legislative and administrative measures to ensure defense and protection of human in-

terests threatened with destruction. The cumulative effect of these "social" measures was all the greater because they were undertaken piecemeal. Each one was regarded as if it stood alone as a mere specific remedy for some danger or evil also regarded as if it stood alone.

In this connection, it is important for even an elementary understanding of events to observe that not just Russia alone but all fascist countries have professed to be "socialistic," and to be engaged in protecting the great mass of their members from the destructive consequences of those "individualistic" measures, baptized with the names of liberalism and democracy, which had brought the population to a state of miserable insecurity. Placing the socialistic in stark opposition to the individualistic was not the creation of Fascism and Totalitarianism. It was a direct inheritance from the laissez-faire "Liberalism" which arrogated to itself the protection of human "individuals" from oppression by organized society. So-called "free enterprise" in business and finance was taken to be identical with the very essence of freedom. When it became apparent as to such Freedom that its net result was recurrent industrial depressions, each one more severe than its predecessor, in which the mass of human beings were reduced to a state of insecurity and fear, it is hardly surprising that peoples who were already habituated to dependence upon superior political authority preferred "the road to serfdom" which promised them some stability of life. The fact that there were at hand the technical means for the establishment of a decent and secure standard of living immensely brightened the prospect—especially when it was viewed as an alternative.

III

OUTWARDLY, superficially, the change was an abrupt one. It caught the world without preparation. It is this seeming abruptness that makes it the more necessary to pay heed to its deep roots in the past. The generally accepted religion of western

Europe played a part as already said, because of its teaching that each human being is "spiritually," and hence fundamentally, an entity whose connections with other human beings exist only in the medium of connection with a supreme over-natural Being, God. It followed that men in themselves are external and physical, rather than morally connected. Indeed, human beings in their "natural" estate were so earthly as to be in themselves standing sources of moral evil. In their natural and secular state they shared in the sinful fall of Mankind. As long as a single ecclesiastical institution dominated the life of western Europe, it could claim to possess and administer the means for filling this moral vacuum. The rise of Protestant dissent contributed to the release of its underlying and basic "individualism."

This isolationism is far from being the only source of the moral phase of the contemporary crisis. A gulf had been established in philosophy in ancient Greece between things that are merely means and things that are exclusively ends; between the "material" and the "spiritual." In early and medieval Christianity, the split ceased to be a matter of philosophy; it was enforced in the habitual attitudes that obtained. The split into mere means and mere ends was most marked in relegation of the economic aspects of human life to that which was base because merely "material." But it affected also the political aspects of life, save as the latter were definitely under domination by the ecclesiastic institution which regarded itself as the sole agency for the higher intrinsic "spiritual" values that were ends in themselves, supreme and ultimate. There is probably no attitude more habitual than the one which regards everything economic as having the status of mere means, because concerned only with "material" things which must then be moralized, if at all, from *without*. The doctrine naturally became effective for harm in just the degree in which industrial, commercial and financial factors have come to hold an ever-increasing importance in actual human life.

The doctrine and its practice were con-

joined in a peculiar way that reinforced the beliefs in isolated individualism. Kant taught, for example, that every human individual is an "end-in-himself." The teaching was noble in purpose. It was meant as a protest against despotism in Germany. It was meant as a welcome to and support of the rising republican tendencies initiated in the American and French Revolutions. But as an "ideal" it was presented in the sense in which "ideal" means that which is totally separate from the actual. That it was named "noumenal" and contrasted sharply with what was "phenomenal" and "empirical" is a clear disclosure of its direct descent from the earlier separation of the supernatural and the human. It is one thing to protest against practices that reduce *some* beings to a state in which they are mere tools to serve the profit and power of some other human beings. But the doctrine that men are only ends-in-themselves and never means to serve others is equivalent to repudiation of all the cooperative ties which bind human beings together.*

Practices which express, and are justified by, doctrines according to which there is a sharp division between things that are inherently but means and other things that are inherently but ends, and which teach that the former division covers the whole range of the economic aspects of life are an abiding part of the present crisis.

THE intimate association of economic issues with political concerns is such a conspicuous fact of life-conditions that its presence does not need to be argued. Totalitarian socialism is without paradox a legitimate consequence of and reaction to the laissez-faire Liberalism that proclaimed

the subordination of the political to the economic.

That economic activities in production, commerce and finance are carried on by "individuals" in their individual capacity is probably the most successful as well as the most harmful myth of modern life. It owes its capacity for evil largely to its alliance with this view that things which are means are set off from things which are ends—ends-in-themselves as the phrase goes. In fact means are the things and the only things that count in producing consequences. No doctrine could possibly be as effective in shielding the actual human consequences of actual economic conditions from judgment in humane or moral terms as the view that they are *merely* means, *merely* material. The economic aspect of human association decides the conditions under which human beings actually live. The decision includes their effective ability to share in the accumulated values of culture and to contribute to the latter's further development. Separation of "ends-in-themselves" from the conditions that are the only active means of ends actually accomplished renders the former utopian and impotent, and the actual conditions brought about by the means in use inequitable and inhuman.

The resulting state of affairs went far to confer attraction upon any and all measures that promised relief. The separation of means and ends, material and spiritual, economic and moral, which sustain the cultural conditions producing this effect, goes so far back in human history, that any explanation which passes over this fact is sure to err radically in diagnosis of the present crisis. The attempt to moralize industry, commerce and finance (namely the conditions under which human beings actually live) by exhortations addressed to the conscience of "The Individual" is the application of a sentimental poultice. On the other hand, a "socialistic" governmental action which represents a sheer swing of the pendulum from the extreme "individualistic" position is bound to travel the old

* Although the Kantian formulation forbids treating man *merely* as a means, the dualism between ends that are super-sensible and means that are natural, which pervades his whole philosophy, leads to a conception of men as constituting a community of isolated ends-in-themselves. On this approach, the nature of their actual empirical, communal ties out of which differential personalities develop, cannot be made intelligible.

road of division between ends and means, the material and spiritual, at an accelerated rate.

Some reporters of the present scene have advanced far enough to hold that its ills should be remedied by calling in those who have at command both the "technics" of effective action and the "morals" for the spiritual adviser. This is on the par with the notion that those suffering from mental disturbance should be attended by one kind of healers for "bodily" disorders and by another for disorders of "mind" or "soul." What is needed in one case as in the other is a report and treatment from the standpoint which recognizes the unity of human beings. There is some slight advance in the idea that there is need for a kind of social therapy from both sources. But it consists only in an undercurrent that may lead forward to a continuous and cooperative observation of men in their unitary structure and function. Otherwise there is but a perpetuation of the old division that is at the root of the troubles. Adding one isolated factor to another one equally isolated does not heal inner division.

A FURTHER but closely allied illustration of the necessity of seeing the present crisis in extensive perspective is furnished by the case of Nationalism. Anyone who has read the literature of a century or so ago—Mazzini for example—will be aware that the words *Nation* and *Nationality* were once charged with fine humane aspiration. They were used to protest against both the narrowness of long established local and provincial units of association, and against the kind of levelling, obliterating unification attempted by a Napoleon. It was in effect a revolt against the footless cosmopolitanism of eighteenth century idealists, as well as against the nascent imperialism which would impose a Roman unity and peace. The words were taken to stand for vital communities of tradition and of aspiration: of all the factors that make up the shared culture that results from free inter-communication. These national communities

were to cooperate with one another in behalf of the still wider international community—humanity—each putting its moral resources into a common human pool, diversity thus enriching unity.

Today Nationalism is largely a synonym for collective aggressive egoism. Peoples have measured their own national state by its power to expand, and "Great Powers" have been those which were alone secure as nations. This change from the ideal of measuring national unity by its contribution to the welfare and progress of humanity as an inclusive whole is vast and devastating.

The actual conditions of national life were taken over, captured, one by one by the union of new economic forces with old political and militaristic institutions. The latter acquired an effective power they had never known. The former were largely deflected from the human service they were capable of rendering into agencies of oppression. Periodically they were deflected into agencies of active destruction, each new cycle of war being more devastating than the preceding one. The capture of new forces by old institutions and customs immensely reinforced their power for evil. The ardent expectation that the development of commerce would create a state of interdependence that could and would compel a condition of widespread harmony of interests and of mutual trust was converted, in the course of events, into a condition in which human beings in their capacity of "nationals" lived in a state of chronic fear.

War is one of the oldest of human institutions. Its alliance with the organization of human beings into diverse political units is also old. The inviolability of human beings in their individual capacities has never been secure at any time or place when and where war prevailed. War and militaristic policies are intrinsically totalitarian in tendency.

Recent conditions have but given an overpowering overt demonstration of this fact. But here again it is not new factors in isolation that are accountable. The "social" factors which have captured the new forces

and which turn them to production of human debasement and violation are as old as history. The "technics" of invention and manipulative control of natural energies have conferred upon war and upon national energies organized for war an unparalleled power for suppression and destruction of human values. But the factors thus intensified are very old.

DESPITE what I have said to safeguard against misunderstanding, it is likely that some readers will interpret my criticism of religious, moral, political and economic "individualism," as a plea for a swing over to "collectivistic," governmentally conducted "socialism." The criticism however is directed against the *separation* of individual and associative aspects of the unitary human being. As totalitarian events in Fascist Italy, Bolshevik Russia, and Nazi Germany have demonstrated (to all who are able and willing to see) a swing from one pole to the other is but an effective perpetuation of the old separation with a change in the kind of suppressions it inevitably entails. Nevertheless, there are many signs at present that revolt against the manifest tragic evils of totalitarian "socialism" is producing a swing back to magnification of something called *the individual*, although this time with an aversion to the "economic" individual and devotion to the ideal of making the "spiritual" individual supreme. Something called "personalism" is being advanced as the alternative to totalitarianism, especially among and by frustrated former devotees of a one-sided socialistic creed. The outcome is a view which, in the actual words of one of them, ascribes "independent reality and ultimate value to the individual person alone"! Apparently, an absolutist once, an absolutist always. The clothing has changed but not the monistic cut and pattern.

We shall be in a position to understand and to frame policies intelligently only when we substitute observations which are necessarily pluralistic for pseudo-observations which proceed from wholesale points of view, enshrined in philosophy under the

title of various monisms. There are all kinds of "individual" traits—in fact, if we take the word "individual" seriously there are as many as there are "individuals." If we once recognize this fact we shall also recognize the absurdity of talking about "The Individual," economic or spiritual. We shall be concerned with the specific and plural conditions of association under which traits that are so differential as to be individual obtain a desirable instead of stunted and perverted development. Meantime assertion that the individual is the ultimate reality and value is, if taken seriously, an invitation to an unrestrained egoism—which is not the more attractive for being labelled "spiritual."

The habit of using "society" and "social" as wholesale monistic terms (whether by way of praise or condemnation) is equally harmful. There are all kinds of associations. The gangster is as highly "social" in one connection as he is anti-social in other connections. Observation and intelligence with respect to human life in its associated phases will not begin to approach the progress made, and still being made, in physical matters until we substitute recognition of *specific* forms and modes of connection of human beings for the conceptual abstractions still largely in control of sociological doctrines in all their aspects. A reading of a telephone directory to note the immense variety of human associations and their vast interrelations might well prove more enlightening than reading most lucubrations on the subject of the "individual" and the "social."

What has been said will be completely misapprehended if it is taken to indicate a belief that a happy issue out of the present Crisis is certain or even highly probable. For its import is restricted to a special point—the disastrous logical, psychological, social and moral consequences of introducing separations where there are no separations. Nothing is implied as to the probable outcome of the present Crisis save under conditions of specific qualification. The purpose is to say that the events constituting the

present Crisis will be dealt with in a way to produce a desirable outcome only in the degree in which they are viewed in their own concrete context. This context is one of a long historical spread and wide geographical scope. An artificially one-sided separation of "social" and "individual" is now the chief obstacle to seeing the Crisis in its right perspective. There are ominous signs of continuation of this distortion.

I close by adding that while there is no guarantee for optimism, there are resources within our grasp which, if used, will tend toward a favorable outcome. The undecided matter is how soon, if at all, we shall use them. The foregoing discussion has referred to individual, singular, differential aspects of human beings as the source of all inventions and discoveries that are not made by chance. They are the medium of all *deliberate* innovation and variation. But only the inventions and technical advances that spring from the intelligence that takes in a wide range of conditions and consequences determines the *direction* they take, and hence the issue they are likely to have.

Intelligence dealing with physical matters has learned this lesson. Physical discoveries and their application in technological invention depend, as a matter of course, upon accumulation of factual conclusions in comprehensive systematic form. Such procedure is definitely *not* the case in the field of our specifically human and humane activities. Here the policies we initiate, the measures we employ to secure results, are decided by very different sorts of considerations. Stated in a summary matter we have no discoveries, inventions and technologies in human affairs comparable at all to those we command in physical matters. Our humane knowledges are relatively speaking in an infantile state.

One reason for this backward condition of humane knowledge and technics has been indicated. No surer way would have been

devised to produce and maintain the present tragically one-sided development of knowledge and practice than division of life into material and spiritual, with the economic assigned to the baser and inherently meaner part. The technics of industry have come to monopolize virtually the entire impact of systematic observation and report. The other portion of life, thus torn asunder, is left under the control of a complex of institutions and traditions that took shape in a static period when changes in life were the work of chance, often of catastrophe. No answer can be given to the question whether "the contemporary crisis is due to technology and large scale planning" that does not place at the centre of consideration the arbitrary limitation thereby created. To attribute to "science," to technology, and to large scale planning the evils due to the one-sided and torn conditions of tragically divided human life is to work for perpetuation, yes towards intensification, of the Crisis.

Our present general attitude is one of impatience and haste. We are not inclined "to stop and think"; to engage, that is, in observation that reaches backward and forward. Emotional reactions restrict vision to what is close at hand in time and space. The emotions are themselves as legitimate as they are inevitable in every rightly constituted human being. But they should be used to promote, not to block, wide observation and a planning that is large-scale: that is, large enough in scale to integrate the economic with the moral and humane, and, by striving to give that which has been debased as material its positive place in promoting secure and widely extended humane values, bring unity into our future life. Would there were prophets who are genuine seers who will warn against reactions to the past and who will show us how to take full advantage of the new resources now at our disposal!

A PALESTINIAN'S SOLUTION

A Pioneer Zionist Offers a Program for Arab-Jewish Peace

MOSCHE SMELANSKY

REHOVOT

IS THERE any hope of establishing a pattern of government and of living in Palestine on which a peaceful existence can be based?

During all of my fifty-five years in this country I have believed in the possibility of the peaceful co-existence of Jews and Arabs in Palestine and of a mutual understanding between them. I have not lost this faith even now. Conditions have indeed greatly worsened in the last years. Many opportunities for rapprochement and a cordial *entente* have been lost, the fault

being mainly that of both parties concerned. Nevertheless, there is still hope.

Right are those who hold that there is no racial animosity between the two peoples of our country; and where there is no enmity there is the possibility of living together in peace. The collisions that take place at times between Jews and Arabs in the course of land quarrels prove nothing whatsoever. Such conflicts, though sometimes going as far as bloodshed, are frequent among Arabs themselves. In rare cases there have even been stormy land quarrels between Jews—but these did not reach bloodshed. "For a slice of bread will man sin"; and bread has its origin in the soil.

The disturbances that have broken out in our country at various times did not originate in racial hatred. It was evil-intentioned incitement, coming from outside, that caused them; and these disturbances increased in direct proportion to the "interest" in our country of a variety of fascists. And indeed, right in the midst of the disturbances Arab women used to come to the Jewish settlements, bringing their children with them to seek medical aid from Jewish physicians. Was ever trust a consequence of hatred? And I know of scores and scores of cases of friendly relations and mutual confidence between Jews and Arabs, fellaheen and effendis alike. Nor are there any psychological factors that would prevent those individual instances from becoming the general case.

Nor is there such economic competition between the two peoples as is likely to create bad relations. On the contrary, there always were and there exist today, too, relations of mutual economic aid between Jews and Arabs. Any Arab will admit that Jewish colonization has not exploited the

ONE OF the oldest living Jewish colonists in Palestine, land expert, farmer, novelist, journalist, political leader, Jewish Legionnaire, patriarch—these roles fall far short of an exhaustive definition of MOSCHE SMELANSKY's activities and position. To understand the universal respect he enjoys, his personality too must be taken into account. Born in the province of Kiev, Russia, in 1874, he went to Palestine at sixteen and worked there as a farm laborer. But soon he acquired vineyards and orange groves at Rehovot, where he still lives in the great colony which he helped build. In a short time he also became, and has remained, one of the foremost Zionist leaders of our time, organizing, speaking, writing, exhorting, studying, advising. He holds office in the Jewish farmers' organization of Palestine and has made himself a leading authority on the land question. At the same time he manages his plantation and contributes regularly to the monthly *Baayot*, published by Dr. Magnes' *Ihud* (Unity) group, of which Mr. Smelansky himself is an adherent. He began to write in 1898 and has published novels and many stories on the life of Palestinian Jews and Arabs. His latest novel, however, published in 1944, is entitled *The Fields of the Ukraine*. Some notion of the esteem in which Mr. Smelansky is held can be gained from the fact that in 1934 a colony was founded in his honor at Benyamina, Kefar Mosheh, to celebrate his sixtieth birthday.

Arabs to their own detriment; nay, it improved and strengthened their economic condition. Effendi, fellah and laborer alike have benefited from Jewish colonization. The effendi sold his land to Jews at exaggerated prices that only an unfortunate, wandering people, hungering for land and a home country, could think of paying. The prices Jews paid for land in Palestine were five times higher than the market prices based on the revenue from it—and that was before the depreciation of our currency.

The fellah sells his produce to Jews in towns and settlements at a price three times higher than that he used to get in the markets of the Arab towns. And it was only with the increase of Jewish settlement that the fellaheen began to increase their own areas of vegetable cultivation. And the Arab laborer has succeeded in getting wages four times larger than those he received on the properties of effendis or wealthy fellaheen, and his daily hours of work have decreased from twelve to eight.

THE Arabs have, moreover, learned much from the Jewish settlers in the way of improving their agriculture. They have learned how to handle trees properly; they have learned the techniques of manuring and crop-rotation. Admittedly, they understood citriculture before the arrival of the Jews; nevertheless, the latter are responsible for great improvement and great achievements in this field. The Jews have considerably improved well-drilling in Palestine, thereby making available large quantities of underground water, and they have improved the country's irrigation methods remarkably. The Arabs witnessed those innovations and did likewise. For they are intelligent and capable pupils.

The Jews also derived no little benefit from the Arabs. The principles of dry-farming were learned from them, the Arab plough doing remarkable work in this respect. The fundamentals of the packing of citrus fruit were learned from them, and improved on later. In the course of World War II, if not for Arab labor, most of our

citrus groves would have gone to ruin. And the Arab-Jewish organization of citrus-growers, now in its fifth year of existence, has already been of great benefit to the whole of the Palestinian citrus industry. This organization and the cooperative delegation of Jewish and Arab growers that visited British, Swedish and Continental markets at the end of 1945 are living proof that Jews and Arabs are capable of economic cooperation. Additional evidence is furnished by other instances of Arab-Jewish business partnership.

Industry in Palestine is a Jewish creation. It has attained an annual production of 36,000,000 pounds, thereby increasing exports—without which no country can exist economically—from 5,117,769 pounds in 1939 to 14,638,463 pounds in 1944—and this has been done in spite of a frightful drop in citrus exports, which fell from 4,355,853 pounds in 1938-39 to an almost negligible quantity in 1943-44.

But our industry has derived no small benefit from our Arab customers in Palestine, and more particularly from customers in the neighboring Arab countries. The Arabs are now beginning to learn about Jewish industry and to copy it. Factories in the neighboring Arab countries are also learning a good deal from Jewish industrial men in Palestine.

There is, as I have said, no economic competition between the two peoples in Palestine—only mutual aid. This fact is a source of encouragement for the future. We are tying up our future economic development in Palestine with large-scale hydraulic projects for irrigation. These cannot materialize unless Arabs and Jews cooperate, for the main sources of our water lie in areas belonging to the Lebanon, and the irrigation canals will have to go through Arab regions. This mighty irrigation project can be achieved only on the base of a Jewish-Arab economic understanding. Jews will supply the financial means and the technical skill and Arabs will provide water and land. The resulting blessings will be shared by all.

THE question arises: If neither hatred nor economic competition is involved, what is it that separates Jews and Arabs, estranges them more and more, and turns them into opposing camps? It is *fear*—and that “awl will not be hidden in the sack.” And the consequences of *fear* are no less dangerous than those of hatred or economic competition. It is not for nothing that the Atlantic Charter was intended to save humanity from fear.

In the hearts of us Jews there has always been a fear that some day this country would be turned into an *Arab state* and that the Arabs would rule over us. This fear has at times reached the proportions of terror. For we have not come to Palestine to exchange one servitude for another. Ahad Ha'am, who as far back as fifty-five years ago insisted on relations of mutual understanding and agreement between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, and warned us of the dangers lurking in the future unless an understanding with the Arabs was arrived at—even he used to say that an Arab state in Palestine meant enslavement for us.

Now this same feeling of fear has started up in the hearts of Arabs with the development of our Yishuv—fear lest the Jews acquire the ascendancy and rule over them. This fear has constituted the main ground for incitement against us since the days of the Balfour Declaration: “The Jews are upon you, Arabs, and the British are with them!” The spokesmen of the Zionist movement have at every opportunity denied any intention of acquiring rule over Palestine. They have maintained that Zionism does not aspire to political rule, but aims merely at unlimited possibilities for economic and cultural development. But agitators told the Arabs that the Zionists were hiding the truth. Then the mistake committed by Zionist leaders in a hapless hour at the Biltmore Hotel perjured the promises of Zionism and confirmed Arab misgivings.

Their fear has since turned into panic, which is always a bad counsel. And matters have reached such a state that the Arab

heart, which is not bad naturally, has hardened to the point of showing a cruel attitude to the fugitives of Israel escaping from the sword and knocking on the gates of Palestine, their last refuge from death and perdition. And the Arabs forget their own Law, which requires them to open their doors to fugitives from death, and do not even dread the curse that falls upon him who locks his door in the face of those who seek shelter.

Has the possibility for a covenant of peace between Jews and Arabs been lost? No! I am deeply convinced that there is a way out. However, that way is not the one ideally most desirable. For it is not by mutual agreement of the parties concerned, but by pressure exerted from the outside, through authority imposed from above. And such an agreement will be lasting only under two conditions: if it is *just* and if the determination is *steely* in the hearts of those who have the power to execute it and also if it is executed without wavering or shrinking, regardless of opposition in the early stages. Then in spite of revolts, which will unquestionably break out in the beginning at the instigation of fanatics in both camps, peace will gradually and progressively come to reign in Palestine. For the two peoples are longing for a life of peace and work and hate bloody adventures.

Now, what would such a just agreement be?

First: mass Jewish immigration in accordance with the country's capacity for economic absorption. Every limitation of immigration on political grounds is an evil deed—an act of wickedness toward the Jewish people of the Diaspora, who see in Palestine their last hope for personal and national existence; an act of wickedness against us, the Jewry of Palestine, for it relegates us to the position of a permanent minority, to which we will never consent; an act of wickedness also with respect to Palestine as a whole, which, without a large Jewish immigration, cannot be restored and cannot emerge from its centuries-old desolation.

Second: the abrogation of any limitation placed on the Jewish acquisition of land in any part of the country. In order, however, to safeguard the vital interests of the fellah and the land-tenant, a law should be passed like that in existence in Egypt, according to which the fellah is not allowed to sell his last five acres. As for the tenant, he should not be deprived of the right to retain in lease at least five of the acres he had been holding. This should apply to regions susceptible of irrigation and rational farming. In dry regions not susceptible of irrigation, the acreage in question should be enlarged in proportion to the fertility of the soil.

Third: to eradicate the fear that one of the peoples of Palestine may acquire political supremacy over the other, it is absolutely indispensable to base the agreement on an obligation by the United Nations Organization never to permit the establishment in Palestine of an independent state, whether Jewish or Arab.

This last condition is not only the *sine qua non* for peace in Palestine, but it is also indispensable to the country's future economic and cultural development. Every small state is pregnant with more possibilities for misfortune than for blessings. The political independence of a small people is in every case a "favor" that ends as a *transgression*. Political independence received as a gift is no more than a self-delusion. And there is no greater misfortune for a nation than self-delusion: a misfortune for the small nation involved and a misfortune for the whole world. The "armies" of small peoples and their political wiles contain that which will be the ruination of these nations' own material means and moral forces, and they constitute a permanent rock of dissension and a storehouse of explosives.

IS THE absorptive capacity of Palestine such as to allow for further large-scale immigration?

According to my innermost conviction, the answer is absolutely in the affirmative. Speaking for myself, I do not close my eyes to the possibility of a temporary economic

crisis in Palestine in the near future. The transition from war to peace in industry, the absolutely moneyless character of our present immigration, the Arab boycott of Jewish products, and the present state of restlessness and uncertainty in the country—all these are capable of bringing about a temporary economic crisis. Yet there is an assured possibility, not only of averting such a crisis, but even of opening up a new period of prosperity and of vast economic vistas by the use of large financial means and technical and economic skill, all supported by a Jewish-Arab agreement.

If the Jaffa-Ramleh area, for instance, which comprises 1,260 square kilometers, gave in the 1938 census a total of 402,095 souls, of whom 174,000, both Jewish and Arab, were living on the land, it seems perfectly reasonable to assume that the Gaza District, comprising 1,110 square kilometers, could also support an equivalent or nearly equivalent population instead of the present total of 105,596 souls, of whom 66,000 live on the land. Since 1938 no official census has been taken in Palestine. Were one to be made now, the difference between the two areas would be even more pronounced—with the Jaffa-Ramleh area showing to advantage. It should be borne in mind that the soil of the Gaza area is not inferior to that of Jaffa-Ramleh; that its concealed stores of water are in most parts not small; that the Gaza harbor is no worse than that of Jaffa; and that the climate in the Gaza area is better than Jaffa-Ramleh's. Furthermore, in the Gaza area vegetables and fruits ripen earlier. The superiority of the Jaffa-Ramleh area is the result of Jewish immigration, which concentrated on it and brought it its blessings.

From this example let us pass on to examine the absorptive capacity of the country as a whole. Roughly, we divide the country into four regions: the Negev, the Mountains, the Coastal Plain and the Interior Valleys.

The Negev contains 12,577 square kilometers supporting 51,505 souls. There are admittedly only about 3,500 square kilo-

meters of good land here. However, this land could be readily converted by irrigation and rational farming into a terrestrial paradise. We have learned from experience that under rational farming the farm-unit may be limited to five acres. Yet even if we raise the limit for the Negev to ten acres under irrigation, we find it has room for 70,000 settlers—that is for 350,000 souls in all. In other words, the Negev can support an additional 300,000 souls living on the land alone.

The Mountain Region spreads for 9,623 square kilometers. In our ancient past, while we were all still living on our own soil, it was the area of densest population in Palestine, and olive groves and vineyards used to thrive there. In the course of the many centuries since then, the mountains have been devastated by erosion, for the terraces our ancestors had built went to ruin and the trees they had planted were hewn down, and the rainwater was carried off the fertile surface-soil into the valleys and the sea. Yet some 4,000 square kilometers of the Mountain Region still constitute fertile soil, while some 3,000 additional square kilometers can be improved by terracing and clearing of stones. Here also the population is relatively quite thin, with only some fifty "agricultural" souls per square kilometer. Undoubtedly, it would be possible to increase this population by another 300,000 souls on the land.

The two remaining regions, the Coastal Plain and the Interior Valleys, which together comprise 4,480 square kilometers, constitute the best soil of the country. They are rich in water, and they are also the most thickly inhabited areas, averaging some ninety souls per square kilometer on the land. However, from the above comparison between the two coastal areas of Gaza and Jaffa-Ramleh we can see that not all parts of these regions are equally populated, and that they still have ample room for more people. There are in these regions big areas still covered with swamps, such as the Huleh, the drainage of which would result in the addition of very fertile

soil for agricultural use. The Valley of Beissan, the Jordan Valley, the Huleh Valley and portions of the Esdraelon Valley are still only partially inhabited. We shall therefore be far from any exaggeration if we arrive at the conclusion that here, in these two regions as well, room is available for an additional agricultural population of 300,000 souls. And the farming unit in these regions can in most cases be as small as five acres.

Thus the soil of Palestine is capable of "embracing," of supporting some additional 900,000 souls on the land. This would mean doubling the present Jewish-Arab agricultural population now numbering some 900,000 souls.

THERE are those who raise the question of the size of the farm-unit, which we have set at from five to ten acres. They ask: assuming that the farm-unit would satisfy the needs of the settler and his family, what would his children do when their turn comes to set up house for themselves? I believe that if a Jewish-Arab Palestine should exist in peace, harmony and due cooperation, it would be possible in the future to expand its limits by an understanding with the adjacent countries.

To the south of Palestine stretches the Desert of Wad-el-Arish, which was once offered to Jewish immigration, and which, like the smaller Negev, can be reclaimed. To the east, beyond the inhabited Transjordan, spreads the Syrian Desert. Now the inhabitants of the Transjordan are too poor and too few to reclaim these barren wastes by their own efforts; consequently, some of the settlers' sons would be able to settle there and some of them would, as usual, go into industry. For an additional agricultural population of 900,000 souls would unquestionably be capable of affording a basis for two souls in industry or commerce for each on the farm.

Furthermore, there exist in Palestine additional occupations that are capable of maintaining at present tens of thousands of souls—and in the future, hundreds of thousands.

The tourist trade was an important source of revenue for our country and is destined to increase greatly in importance. He who knows our wonderful winter will not doubt the possibility of developing seaside resorts here on the model of the Italian and French Rivas. The sea too is indeed destined to yield ample sustenance to those who live on its shores. And when the mountains of Palestine are afforested, they will in the summer attract people residing in nearby countries with inescapably hot summers.

It is of course understood that because of the iron laws of economics, not to be violated with impunity, Jewish immigration cannot flow into Palestine like a flood. Any unplanned, unorganized, flighty immigration ends in flight the other way. However, we can estimate with almost absolute certainty, on the basis of our experience during the immigration period of 1932-37, that if we take into consideration the development our industry has since attained as well as the available plans for irrigation, construction and agricultural training, the country will be able to absorb annually some 100,000 new immigrants.

BUT what is the political form most desirable for Palestine?

Just as a "Jewish state" and an "Arab state" are unsuited to Palestine, so are, according to my deepest conviction, a "Palestinian state" and a "bi-national state." For a small state is valueless, precisely because it is *small*, because it is an artificial creation with no right to existence. Every people, even the very smallest, is justified in demanding cultural and economic independence, but not political independence. A politically small country must be incorporated in the political structure of some big country and become a link in a chain.

Fate has tied our country to Great Britain and its commonwealth of peoples, and it would be most unwise to detach it. The government of Palestine has committed many a grave error. The gravest, which borders on a crime, is the White Paper. The White Paper was a crime because it tended to dis-

criminate between two neighboring peoples; and because it propitiated terrorist bands in Palestine, thereby creating the impression among fanatics, Arab and Jewish alike, that the end in view justifies violence and the shedding of innocent blood, and that the government is open to "persuasion" by acts of terrorism.

Yet, as we learn from history, Great Britain has always known how to learn from her own mistakes. She will undoubtedly also learn now. It should not be forgotten that under the British Mandate our country also enjoyed good, bright periods, of which we failed to take full advantage. The period under Lords Herbert Samuel and Plumer and particularly under Sir Arthur Wauchope, up to the days of the propitiation of the Arabs (wherein he fell into error), were days of "more light than shadow." For in the final account, in the era of the British Mandate we Jews grew from a population of 50,000 to one of 600,000; our landed property increased fourfold, and we managed to develop a good-sized industry. And our growth was not always impeded by governmental indifference, but sometimes also by our own.

The British government has indeed committed very serious errors in Palestine, but there is no guarantee that any other rule, let it be what it may, will not err, too, until it has *learned*.

The country should remain under a British mandate during the period of transition—but under the strict supervision of the United Nations Organization. The ultimate goal should be dominion status, a Palestinian member of the British commonwealth of peoples. The renewed British Mandate should be based clearly and explicitly on the principle of Jewish immigration in proportion to the economic absorptive capacity of the country; on the abrogation of the prohibition of land-acquisition by Jews; on the "five-acre principle," as previously explained; and on the gradual preparation of the country for the status of a British dominion. This preparation should find its expression in the near future as follows:

1. The full, all-embracing educational autonomy of the two communities should be established with the Treasury covering all budgetary expenditures involved in public education, said expenditures to be covered by taxation.

2. Legal and financial aid should be granted to commercial or industrial Jewish-Arab organizations—in particular to cooperative enterprises.

3. Complete autonomy should be granted to municipalities and village councils.

4. There should be encouraged an equal, steadily progressive participation of Jews and Arabs in the administration of the country in all ranks from district governor

to the higher offices of the central government. Except that the posts of High Commissioner, Chief Secretary and Chief Justice should always be filled by British officers until the granting of dominion status, with all other administrative posts to be equally divided among British, Jews and Arabs.

5. A "Legislative Council" composed in equal parts of elected representatives of the two peoples, Jews and Arabs, with a British chairman, should be constituted to pass on the laws of the country and to prepare the political foundations for dominion status.

I feel confident that such a political form for Palestine will ensure its peace, progress and development for generations to come.

(In its continuing presentation of diverse views on the Palestine question, COMMENTARY will print in future issues the following articles: "No Hope Except Exodus," by Shlomo Katz; "The Arab Mind Today," by S. D. Goitein; "My Kvutzah Revisited," by Meyer Levin, and "Build on Palestine Realities," by Ahad Ha'am.)

THE PEOPLE VS. DISCRIMINATION

The FEPC Fight Initiates a New Epoch

FELIX S. COHEN

THE American people are today aroused as never before to the dangers—and the dollars-and-cents-cost—of racial and religious prejudice. The recent successful filibuster by a handful of bitter-enders in the Senate against the bill to establish a permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission did not alter this basic fact. If the bill had come to a vote, it would have passed by a large majority—such is the prevailing national sentiment. If anything, the temporary defeat only served to increase both the number and the determination of those who now seek once more to put it on the statute books of the Federal Government.

The once popular philosophy that racial and religious prejudice—and their concomitant evil, discrimination in employment—would automatically disappear through the gradual effects of education in democ-

IN THE past thirteen years, FELIX S. COHEN has served on the legal staff of the Department of the Interior, and is today chairman of its Board of Appeals. Through private research, he has built up a veritable arsenal of facts on the effects and costs of prejudice generally. As this article indicates, the fight for a permanent FEPC is by no means over—and arguments such as this will undoubtedly help put it on the statute books. His experience in taking sides on vital issues dates back to undergraduate days in the College of the City of New York in the mid-1920's, when as editor of the *Campus* he led a student revolt against compulsory military training and faculty censorship of student publications. From there, he went on to Harvard University, Columbia Law School and the private practice of law. He is the author of a treatise on legal philosophy, *Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals*, a treatise on Federal Indian Law, and of numerous articles which have appeared in such publications as the *Journal of Philosophy*, the *Columbia Law Review* and *Ethics*.

racy and brotherhood no longer commands the support it had two or three decades ago. Now individuals and organizations who formerly held such views, as well as new, recent allies, look to some form of governmental intervention. The crystallization of feeling in favor of Federal legislation is an important manifestation of that conviction.

The attack on discrimination thus reaches a new stage. Its strength no longer comes only from professional advocates of good will and from the victims of prejudice themselves; today it has the support of all branches of the American public, including the business and industrial world. For our businessmen are at last beginning to realize how high a price we pay for the luxury of racial and religious prejudice.

The businessman's point of view on this question was succinctly put by the president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, Eric Johnston:

The withholding of jobs and business opportunities from some people does not make more jobs and business opportunities for others. Such a policy merely tends to drag down the whole economic level. You can't sell an electric refrigerator to a family that can't afford electricity. Perpetuating poverty for some merely guarantees stagnation for all. True economic progress demands that the whole nation move forward at the same time. It demands that all artificial barriers erected by ignorance and intolerance be removed. To put it in the simplest terms, we are all in business together. Intolerance is a species of boycott and any business or job boycott is a cancer in the economic body of the nation. I repeat, intolerance is destructive; prejudice produces no wealth; discrimination is a fool's economy.

In the South, many intelligent citizens are coming to the conclusion that prejudice is the greatest burden of the Southern busi-

nessman, cutting down not only the size of his markets but the efficiency of his production as well. Every Southern employer carries on his neck an "old man of the sea" who tells him, when he wants to take on an employee or shift a man from one job to another: "You may not pick the man who is best qualified for a particular job if his skin is of the wrong color. You may not put a good white man in this job if the job is traditionally a colored man's job, and, at the same time, you cannot put a colored man in a white man's job even if he is twice as efficient and three times as productive as his white competitor for the position."

Every Southerner whose eyes are not fastened on the past knows that a new South is arising today, a South of industry and commerce, a South that will once again be a dominant factor in the prosperity of the country and the trade of the world. This new South is throwing off its shackles. It will not accept discriminatory freight rates or any other type of economic discrimination and it cannot allow prejudice or discrimination to stand between its machines, its docks, its ships, its water power, mineral and forest resources, and the men and women who have the capacity to produce goods and services that the nation needs. The South cannot forever support a situation under which it rears 33 per cent of the children of the nation on an income that is only 8 per cent of the national income, pays for their education out of taxes on the poor, and then sees many of the most ambitious and talented of its children move to other sections of the country to find economic opportunities denied them at home.

The problem, of course, is not entirely a Southern problem. Discrimination against Negroes in the North, against Spanish-Americans and Indians in the Southwest, against Orientals on the Pacific Coast, against Jews, Catholics and foreign-born throughout the land, is morally as vicious as the worst anti-Negro discrimination of the South. These other forms of discrimination are of less economic importance only

because outside of the South the proportion of the population against which large scale economic discrimination is practiced seldom reaches anything like the proportions that are found in the Southern states. And it is for this reason that the emergence of a clearer vision of the economic burdens of race prejudice among Southern leaders—not all of whom are in Congress—is a cause for particular satisfaction.

Costs to Consumers and Taxpayers

DISCRIMINATION is bad business not only for businessmen in the South or elsewhere, but also for consumers and taxpayers everywhere.

When the Supreme Court decided a few years ago that exclusion of colored law students from a state law school was unconstitutional unless equal separate facilities were provided, and the State of Missouri forthwith established a separate law school for half-a-dozen Negro students, the cost of race prejudice fell upon the whole State of Missouri.

When the Southern Railroad puts on an extra Pullman to carry a single Negro passenger so that white passengers will not have to share a railroad car with a member of the Negro race, the cost of that extra car falls ultimately on the entire public this railroad serves.

When defense industries in the South, operating on a cost-plus basis, set up separate machines and separate assembly lines for colored and white workers, the Government paid double for the capital outlay involved.

When a considerable portion of the population of any state is excluded from higher salaried jobs or denied the educational opportunities that fit it for such jobs, the standard of living of the entire state sinks accordingly. The states with the lowest per capita income in the United States (less than \$300 in the boom year of 1940) are the states in which large segments of the population are subjected to the most serious discrimination in employment, the states whose representatives in Congress are least often on the side of racial and religious

tolerance—such states as Mississippi, Arkansas, Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, Tennessee and the Carolinas. In part, this is a reflection of the low incomes of the victims of discrimination—Negro income is at least four billion dollars less each year than the income of a like number of whites—but the greater part of this difference reflects the closing of opportunities to the dominant whites when prejudice rules production and distribution.

No state is wholly free of prejudice, but we can identify the states which have exhibited the greatest measure of tolerance towards racial and religious minorities by the extent to which they attract migrants of diversified races and faiths from other states and other nations, and by the record of their legislatures and their representatives in Congress in the cause of equal opportunity for all. These states are Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Illinois, Utah and Washington. These states have the highest per capita income in the nation, averaging in 1940 more than \$800. If that level were reached throughout the nation, the national income, year in and year out, would be increased by more than thirty billion dollars a year.

Whether one accepts that figure as the current cost that we pay for the luxury of intolerance, or whether one accepts the more conservative figure of fifteen billion dollars a year fixed by a University of Chicago economist, the tangible costs of intolerance clearly represent the difference between an American standard of living that provides the necessities of life and a standard that menaces our national well-being.

Some of our own draft officials were shocked to learn that mental and educational deficiencies serious enough to bar Army service were approximately six times as numerous in the low-tolerance states as in the high-tolerance states. Statistics on malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, unemployment and crime follow a similar pattern. The social costs of these by-products of prejudice are far in excess of the more direct economic costs. And these social costs are

not limited to the areas in which race prejudice rides rampant. The poison engendered in these areas runs through the body of the nation. The problem has ceased to be one that could be solved solely by state legislation or local campaigns of enlightenment.

The Wartime Gains

THE war, of course, has strengthened and accelerated recognition of the nation's responsibility in the matter of job discrimination. But this is a logical result of the development of the national conscience since 1929 in the direction of recognizing that government has an economic responsibility to the people. The significant thing about President Roosevelt's "four freedoms" was the idea that government could be asked to assure "freedom from want" in the same way that it is asked to assure "freedom of religion" and "freedom of expression." The thought was not new; the President's words took hold because they expressed what was already a part of the national conscience. And that conscience today cannot be reconciled to racial or religious discrimination in Federal employment or in employment in public works of any kind.

There are, of course, realms of employment in which personal relations arise that should not be submitted to governmental scrutiny, and there may be honest differences of opinion as to how broadly such realms should be defined. But there can be little room for argument against Federal protection of racial and religious minorities in employment relationships which are already subject to Federal regulation as to hours, wages, unemployment insurance and labor representation. Indeed, to exclude any such area of labor relations from the scope of anti-discrimination legislation is to invite a situation in which an employer willing to hire on a non-discriminatory basis is forced by Federal laws and regulations to bargain collectively with a union that insists upon a discriminatory employment policy. Even men and women who hold to the abstract proposition that government should stay

out of the field of prejudice and discrimination are coming to realize that once government becomes a large scale employer and a director of other people's employment policies it can no longer avoid the problem of discrimination.

If the economic boycotting of any racial or religious minority has reached criminal proportions in the public conscience, federal legislation is inevitable. In some quarters proposals have been advanced which deal with this problem in non-economic terms, in terms of punishing racist propaganda. Generally speaking, these side attacks have gotten nowhere and hold no promise of winning mass support. One reason for this is the tradition of liberty of expression which is esteemed by liberals and conservatives alike. Another is the fact that some of the worst racist propaganda in the country today comes from a handful of members of Congress. As long as they are in a position to preach racial and religious hatred from a national pulpit, the value of suppressing lesser preachers must remain doubtful.

The Vulnerable Sector

THE crystallization of feeling that is taking place today among the friends of tolerance is along the lines that prejudice can best be fought at the point where it takes the tangible dollars-and-cents form of the job boycott. At this point the sentiments of old-fashioned democrats are best enlisted on behalf of legislation protecting individual rights, for as the Supreme Court said in the case of *Truax v. Raich*, some thirty years ago, when employment discrimination against aliens by state law was declared unconstitutional: "The right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the essence of that personal freedom and opportunity which it was the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to secure." And as the same court said in *New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.*: "Race discrimination by an employer may reasonably be deemed more unfair and less excusable than discrimination against workers on the ground of union affiliation."

It is because such arguments are supported in conservative as well as in liberal circles that the outlawing of racial and religious job discrimination holds promise of greater success than other endeavors in the field of legislation for equality. Only by these signs can one explain the tremendous and unexpected turnout of religious, labor, business and civic organizations in support of the Ives-Quinn Act in New York and the Chavez-Norton Bill in Congress. And only so can one explain the steady popular support—nonwithstanding the oratorical antics of a few unreconstructed rebels—for the advances that have since 1933 marked the position of the Federal Government on the issue of discrimination.

It was former Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes in 1933 who first raised the issue in its clearest terms. If the Federal Government was to spend vast sums on public works, he declared, it was essential that contractors not discriminate against any part of the American public that was paying the bill. Moreover, if public works, such as schools, hospitals and public housing were to be based upon the criterion of need, those groups which had the worst school and hospital facilities and the worst housing were entitled to prior consideration in the national construction plan.

Secretary Ickes was supported* by President Roosevelt. Public works contracts included non-discrimination clauses, and Negroes, Spanish-Americans, Indians and other depressed groups were admitted to jobs that had traditionally been closed to them. One third of all low-rent housing built with Federal funds went to Negroes. The building of new schools for colored boys and girls helped to bring about an increase in Negro enrollment during the past decade and a half that is three times as great as the comparable increase in white school enrollment. During the same period the proportion of Negro children in high schools was doubled. The proportion of Negroes in the Federal civil service rose to 12½ per cent. Health, education and employment opportunities on Indian reserva-

tions, in Puerto Rico, and in other areas blighted by old discriminations reached new high levels.

The policy of insisting on non-discriminatory employment under Federal contracts was extended to defense contracts in 1941, when President Roosevelt set up a Fair Employment Practice Committee with authority over employment practices of Federal agencies and war industry. Without statutory powers and without the ability to rely on judicial enforcement of its orders, this Committee did not succeed in cracking the anti-Negro boycott of the railway labor unions, but it did achieve moderate success in many other fields of labor. It helped to open up more than one-and-a-half million jobs to workers once excluded from these jobs on grounds of race or creed. Our war-time tolerance in no small measure helped achieve the miracle of our war production.

Legislation for Equality

THE job of the President's war-time FEPC draws to a close, with the present appropriation running out in June. The question still remains whether Congress will establish a national policy and a Federal agency to preserve and continue our recent gains. The Chavez-Norton Fair Employment Practice Bill, temporarily tabled in the Senate, is expected to be brought out of committee to the floor of the House for a vote this month or next, with excellent prospects of passage. The supporters of the bill hope to see it up for another vote in the Senate by late spring. The bill is a simple measure that strikes at discrimination in its most basic and tangible form. It forbids racial and religious job discrimination in (a) Federal employment, (b) employment under Government contracts, and (c) employment in activities affecting interstate or foreign commerce which are already subject to Federal control in respect to labor relations. It applies equally to employers and to labor unions, forbidding racial and religious discrimination by unions against members, employees or employers.

The bill does not attempt to interfere with

non-commercial enterprises or even with commercial enterprises which are engaged solely in intrastate commerce, and it touches enterprises engaged in foreign and interstate commerce only if they are of a substantial size employing six or more employees. (Some friends of the legislation have urged that the exemption level be raised to twenty-five or fifty in order to economize in enforcement and avoid interference with family-type businesses.) A board of five members to be appointed by the President, with Senate ratification, and to be known as the Fair Employment Practice Commission would administer the act. This Commission would be empowered to make investigations, hold hearings, and issue "cease and desist orders" against violators. The Federal courts would be empowered, after appropriate judicial hearings, to enforce "cease and desist" orders found to have been properly issued by the Commission.

The bill incorporates the lesson which all students of social legislation have found in the experience of recent decades: that it is of little use to enact laws prohibiting undesirable economic practices unless adequate enforcement machinery is set up. The establishment of a special administrative agency to carry out the purposes of the Fair Employment Practice Act, with court review to assure that the agency does not exceed its proper scope, is in line with techniques which have been developed and perfected in the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Communications Commission.

As reported by the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, the Fair Employment Practice Bill is a concise document which defines and implements "the right to work and to seek work without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry." It does not give vast powers of unknown scope to an administrative board, nor does it attempt, as many reform bills do, to spell out in a mass of detail the

proper answers to a host of hypothetical problems that may arise in the administration of the legislation. Instead, the bill proposes that rules and regulations shall be issued from time to time by the Commission and subjected to Congressional review. Such rules would be effective sixty days after transmission to Congress unless Congress has meanwhile amended or nullified the rules. In this way Congress is assured that the Commission set up under the Fair Employment Practice legislation will not go haywire, but will operate as an agency responsible to public opinion as that opinion is reflected in Congress.

A few critics have objected to this feature of the legislation on the ground that Congress is not to be trusted. But the backers of the legislation take the sensible position that if Congress is not in sympathy with the purposes of the bill it will not pass it, and that if it is in sympathy it can be trusted to give proper backing to the administrative agency it sets up, where backing is needed. At any rate, recent history has indicated that no administrative agency which does not have the support of Congress can hope to do an effective job, and Congress is certainly more likely to support an agency that presents its plans of campaign in advance for Congressional approval.

Implemental Legislation

ANOTHER significant feature of the proposed legislation is its attempt, apparently the first in history, to implement the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that declares: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Attempts have been made in the courts to protect individuals against discrimination under state laws on the ground that freedom from discrimination was a privilege or immunity of Federal citizenship. Generally—the case of the *CIO v. Hague* being a notable exception—the courts have rejected the argument; but in rejecting it they have called attention to the fact that Congress has never specifically legislated to

declare non-discrimination a privilege or immunity of citizenship. The pending bill would do that, and would thus bring the protection of the Federal Constitution to bear against any efforts that might be made in states unfriendly to the purposes of the legislation to interfere with its effective administration.

Testimony to the care with which the provisions of the Chavez Bill (S. 101) were worked out is found in the fact that bills introduced in various state legislatures during the last few years, including the Ives-Quinn Bill enacted in New York, have followed it with only minor alterations.

At the hearings before the Chavez Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor some sixty million American citizens were represented. In all that array of witnesses there was not one who opposed the enactment of the bill. At the House hearings too, the opposition failed to appear. Representatives of all the religious faiths of America have been unanimous in urging enactment of the bill. Other organizations testifying in support of the measure included the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American Federation of Labor, the Consumers League of America, the National Bar Association and the National Farmers Union.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the Senate hearings was that those who testified did not confine their expressions to vague generalities. They did not come before the Committee to denounce sin or prejudice in general terms or to advocate general enlightenment, as many of them might have done years ago. They came to support legislation with full enforcement powers and to speak out emphatically against any substitute measure. Eventually this bill must pass.

Its enactment would perhaps be the most important event since the Civil War in our long national striving towards the Jeffersonian vision of a government based on the equality of human rights, as well as towards the more ancient vision of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man.

ON BEING OF THE B'NAI B'RITH

An Address to the Society in Vienna

SIGMUND FREUD

RIGHT HONORABLE *Grand President, honorable Presidents, dear Brothers:*

Thank you for the honor you have done me today. You know why I cannot answer in my own voice. You have heard one of my friends and followers speak of my scientific work—but the verdict on these things is difficult to pronounce and perhaps will not be pronounced with any certainty for a long time to come. Permit me to add something to the remarks of the other speaker, who is also my friend as well as my solicitous physician. I would like to tell you briefly how I became one of the B'nai B'rith, and what I sought among you.

In the years following 1895 two strong impressions were made upon me that combined to leave the same effect. On the one hand, I had won my first insight into the depths of the instinctive life of human beings, had seen much that was sobering and even frightening. On the other hand, the communication of my unpleasant discoveries resulted in the loss of what were then the greatest part of my personal rela-

This address was written by FREUD on the occasion of the celebration of his seventieth birthday by the B'nai B'rith Society of Vienna, on May 6, 1926. It was to be given by him in response to the official speech by Professor Ludwig Braun, one of his disciples. However, illness made it impossible for him to be present and it was read for him. This is the first time the address appears in English. By 1926 Freud's theories had won enough acknowledgment if not acceptance to make his fame worldwide. He was no longer the prophet crying in the wilderness. Coming at this point in his career, his expression of obligation to his fellow-Jews of the B'nai B'rith Society has particular interest. (The address is printed by permission of Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., London, the owners of the copyright.)

tionships. It seemed to me that I was like a man outlawed, shunned by everyone. In my isolation the longing arose in me for a circle of chosen, high-minded men who, regardless of the audacity of what I had done, would receive me with friendliness. Your society was pointed out to me as the place where such men were to be found.

That you were Jews only suited me the more, for I myself was a Jew, and it always seemed to me to be not only shameful but downright senseless to deny it. That which bound me to Judaism—I am obliged to admit it—was not my faith, nor was it national pride; for I was always an unbeliever, raised without religion, although not without respect for the so-called "ethical" demands of human civilization. And I always tried to suppress nationalistic ardor, whenever I felt any inclination thereto, as something pernicious and unjust, frightened as I was by the warning example of the peoples among whom we Jews live.

But there remained enough other things to make the attraction of Judaism and Jews irresistible—many dark emotional forces, all the more potent for being so hard to grasp in words, as well as the clear consciousness of an inner identity, the intimacy that comes from the same psychic structure (*die Heimlichkeit der gleichen seelischen Konstruktion*). And to that was soon added the insight that it was my Jewish nature alone that I had to thank for two characteristics that proved indispensable to me in my life's difficult course. Because I was a Jew I found myself free from many prejudices that hampered others in the use of their intellects; and as a Jew I was prepared to take my place on the side of the opposition and renounce being on good terms with the "compact majority."

And therefore I became one of you, took part in your humanitarian and national interests, made friends among you and persuaded the few friends remaining to me to join our society. There was no question whatsoever of convincing you of the truth of my theories, but at a time when no one in Europe listened to me and I had not a single follower even in Vienna you granted me your benevolent attention. You were my first audience.

For some two-thirds of the long period of time since my admission I came to you conscientiously, gaining recreation and stimulation from my intercourse with you. Today you were kind enough not to reproach me for having stayed away from you the

last third of this time. My work piled up over my head; the demands connected with it mounted; my day could not be prolonged enough to permit me to attend your sessions; my body soon after could no longer endure the delayed meal-time. And finally there came years of illness, the illness that today too prevents me from putting in an appearance among you.

I do not know whether I was a regular B'nai B'rith in your sense. I am almost ready to doubt it; too many special conditions came up in my case. But I can assure you that you meant much to me and did much for me during the years I belonged to you. And so accept my warmest thanks for the past, as well as for the present.

RUMANIA: EQUALITY WITH RESERVATIONS

"Political Necessity" Makes Strange Bedfellows

HAL LEHRMAN

BUCHAREST

MY INTERVIEW with Father Constantin Burducea, Minister of Religion, was very gratifying.

He looked most venerable, a proper shepherd of the varied Rumanian cults, in his orthodox black silk soutane buttoned up at the throat like a Russian blouse. His dignity was lightened at precisely the correct degree by careful smiles and a mouthful of good teeth.

He confirmed what the Grand Rabbi of Rumania had already told me: that Judaism enjoyed absolute equality with many other faiths. Father Burducea was proud his ministry was the first in the cabinet to begin implementing the Moscow agreement. A Congress of the Cults had been convened to draw up a law which would legitimize by decree freedom of religion existing in fact since Rumania turned against the Germans. "My government made racial discrimination and incitement of religious hatred punishable by three months to three years in prison. I have ordered the clergy to fight every sign of anti-Semitism. For new democratic Rumania, anti-Semitism means fascism."

I repeat, my interview was very gratifying

THIS is the first detailed first-hand report on Rumanian Jewry since the liberation of that country. HAL LEHRMAN has been abroad as a correspondent for more than a year—in Greece, Palestine, Syria, Turkey and, during the last six months, in Yugoslavia, Hungary and Rumania. During the war he directed OWI activities in Turkey and organized propaganda activity for the Balkans. He is regular correspondent for the *Daily Express* of London. His articles have appeared in the *Nation*, *PM*, *New York Herald Tribune*, *Vogue*, the *Canadian Toronto Star*, and the *British News Chronicle* and *New Statesman*. He was born in 1911, in New York, and graduated from Cornell in 1933.

—except that not so long ago Father Burducea, a priest in a Bucharest parish, was a member of the Iron Guard. . . .

In Rumanian context this is not as obscene as it sounds. After all, George Tatarescu who applauded the 1924 pogrom of Oradea Mare, sabotaged the Russian-Rumanian Alliance, engineered King Carol's dictatorship, is now Vice Premier of the Communist-dominated Groza government. Why shouldn't a priest who once hailed Guardists murdering Jews as the bulwark against bolshevism now be Minister of Religion?

Nevertheless, the quaint role being played by this clerical quick-change artist does justify reasonable doubt concerning the sincerity of the current brotherly-love act. It fits with Father Burducea's gentle admission that he gets about six dollars monthly as cabinet member plus allowance for expenses, by virtue of which he courteously returned me to my hotel in his chauffeur-driven Cadillac. It illuminates his recent decree reinstalling with full back pay many pro-fascist priests purged since the Russian occupation.

A Jew in the good old days couldn't walk past the Theological Seminary without risking a beating from "divinity" students. Students came from families which represented all Rumania—and still do. The present government, which certainly is not anti-Semitic in its ideology, has to take this mental climate into account if it wishes to continue in government. Father Burducea is a political necessity.

This unpublicized but ubiquitous slogan—political necessity—solves many Rumanian riddles. It explains why death sentences against twenty-six war criminals were commuted. (Colonel Modest Isopescu explained to the Peoples Tribunal, "I didn't kill 60,000

Jews in Transnistria. I only killed 16,000.") It explains why two Jews who helped buy 300 other Jews out of the ghetto to safety in Switzerland have been arrested as war criminals because they bribed the Gestapo. Political necessity prevented full recovery by Rumanian Jewry of property, jobs and damages. Political necessity inspired government invasion of internal Jewish affairs with the sum total result to date of setting Jew against Jew.

OF ALL countries under Nazi domination, Rumania was the kindest to her Jews. Northern Transylvania was decimated, but that was during the Hungarian regime. So were Bucovina and Bessarabia, but these territories had been briefly occupied by the Soviet, and Marshal Antonescu was helpless to resist German demands for cleaning up "Bolshevik infection." In the Old Kingdom—core of Rumania—the Marshal stood firm against extermination and the Germans humored their ally because they needed him. Moldavia and Wallachia were Jewish paradises, relatively speaking. This means that massacre was restrained and outrage limited while the rest of Europe was a crematory. Over 20,000 Jews even managed to get here from Poland and other death traps. Four billion lei levied on Jews netted only half a billion and no reprisals were taken. A Jewish leader, Doctor William Fildermann, was deported to Transnistria because he protested against the exorbitance of the tax, but he traveled first class and took all of his luggage complete with a crate of oranges, lived in a comfortable apartment with his wife, and was brought back after six weeks. Many Jews continued in their own businesses throughout the war. Today they are in far less distress than say in Hungary, my previous station in this inspection tour of Israel's misery.

Love for the Jews wasn't among the motives impelling such tolerance. One reason was the belief of Radu Lecca, Antonescu's Commissioner for Jewish Affairs, that "Jews made sizable sources of income." Another was the Rumanian conceit of want-

ing to spite the Germans. Killinger, Hitler's envoy, once called the play neatly when he rose at a Bucharest banquet in his honor and sneered, "You Rumanians want us to eliminate the Russians for you and then want the English to get rid of us." But the basic reason was that being nice to the Jews was a good insurance policy. It was part of an ancient Rumanian game of playing both ends against the middle in a country where—*Les fleurs n'ont pas d'odeur, les femmes n'ont pas de pudeur, les hommes n'ont pas d'honneur* (The flowers have no odor, the women have no modesty, the men no honor). The chairman of the University purge committee confessed to me for instance that nearly every time a professor was about to be condemned for fascism "the accused was able to produce a certificate that he once shielded a Jew."

It isn't news that Rumanians still dislike Jews. The feeling goes back to the Fanariot and Boyar era in old Rumania when the Jew, as everywhere else, was a convenient scapegoat for exploiters. Contemporary Rumania persists in being 65 per cent partially or totally illiterate, very poor soil for liberalism.

But it is news, startling and ominous, that mass anti-Semitism—under a regime which outlawed racialism—is more virulent than ever.

Overt acts are rare because of strict controls. Only one slip has been made by the severely censored government press, when the Minister of Cooperatives, Anton Alexandrescu, in an article attacking Zionists as "disloyal citizens," wrote that certain Jews "who have previously suffered some injustice or other now expect to be eternally privileged." When an anti-government newspaper the other day described a Jewish journalist as a "stinking scribe tolerated by Rumanian laws and newly arrived in this country" the paper was immediately and permanently suppressed.

However, this doesn't prevent secret circulation of mimeographed tracts like one I found in an ash-can summoning Rumanians to "get rid of Jews, totally, absolutely, with-

out exception." It didn't save Jews from being beaten by anti-Groza demonstrators last November. In January I heard other National Peasant demonstrators chanting as they marched "*Toti Romanii Cu Noi*" which means "Many Rumanians With Us"—which is also translatable into "Down With Jews." I know Jewish university students who are being subjected to an organized boycott of silence by their Gentile classmates. Sober Jews and non-Jews, some of them pro-Russian, assure me that if a reactionary regime comes in when the Soviet army goes out—a combination of events unlikely to occur—Rumania would have the worst pogrom in its history.

THE causes are emotional, material and psychoneurotic. The average Rumanian, regarding Jews as traditionally second-class citizens, resents their present equality of rights. He detests the government and its democratic labels. He identifies it with a hungry occupation army, which he must feed, and heavy reparations, which he must pay. He identifies Jews with the government. There isn't a single Jew in the Cabinet. But Jews, as in Hungary, accepted unpopular jobs in the police. Many Jews were victims of Nazi labor battalions and entered the Communist Party in the first ecstasy of liberation. Anna Pauker, one of the Communist triumvirate, is a Jewess. That's enough to convince any bedrock anti-Semite eager to be convinced.

The subtlest cause of all this lies in the murky depths of the national subconscious. Having been haunted for years by the Jewish-Bolshevik bogey, Rumanians thought their last moment had come when the Red Army finally arrived. They rushed about frantically in search of some Jew they could placate and cling to as protection. But retribution misfired. The purge was light; not a single war criminal was executed; there were even astonishingly few Jews in the Russian Kommandatura. With astonishment came relief, and then humiliation over previous panic, and finally desire for revenge for humiliation.

Jewish leaders here will never forgive the government its failure to seize the moment of fear and make a clean sweep for redemption of Jewish losses. They argue that swift and resolute action, from hanging of mass murderers to restoration of stolen furniture, would have been publicly accepted as moderate and reasonable, and the ugly business would have been over and done with. Instead the government took half measures or did nothing. To make matters worse, it kept publishing notice after notice that Jews would receive full justice. Jews received little. Publicity, however, persuaded the Rumanians, by that time recovering from their fright and grouching about their occupation burdens, that the whole country was being delivered to the Jews. That's how anti-Semites are born.

A PART from the moral necessity for punishment of their oppressors, Jews had four basic material demands:

1. *Restitution of Property.* The squeeze play executed by Antonescu first declared all urban Jewish real estate to be state property, and then barred Jews from occupying state property. The sick and old along with the rest were dispossessed on a half-hour's notice from 80,000 properties throughout the country. They found shelter where they could, paying exorbitant rents because the fixed rent law didn't protect new tenants.

After the armistice, community spokesmen proposed immediate restitution. Those living in Jewish property could move to flats now to be vacated by Jews, at low 1940 rents. Non-Jewish war widows and disabled veterans could be moved without charge in state vehicles, reducing expense and discomfort to a minimum. The government decided otherwise. The Law of December 19, 1944, issued by Communist Lucretiu Patrascanu, Minister of Justice, ruled Jews could repossess only by bringing suit, and that civil servants could not be ousted under any circumstances before April 1945. The result was a welter of unsettled law cases, lawyers' fees, and headaches. Civil servants,

the greatest beneficiaries of racial laws, are still occupying Jewish flats, thanks to progressive postponements of their deadline. In Bucharest alone, out of 17,833 Jewish properties involved, only 3,356 have been brought to court, and of these 21 per cent remain unsettled after fourteen months of litigation.

2. *Restoration of Jobs.* The Antonescu law had ordered discharge of all Jewish salaried workers in three months.

Instead of authorizing their compulsory reinstatement with seniority status, Patrascanu said Jews had the right to request their jobs, but employers also had the right to refuse. Jews could then appeal to special labor tribunals. More litigation and unnecessary distress. Last November, nearly a year after liberation, the State Employment Office was authorized to find jobs for Jews who still had not been reinstated in their former positions.

3. *Reimbursement for Losses.* Jews claimed twelve billion lei in profits and rents collected from their properties by the fascist state, plus 11.70 billion lei in wages lost by Jews fired from their jobs. These sums were much smaller than they looked. Inflation had cut their value to less than 5 per cent, but Jewish spokesmen didn't insist on an adjustment. They were even willing to take 25 per cent of their watered lei in cash, with the rest in bonds and tax premiums.

The Minister of Justice replied that the state had no money. (Government salaries have since been hoisted several times.) He announced that all questions of reimbursement would be considered at a later date. The date is still to come. His announcement also spiked all claims for damages by Jews who had re-entered their homes and shops to find them stripped of everything except the walls. Needless to add no pensions have been paid to Jewish victims of Nazi terror or their dependents, while pensions are of course going to widows of Rumanian soldiers who fought on the Nazi side.

4. *Revocation of Forced Sales.* Many Jews had sold property at a heavy sacrifice

to avoid its total loss by confiscation. The Jewish community now demanded that all such Jewish transactions between the first fascist regime of Octavian Goga in December 1937 and King Michael's *coup d'état* in August 1944 be declared null. Patrascanu ruled any sale which brought 60 per cent of declared value was legal. This meant he considered a 40 per cent loss good business. His law, in addition, had a maze of special clauses. One lawyer told me complacently "Only two of my thirty cases are making progress."

Patrascanu claimed to friends that the unsatisfactory parts of his legislation weren't his fault. In December of 1944 Rumania had a coalition government. The Liberals and National Peasants, now in opposition, were on the interparty commission which wrote the laws, he says, and they were the ones who invented the troublesome restrictions. I don't doubt Liberals and Peasants cooperated cordially in rendering Jews less justice. Quite a few of them lived comfortably in confiscated Jewish homes under the Germans.

Buck-passing responsibility to the opposition doesn't quite settle matters. The coalition government went out last March, and since then the Communists and their friends have had complete control. Yet there has been no appreciable improvement detected in the government's policy on Jewish reintegration. Moreover, Communists were first tenor in the Rumanian opera right from the *coup d'état* curtain, thanks to the Red Army in the orchestra. They could have sung louder than the rest and prevailed if they really wanted to.

The truth is they didn't dare. The Soviet Army was the Communists' only real support in the country. Estimates range from 80 up to a maximum of 400 registered party members at the time of the coup. Their most urgent task was to gain strength. That is why they welcomed "repentant" Iron Guardists, as did opposition parties. That is why they shook the hand of Tatarescu, who had put many of their leaders behind bars. That is why they encouraged numerous "fronts,"

like the "Ploughmen's Front" of Premier Groza, which started with Groza and the peasants on his estate, and just about ended there. That is why they have even concocted a middle-class party based on family, church and king!

And that is also why they couldn't afford to be completely fair to Jews. They would have liked to, I think. Where there wasn't risk, the government could sometimes behave handsomely. Trains were sent to the frontier to bring back deportees. The Jewish population, cut in half by war, was exempted from military service against Germans (though 80,000 Jews with captured German helmets and guns helped hold Bucharest after Michael's coup). For the first time in Rumanian history, the State included Jewish schools and synagogues in its subsidies for education and religion.

But these were concessions which didn't disturb vested Rumanian interests. Civil servants and small-shot politicians had grown fat on Jewish loot. It was their support and their votes which Communists, inexperienced in government and feeble in numbers, needed more than they needed Jews.

UNTIL recently Jewish political life centered around A. Zissu's Jewish Party and William Fildermann's Union of Rumanian Jews. Zissu, one of the greatest journalists in the Balkans and a fanatic Zionist, fought for a grant of full minority status to Rumania's 350,000-odd surviving Jews, pending the great day of total emigration. Fildermann, who rescued more Jews from Fascist annihilation than perhaps any other Jew in Europe, campaigned for the rights of Jews as Rumanian citizens.

Something new was added last June when the Communist Party and a handful of deserters from Fildermann's group launched the "Jewish Democratic Committee." Branding old line leaders "reactionaries," the committee directed its heaviest fire against Fildermann, whom it accused of collaboration with Germans! Fildermann's paper

was suppressed, government distribution of newsprint to Zissu's paper shrank, and the Committee's paper thrived. Fildermann was even arrested once without a warrant and held for five days, then released without questioning. The climax came late in January when the Committee, with the patronage of the government, trade unions and Communists, convened a "national" congress and formally appropriated the name of Union of Rumanian Jews (Democratic Branch) and "expelled" Fildermann.

The issue is between two interpretations of the Jewish problem. Old leaders remember that the Jews have been persecuted, whatever the size of their purse; they believe the class struggle has nothing to do with the Jewish social struggle for equality; they fear that Jewry's total surrender to one branch of political dogma or another will only confuse the main business of protecting Jewish interests per se. The younger group condemns its rivals for refusing to take sides with the "new democracy" against surviving remnants of the despicable Carol regime who today masquerade as a liberal opposition and who tomorrow, if they can, will restore Jewish Gehenna. Whatever the motives of the dispute, the outcome has been bitterness and passion which has already sapped the solidarity of the Jewish island in the eternally hostile Rumanian sea.

All of which makes the document I have before me a piece of supreme irony. It is a letter like many others I've seen from a Rumanian Jew to his relatives. It says in part: "I spend all my time waiting for news about the opening of the frontier . . . implore you to use all your connections to get me necessary authorization . . . my money almost exhausted . . . I've made terrible mistake . . . this country needs youth and only youth . . . again I beg you not to lose a single moment in helping me to get out. . . ."

The letter was written in Tel Aviv, its destination Bucharest.

the greatest beneficiaries of racial laws, are still occupying Jewish flats, thanks to progressive postponements of their deadline. In Bucharest alone, out of 17,833 Jewish properties involved, only 3,356 have been brought to court, and of these 21 per cent remain unsettled after fourteen months of litigation.

2. *Restoration of Jobs.* The Antonescu law had ordered discharge of all Jewish salaried workers in three months.

Instead of authorizing their compulsory reinstatement with seniority status, Patrascanu said Jews had the right to request their jobs, but employers also had the right to refuse. Jews could then appeal to special labor tribunals. More litigation and unnecessary distress. Last November, nearly a year after liberation, the State Employment Office was authorized to find jobs for Jews who still had not been reinstated in their former positions.

3. *Reimbursement for Losses.* Jews claimed twelve billion lei in profits and rents collected from their properties by the fascist state, plus two billion lei in wages lost by Jews fired from their jobs. These sums were much smaller than they looked. Inflation had cut their value to less than 5 per cent, but Jewish spokesmen didn't insist on an adjustment. They were even willing to take 25 per cent of their watered lei in cash, with the rest in bonds and tax premiums.

The Minister of Justice replied that the state had no money. (Government salaries have since been hoisted several times.) He announced that all questions of reimbursement would be considered at a later date. The date is still to come. His announcement also spiked all claims for damages by Jews who had re-entered their homes and shops to find them stripped of everything except the walls. Needless to add no pensions have been paid to Jewish victims of Nazi terror or their dependents, while pensions are of course going to widows of Rumanian soldiers who fought on the Nazi side.

4. *Revocation of Forced Sales.* Many Jews had sold property at a heavy sacrifice

to avoid its total loss by confiscation. The Jewish community now demanded that all such Jewish transactions between the first fascist regime of Octavian Goga in December 1937 and King Michael's *coup d'état* in August 1944 be declared null. Patrascanu ruled any sale which brought 60 per cent of declared value was legal. This meant he considered a 40 per cent loss good business. His law, in addition, had a maze of special clauses. One lawyer told me complacently "Only two of my thirty cases are making progress."

Patrascanu claimed to friends that the unsatisfactory parts of his legislation weren't his fault. In December of 1944 Rumania had a coalition government. The Liberals and National Peasants, now in opposition, were on the interparty commission which wrote the laws, he says, and they were the ones who invented the troublesome restrictions. I don't doubt Liberals and Peasants cooperated cordially in rendering Jews less justice. Quite a few of them lived comfortably in confiscated Jewish homes under the Germans.

Buck-passing responsibility to the opposition doesn't quite settle matters. The coalition government went out last March, and since then the Communists and their friends have had complete control. Yet there has been no appreciable improvement detected in the government's policy on Jewish reintegration. Moreover, Communists were first tenor in the Rumanian opera right from the *coup d'état* curtain, thanks to the Red Army in the orchestra. They could have sung louder than the rest and prevailed if they really wanted to.

The truth is they didn't dare. The Soviet Army was the Communists' only real support in the country. Estimates range from 80 up to a maximum of 400 registered party members at the time of the coup. Their most urgent task was to gain strength. That is why they welcomed "repentant" Iron Guardists, as did opposition parties. That is why they shook the hand of Tatarescu, who had put many of their leaders behind bars. That is why they encouraged numerous "fronts,"

like the "Ploughmen's Front" of Premier Groza, which started with Groza and the peasants on his estate, and just about ended there. That is why they have even concocted a middle-class party based on family, church and king!

And that is also why they couldn't afford to be completely fair to Jews. They would have liked to, I think. Where there wasn't risk, the government could sometimes behave handsomely. Trains were sent to the frontier to bring back deportees. The Jewish population, cut in half by war, was exempted from military service against Germans (though 80,000 Jews with captured German helmets and guns helped hold Bucharest after Michael's coup). For the first time in Rumanian history, the State included Jewish schools and synagogues in its subsidies for education and religion.

But these were concessions which didn't disturb vested Rumanian interests. Civil servants and small-shot politicians had grown fat on Jewish loot. It was their support and their votes which Communists, inexperienced in government and feeble in numbers, needed more than they needed Jews.

UNTIL recently Jewish political life centered around A. Zissu's Jewish Party and William Fildermann's Union of Rumanian Jews. Zissu, one of the greatest journalists in the Balkans and a fanatic Zionist, fought for a grant of full minority status to Rumania's 350,000-odd surviving Jews, pending the great day of total emigration. Fildermann, who rescued more Jews from Fascist annihilation than perhaps any other Jew in Europe, campaigned for the rights of Jews as Rumanian citizens.

Something new was added last June when the Communist Party and a handful of deserters from Fildermann's group launched the "Jewish Democratic Committee." Branding old line leaders "reactionaries," the committee directed its heaviest fire against Fildermann, whom it accused of collaboration with Germans! Fildermann's paper

was suppressed, government distribution of newsprint to Zissu's paper shrank, and the Committee's paper thrived. Fildermann was even arrested once without a warrant and held for five days, then released without questioning. The climax came late in January when the Committee, with the patronage of the government, trade unions and Communists, convened a "national" congress and formally appropriated the name of Union of Rumanian Jews (Democratic Branch) and "expelled" Fildermann.

The issue is between two interpretations of the Jewish problem. Old leaders remember that the Jews have been persecuted, whatever the size of their purse; they believe the class struggle has nothing to do with the Jewish social struggle for equality; they fear that Jewry's total surrender to one branch of political dogma or another will only confuse the main business of protecting Jewish interests per se. The younger group condemns its rivals for refusing to take sides with the "new democracy" against surviving remnants of the despicable Carol regime who today masquerade as a liberal opposition and who tomorrow, if they can, will restore Jewish Gehenna. Whatever the motives of the dispute, the outcome has been bitterness and passion which has already sapped the solidarity of the Jewish island in the eternally hostile Rumanian sea.

All of which makes the document I have before me a piece of supreme irony. It is a letter like many others I've seen from a Rumanian Jew to his relatives. It says in part: "I spend all my time waiting for news about the opening of the frontier . . . implore you to use all your connections to get me necessary authorization . . . my money almost exhausted . . . I've made terrible mistake . . . this country needs youth and only youth . . . again I beg you not to lose a single moment in helping me to get out. . . ."

The letter was written in Tel Aviv, its destination Bucharest.

NASTY KUPPERMAN AND THE KU KLUX KLAN

A Story

LOUIS BERG

EVERY time I cross the Brooklyn Bridge at night and see the huge electric sign of the *Jewish Daily Forward*, my spirits rise. Let the heathen rage! Was there not a plot to blow up Ab. Cahan and the Bialystocker Benevolent Society together in this same building, and are not both octogenarians still alive? The sign is still there through the perilous night.

When I am nowhere near the Brooklyn Bridge, I take comfort from the memory of Nasty Kupperman, a pillar of fire in a similar dark hour.

WHEN I first knew Nasty, I was working as a yard clerk for the railroad in a small Southern town, the only Jew, and even in those days of indulgent anti-Semitism the *goyim* there made life miserable for me. "Hey, lkey," they would hail me. "What are you doing with your salary—saving it up to open a drygoods store?" Worse were my defenders. "Better let the Jewboy alone. You'll be working for him some day."

It did not pay to get angry. "Never buy at a Jewstore," one of my tormentors would remark for my benefit. "Look at these here-now overalls. Bought 'em at Ginsberg's last week and they're coming apart already." I thought I knew the answer to that. "Don't buy at the Jewstore then," I would rant.

LOUIS BERG was raised in Virginia, and has written a number of short stories about the Jewish community life of small Southern towns. He has been an editor, serving on the staff of the *Contemporary Jewish Record* and the *Menorah Journal*. He has done publicity and public relations, both for Jewish welfare organizations and for motion picture companies, among them Twentieth Century-Fox, Gaumont British and United Artists. At present he is on the staff of the national weekly, *This Week*. He lives in New York City and Hampton Bays, L.I.

"Who tells you to? Buy your stuff at the commissary. Shorty will treat you right. He won't cheat you—oh no! Shorty's your kind."

Company commissaries being what they were and Shorty as disagreeable a swindler as ever ran one, I thought I had scored in the exchange. But my adversary was imperturbable.

"Don't get mad. I didn't mean nothing. Jews are all right. Just as good as niggers, I always say, long as they behave themselves."

It was like that all the time, and you might call it harmless joshing; just the same when the Ku Klux Klan got started in town most of the fellows working with me joined it. They were not in the least secretive about it either. In fact they made a point of letting me know they had joined, doubtless to get a rise out of me. They succeeded.

"You can't beat a Gentile for being a damn fool," I would rage. "Take your ten dollars and what do they give you for it? A cotton sheet with holes in it. You'd do better at Ginsberg's."

My adversary would stand there and grin at me. "Hell, ain't it worth ten dollars to get a chance to kill a Jew?"

Ah, the good-natured *Hackenkretzer!* The jolly *Judenfresser!*

But when the Klan began to gain in power and influence, they stopped kidding with me about it. I found that even worse.

I WAS not the only Jew to be worried. Up and down County Street, from Flourmoy Street to Shell Road, where most of the Jewish stores were, and in the basement of the Shaari Chesed Synagogue, after the perfunctory prayers had been read and Jews could settle down to talk, the Ku Klux Klan was almost the sole topic of anxious discus-

sion. What did it mean for Jews? Opinions differed.

My own father, stiff-necked and Zionist, held the Klan's emergence to be a vindication of all that he had argued with me about—that it was fundamentally the same in this country as in Russia. A *goy* remained a *goy*. He might be as courteous and friendly as the angels who visited Abraham in his tent, and then—oowah!—without warning he was ready to burn and to kill. My father sounded almost pleased.

Charlie Seff, who sold furniture to the colored people on the installment plan—dollar down and dollar a month until they failed in their payments and the furniture was taken away from them to be sold again—thought the Klan might even prove to be not such a bad thing. "There are some mean niggers in this part of town," he said.

Mr. Samuel Cohen, respectable produce merchant and community chest worker, who contributed to the support of the shul and the YMCA alike, was similarly not too much alarmed. "Those of us who have lived here a long time have learned to get along with the Gentile community. But the riff-raff along County Street, those New York newcomers who have filtered into the community (he sounded like Judge Waters complaining of the Tarheels in town) might take this as a warning," he declared.

Max Wishengrad, tailor and Socialist, blamed the *lumpenproletariat*, egged on by the exploiters of labor. He urged united action by the whole working class. No one knew what he meant, and no one took him seriously anyhow.

Joe Spiegel, drygoods, thought the best thing was to "lay low" and go about one's business until the whole thing blew over. He, too, had it on good authority that the Jews would not be harmed. "Niggers, yes; Catholics, maybe; but Jews—they were just stuck in to prove the Klan is broadminded." Mr. Spiegel, a cynic, was suspected of negotiating a deal to sell cotton sheets to the Klan in cut-rate lots.

Rabbi Perlman urged increased attendance at the synagogue.

Old Man Pintele, the only Galician and *hasid* in our Litvak Jewish community, shook his head and broke into sing-song. In his time and in his old home, when the Jewish community was threatened, the Dembitzer rebbe had intervened, he chanted, with a miracle. For at Easter time, when the priest was stirring up the old libel against the Jews, the rebbe, two hundred miles away, stopped his throat, and he fell to the ground like a dead man.

And what, Pintele demanded gleefully, did Rabbi Perlman intend to do about the present situation: what sort of miracle did he aim to perform?

This summary of community opinion is not complete. It was rumored for example, that Mr. Oppenheim, president of the Temple, had had a long session with the rector of the Episcopal church, undoubtedly about the Klan. But what was said or undertaken at this meeting remained a mystery to us all. Who ever got to talk to a German Jew?

And there was, of course, Nasty Kupperman still to be heard from.

THE night of the first big Klan Konclave, held of all places in the local ball park rather than in the sandhills back of town, I was in Luigi Colisanti's barber shop getting a once-over-lightly while the shoe-shine boy snapped a rhythm over my shoes. No one else was in the shop. The whole town turned out for a Roman holiday and we three the victims—Catholic, Jew and Negro.

I did not get a chance to communicate my idea to Luigi; it had probably occurred to him, too, since he was unusually silent. For just then Nasty Kupperman entered the shop, making a fourth, but miscast for the role of any kind of victim.

There is in every Jewish community in the South at least one mean, tough Jewboy who has deserted the fold, and gone off to run with the wolves. Such a one doubtless was also Samson of old who preferred Gaza to Jerusalem, and the harlots of the Philistines to the pious daughters of Israel. He came to a bad end, to be sure, among the

Gazites, but he got himself put down in the Book of Judges, just the same, as a hero in Israel.

And such a one was Nasty Kupperman. They called him "Nasty" because that is what he was. He was a great, hulking youngster who looked good-natured, which he was not. He was simply trifling, as the Southerners would say. I have known him to pick up a rock as big as a water-bucket and hurl it full force at some fellow who was offending him—with no particular intent to injure, but no concern that he might. He once threw an obstreperous customer out of his father's shoe store with such vigor as to send the unfortunate man to the hospital for three weeks. And the story went that thereafter the man would never buy his shoes anywhere except at Kupperman's. Not that Nasty bothered to be his father's salesman. If he was in the store at the time it was doubtless to pick out a pair of shoes for himself—large, yellow ones.

Nasty in fact spent almost all of his time in Goo-Goo Wright's poolroom. He was good enough with the cue balls to play on commission for the house. It was a sight in this world to see the big overgrown youngster stroke the balls with the deft and delicate touch of an artist. He would persuade the balls into the pockets; they would hang on the lip while you held your breath—they did not want to drop but the "conjurations" were on them and they were bound to go.

Outside of this one accomplishment he was pretty worthless all around. The few pathetic Jewish girls in town, hungry for a kosher date, would have nothing to do with him—or he with them for that matter. Nasty's taste for company, male or female, was pretty ordinary, as we used to say.

His constant companion, in the poolroom, or on unsavory Stratford Street, was a cripple of vicious character called Lobby Turner. In a town where the choice in depravity was wide and varied, Nasty really had to dredge the bottom to reach Lobby.

I remember Lobby when we were kids in school together. He was even worse crippled

then, his leg so deformed that he hobbled with difficulty on crutches. He would lean against the school building, a frail, slight figure, an object of pity, and all of a sudden, without reason or warning, he would lash out with his crutch at some unoffending child who happened to be passing. He would strike out to hurt, secure from retaliation by virtue of the same crutch that was his offensive weapon, and he would squeal with glee at the victim's cry of shock and pain—out of sheer spite and hatred I suppose for anyone on two sound legs. His folks, who had money once, sent him to Johns Hopkins for an operation and the doctors there fixed him so he could get around pretty well without crutches, but they did nothing to extract the venom from his system. When he abandoned his crutches he adopted as a weapon a wicked-looking spring clasp-knife; he would brag and threaten with it, flourishing it viciously to demonstrate how some "dirty nigger" had started out after him and how he had slashed the "black bastard's guts"—"and, -man alive, you should have heard that nigger squeal O, my Jesus white man you done lay me wideopen you done kill me for sure." Emasculation was his favorite threat; he would spring the six-inch blade and twist it with relish. Remembering the crutch, it was enough to make one uneasy.

Lobby was not what you might call a Jew-lover, which made his relationship with Nasty a strange one. Nasty, for his part, never referred to the cripple except in terms of brutal, jeering contempt. Yet the two were inseparable, and it was known that Nasty on occasions had protected Lobby from the consequences of his more outrageous actions.

TONIGHT, however, Nasty was alone. I greeted him with unaccustomed warmth. "Hi there, Nasty. Stepping tonight?"

Nasty did not answer. His contempt for the Jewish community that ostracized him included me. He slumped into an adjacent chair and waited his turn in silence.

Suddenly, however, he bounded up as if

springs had released him and bawled at the top of his lungs.

"Hey, Lobby! Whoa there!"

Lobby, dimly visible outside the window, halted but made no move to enter.

"Come on in, you gimpy-laig — — —!"

Lobby poked a reluctant head in the door, between the screen and the jamb.

"What in hell you want? I'm in a hurry."

"I'll hurry you. I'll twist that good laig of yours so you'll never be in a hurry again. Don't you know I've been looking all over town for you, you no-count, ordinary bastard!"

"Say you have, hey?" Lobby's tone was not pleasant. "What for?"

"Want you to go with me."

"I ain't going nowhere."

"Hell you ain't. You're going to the Klan meeting, that's where you're going, and I'm going along with you. Don't you know they going to make me a Kleagle tonight?"

Lobby didn't smile. "I ain't going to no Klan meeting, and you ain't going with me."

"The hell I ain't."

All this was banter on Nasty's part. But Lobby wasn't taking it well. He kept muttering to himself, and suddenly he blurted out, surprisingly:

"Stay on your own side, you Jew bastard!"

And he was gone. Watching him move away I could see that he was not alone, that moving off with him were several nondescript poolroom characters. But that wasn't what prevented Nasty from leaping after him, I was sure. He didn't usually let Lobby talk to him that way, and wouldn't if there were sixty on Lobby's side. But when I rolled my eyes back to him I noticed he was grinning evilly, as if at some secret joke. I ventured another effort at conversation.

"What you want Lobby at the Klan meeting for? You ought to be glad there's at least one goy staying away."

He stared at me, acknowledging my presence for the first time. "Hell," he said without emotion. "Lobby'll be there all right—and with a white sheet on."

I THOUGHT I understood everything now, and understanding I never could explain how Nasty prevailed on me to go to the Klan meeting with him. The ball park on that particular evening was one place I was really not anxious to visit. But possibly I was flattered by Nasty's invitation, or maybe I was ashamed to appear scared. Anyway, I went along.

The crowd was there ahead of us, very few in the bleachers or grandstand, mostly spilled onto the diamond for a closer view. The cops had roped off the baselines, leaving little more than the actual playing space clear, and were now engaged in shooing off some kids who had been running bases inside the lines. In the center of the diamond, precisely at the pitcher's box, a huge wooden cross had been erected for the burning.

The sight of it moved me to a deep, obscure resentment. It was from this same pitcher's box that "Hooks" La Motte had hurled his classic one-hitter to clinch the pennant only a week ago, a triumph applauded in an atmosphere of such good-feeling that total strangers were slapping one another on the back and shaking hands violently like long-lost brothers. In the ball park the whole community was one, and the rays of the afternoon sun shone benignly on all, and only the visiting players and the impartial umpire were hated. The Klan was an alien element here.

With Nasty running interference we managed to force our way to the front, right near the roped-off base lines. There were mutterings from the people who made way for us, and I was not happy. We waited. It was around eight in the evening and getting quite dark. There was no sign of Klansmen.

But now, from out of centerfield, at last a lone horseman, white-robed and hooded, came riding. The centerfield gate had opened to admit him; he bore a burning torch in his hand. The space through which he had entered glittered now with many flickering lights. The Klansmen were massed outside.

The horseman came in at a gallop, wheeled at the cross, his horse rearing slightly as he curbed it. He galloped back again and for a while nothing more happened. The crowd strained forward eagerly. I could feel the hot breath on my neck of the people behind me. I squirmed and looked up at Nasty. No expression.

When the parade started, it was with scant warning—a few notes from the trumpet sounded the Valkyrie theme used so effectively in the motion picture, "Birth of a Nation." The flickering lights moved. In place of the lone horseman there emerged ten or twelve others. They came in from centerfield at a slow, grave forward pace, but the curbed hoofs of their horses moved rapidly, beat out a nervous drumbeat, raised a cloud of dust that glistened in the torchlight. Behind the horsemen now we could see the white-robed marchers shuffling on foot.

They were upon us before we realized it, marching so close to the ropes that their robes brushed onlookers. I could even hear voices admonishing their fellows: "Keep in line. Keep in line." Even this homely injunction, testifying that these were amateurs on the march, failed to reassure me. In the twisting light of the hundreds of torches the sheeted figures were terrifying. I was scared.

What happened next scared me more. For one of the marchers suddenly pitched forward, threw out his arms to save himself, sent others staggering, and went sprawling himself to the ground. There was momentary confusion; the parade halted; voices were raised in inquiry; several of the riders spurred their horses to the scene.

The Klansman who had fallen was up at the count of three. His white robe was streaked with dust. "Who tripped me?" he demanded. "What — — — tripped me?"

Swearing, he reached down to lift his robe, revealing the full-length of his blue-serge pants; his hands fumbled in his pocket, emerged with a huge clasp-knife.

The spring-blade, the snarling voice. It

was Lobby Turner and no mistake. No need either for me to be told who tripped him. It had all happened directly in front of me. Nasty must have spotted him by his hobbling walk.

Lobby's head was bobbing like a prize-fighter's from side to side, in search of his assailant. His eyes were baleful through the narrow slits of his hood. The clasp of his knife was sprung, and the point sawed the air. Behind him the Klansmen were thickly massed; confused or menacing—who could tell behind those hoods? But menacing enough for me. Before me were my enemies in array; behind me no friends.

And then Lobby spied Nasty grinning down at him evilly. The force of habit is strong. His knife-blade dropped. Under the white sheet his body subsided, like a blowtad deflated.

He said: "Oh go long, Nasty."

But Nasty was not yet satisfied. He lifted the ropes and made to duck under them after Lobby. And Lobby, forgetting where he was, and the massed phalanx in support of him, actually ran quite a few paces before he remembered himself.

Nasty leaned back and roared. "What you running for, Lobby Turner?" he called out. "Why don't you wait for your gang?"

It was a situation. But Nasty was not one to see it. He never saw any situation except as between man and man. Maybe that is the way others saw it, too. Maybe in the darkness and confusion nothing was clear to anyone. But at any rate nothing else happened. The parade moved on. At a signal the cross burst into flames. The oratory began. In the bolder light I could see now the prosaic trouser cuffs of the marchers.

* * *

IN the Book of Judges it is written: "Then three thousand men of Judah went to the top of the rock Etam and said to Samson, 'Knowest thou not that the Philistines are rulers over us?'" . . .

"And he said to them, 'As they did unto me, so have I done unto them.'"

THE INNER WORLD OF THE HASID

A Jewish Mystical Experience Projected for Moderns

HAROLD ROSENBERG

NOTHING could be more difficult for the modern mind to grasp than the reality of Hasidism—the mystical movement that flourished in Poland in the 18th and 19th centuries and still exercises a far-flung influence on Jewish religious thinking and culture today. For as Kierkegaard has pointed out, and Valéry after him, modern man is crammed with knowledge but estranged from inwardness.

Thus there is a way *not* to read Martin Buber's novel of Hasidism, *For The Sake Of Heaven*. Unfortunately, it is just this wrong way that the publisher is recommending. We are told somewhat apologetically on the jacket that *For The Sake Of Heaven* describes a historical struggle that "resembles strikingly the events of the past few years," and that "though its conversation is quaint and seemingly unreal, its religious attitudes, hopes, fears, and spiritual conflicts have their counterparts in our contemporary life." In short, we are to read the book with one eye on ourselves; it is interesting and we

can learn from it because it says something about us and our situation.

Exactly the opposite is true: Buber's novel is interesting, even fascinating, and extremely suggestive, precisely because the Hasidic rabbis who are its heroes are so different from us, and because Buber has preserved that difference. *For The Sake Of Heaven* tells of the Hasidic congregation, the communion, of Lublin in the years of the Napoleonic wars, and of the strange process whereby a second communion was formed inside the body of the first under the shaping pressures of world history. Such a communion is a thing that we today in America know nothing about; we can hardly imagine it; its inner phenomena, its assumptions, its real relations are as strange to us as the life of the Hindus in E. M. Forster's *Passage to India*.

In Lublin, men communicated with one another in a symbolic language drawn from the Torah's hoard of metaphors. "Of the high things they spoke as of things which were taking place in the here and now; of earthly happenings they spoke as though these were woven of a heavenly substance." Spirit could speak to spirit with the directness of gesture. Neither fact nor concept stood between minds. The rabbis of *For The Sake Of Heaven* touch and understand each other's consciousness with the precise and subtle contact of poetic intuition. . . .

To see this immensely developed form of communication *from the outside* as "quaint and seemingly unreal conversation"; to describe the original synthesis attained by the rabbis as "the mystical, somewhat naive and otherworldly range of thought and action evoked by the term 'Hasidism'"—what is this but to assume, perhaps without realizing that one is doing so, that one can now

HAROLD ROSENBERG is a poet and critic living in New York City. He is the author of a volume of poems, *Trance Above the Streets*, and is now at work on a book dealing with modern revolutionary communions. He worked for the radio division of the Office of War Information during the war, and is now with the Advertising Council. MARTIN BUBER, greatest contemporary Jewish philosopher, and enthusiast and authority on Hasidic mysticism and symbolism, was born in Vienna in 1878. Exiled from Germany in 1933, he has been professor of social philosophy at the Hebrew University in Palestine since 1938. His novel, *For The Sake Of Heaven* (translated by Ludwig Lewisohn. Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1945. 316 pp. \$3.00), is a work of scholarship as well as of speculative and poetic insight, with much of its material drawn from first-hand historical sources.

look down from a height upon these philosophers of existence?

Another caution—one can read this book in such a manner that he will see in it mainly (to quote the publisher again) a “picture of Hasidic life and . . . provocative tales of Hasidic lore.” On the surface, *For The Sake Of Heaven* does seem to resemble an anthology of character sketches, anecdotes, and metaphysical exchanges, loosely held together by a rather vague plot. But as a “picture of Hasidic life” it is by no means adequate. For it contains few details of the *mise en scène* of Lublin or of the secular routine of the Hasidim. We learn almost nothing of what Lublin, and the Lubliners, looked like, how the ordinary Hasid earned his living, what he ate, how he married, how he educated his children, was governed by the Kahal. We are not shown what his position was in Russian-Polish society, nor even his relation with the non-Hasidic Jews, the *mithnagdim*—at that time fiercely anti-Hasidic. We are not given the data upon which to judge the degree to which the tensions caused by poverty, segregation, government restrictions, and Jewish communal autonomy influenced the rise of certain extreme attitudes, particularly under the still echoing resonances of the Sabbatian Messianism of the century before. *For The Sake Of Heaven* has little in common with such a solid diorama of Jewish life as *The Brothers Ashkenazi*. Buber has seen Hasidic existence as the devout Hasidim themselves saw it—from within, as spirit concentrated in saints and miracle-workers, in symbols, ecstasies, legends and compelling promises of freedom and greatness. Only when the physical facts break into the metaphysical adventure and become part of it do they have any experienced reality.

As Buber approached the Hasid, so must the reader approach *For The Sake Of Heaven*. Read from *within*, the book shows itself to be an absorbing drama of the inner development of communities and individuals, a work unified in mood and coherent in plan. It is an authentic summary of Hasidic views and images of the world. But far

more than that, it grasps the internal attitudes of soul that created and accompanied Hasidic pantheism and transcendentalism.

JACOB Yitzhak ben Matel, the “Seer” of Lublin and “leader of his generation,” learned in a vision that the leader who would one day replace him would also be named Jacob Yitzhak ben Matel. Soon a namesake did appear in Lublin and took his place as the rabbi’s favorite. But this youth proved to be a vain wretch, almost an incarnation of evil. Thus, like Hamlet, *For The Sake Of Heaven* opens with the theme of the baffling and ambiguous character of a visitation.

When the truly-predicted Jacob Yitzhak arrived, however, he could be promptly recognized by the signs of election he bore—“It shows,” said the rabbi. The newcomer was called the “Yehudi,” because “here for once is a Jew.” No sooner had he joined the Seer’s disciples than a nucleus of minds began to form about him. At the same time he became the object of tense opposition and even hatred. The Seer, too, was troubled by this pupil whom he loved, and he gave ear to the gossip of the malicious—he did not exactly believe it but he listened. For his part, the disciple remained utterly loyal to his master, though in time he actually did, by destiny, what his enemies said he was planning to do from the start: he became the head of a congregation of his own.

The relation between the two Jacob Yitzhaks is a highly intimate one. Yet it is shaped by supernatural and traditional elements, and the men feel both a closeness to each other and a detachment beyond our sense of the personal. For instance, at the “Third Meal” on the Sabbath, the rabbi would send a piece of fish from his plate to someone to whom he felt drawn. “Thus within this great communal sacrifice, as this meal was interpreted and within which the *Zaddik* functioned as high priest, there were included these special personal unions between himself and certain of the faithful. The head of a pike was sent in this manner to the young Jacob Yitzhak and he blushed. . . .”

The unity and health of Lublin flowed from the spirit of the Seer—"all that sustains belongs to the realm of the hidden." But history was sending an enormous alien tremor across the clear ebb and flow of the rabbi's despairs and ecstasies: Napoleon's movements were upsetting Europe and reviving in the Jewish soul ancient prophetic voices. Napoleon? Napollyon? Apollyon—the Destroyer! Abaddon! Were not these wars that were ploughing up and remaking Europe the pre-visions of wars of Gog and Magog, the final conflict, the terrors of which were to precede the redemption of Israel?

The Seer's position was the traditional apocalyptic one—what we might call today "dialectical." Napoleon's devastation was evil, but it was evil growing to the scope and completeness of world catastrophe, so that its magnitude would make it creative and its violence become the pangs of birth. The *Zaddik* should therefore intensify the evil through his magical influence with the heavenly powers. ("God has placed within the power of his *Zaddikim*" the timing of the final phase.) By bringing the destruction to its term, the birth of the new world would be achieved and Israel saved.

To the Yehudi the evil of Gog is not an independent phenomenon of the material world; it derives its strength from the darkness in man. The Yehudi's path to redemption is not through the dialectics of destruction but, like the ancient prophets, directly through spiritual purification by repentance. Therefore he is opposed to magical intervention. Even if successful, it would in itself accomplish nothing, since it would not purify. "The miracle is not of such great importance. . . . The miracle merely bears witness." The task is to lift up the *Shekhinah*, which lies faint and weeping in the dust of exile—and to do this one must penetrate evil to free the good from it and create within the self a place for the Kingdom.

But will Israel be redeemed through the turning of *teshuvah*? The Seer's decision to manipulate external forces is based on a profound despair over Israel's moral strength.

"The men of Israel will not repent," he said. "And yet will the Redeemer come."

As the Seer's undertaking in support of Napoleon clarifies itself, a crack appears in the congregation of Lublin. On *Shavuot* he had gathered about his table sixty chosen disciples, corresponding to the sixty heroes around the bed of Solomon. There, in an inspired exegesis of the fires of Mount Sinai, he announced that world conflict was to be kindled and the mountain melted once more. It was then that the Yehudi, Rabbi David of Lelov, and Rabbi Bunam, the apothecary, confessed to the Seer that they had undergone "an experience which severely shook their integration with Lublin." The bond had been loosened. And immediately thereafter Rabbi Bunam told the Yehudi that a house was waiting for him in the town of Pshysa.

A striking scene between the Seer and Rabbi Bunam, whom the Seer had once saved from the egotism of studying other men with detached curiosity, brings to an end the First Part and discloses that the split in Lublin has been accomplished. With the dark psychological absoluteness of Kafka, the dialogue of the two philosophers recapitulates the spiritual ties between them and resolves itself into declaration of the breach as Bunam responds to the Seer's, "We, too, need you, Bunam, for our purpose," with, "Rabbi, my lungs and my mouth could never learn to blow this *shofar*."

THE Second Part is more fragmentary and anecdotal than the First; and there are more wonder-workings, visions and telepathy.

For a while events in Europe seemed to disappoint the Lublin rabbi's hope that the last days were coming, but his spirit remained fixed on the duty of the *Zaddik* "to make Napoleon into Gog" and not to allow "the density of happenings to thin out." And when Napoleon moved toward Poland and Russia, the rabbi's resolve deepened and he undertook the practice of magic in earnest, seeking to heighten the European conflagration by influencing the dreams of

Napoleon and the Czar and by concentrating the will of the Hasidic communities. At the same time he began to hate the humanistic Yehudi whose attitude, he felt, was interfering with the gathering of spiritual force needed for his plan.

With Napoleon defeated in Russia, the Seer had to acknowledge a severe setback. But though he had now lost all inner direction, he would not give up his effort. Instead he determined to "send a messenger to Heaven" for guidance. For this role he selected the Yehudi, and though the latter was opposed to his doings he obeyed the discipline of the Hasid. Thus on the Feast of Tabernacles he sent himself off to the other world, entering through the ecstasy of prayer into a state of voluntary possession which brought about his death.

So terminated the conflict between the leaders of Lublin and Pshysha, between him who saw Gog in the world and him who saw the evil within.

The Epilogue is mysterious. With increasing desperation the Seer and the rabbi of Rymanov continued their efforts even after Napoleon had fallen. Finally, the Seer fixed the coming of the Messiah for the noon hour of the Ninth of Ab, and at that hour, with a look of astonishment on his face, he expired suddenly. A disciple noted the irony that "in this manner (in the prediction of the Messiah) the time of his death was being made known to him." And the death of the Seer brought to an end the school of Lublin. It was said later that, "The true Lublin never saw the light of day."

FOR *The Sake Of Heaven* is a philosophical novel, not in the ordinary sense of a novel of ideas, but of a human struggle with existence and non-existence. The supernatural world of the rabbis is not merely a myth and concept of the mind; it takes on reality through their action as adepts of spirit—they know themselves and perfect themselves in it with a concreteness and clarity impossible to the detached empirical ego. The experiments of both Lublin and Pshysha

failed; they were doomed in advance, since both the miraculous and the pure are impossible. But theirs was the doom of poetic tragedy, not the doom of primitiveness and ignorance.

It is true that Hasidism reflected the stagnation, disintegration and essential hopelessness of Jewish life in 18th- and 19th-century Poland; and that by movement upward toward heaven and away from the objective facts of its situation, it did nothing to break the stasis in which the Jew was trapped, but even deepened and confirmed it. From the point of view of historical progress and practical reason, *Zaddikism* was therefore opium and decadence.

There is, however, no indication that practical historical thinking could have solved the problems of the settlements in the Russian Pale, based on trading, innkeeping, and petty crafts within a sea of feudalism, and steadily compressed by restrictions imposed under the promptings of Gentile commercial competitors and the rancor of the Church.

Moreover, granted that the Hasidim were insensible to progress, men and nations are valued for what they are, and for the quality of their vision of the world, not for their ability to take advantage of opportunities. To live in a state of inspiration and delicate understanding, to create exalted men and exalted ideas in the midst of poverty and isolation (or under any conditions for that matter), is a value in itself—a value of human existence that cannot be negated by the contention that more attention should have been paid to the *conditions* of existence.

Hasidism was a creative surge in perhaps the only direction in which it was possible for Jewish life in Poland to go—upwards. It is of special interest to us that the core of this movement is disclosed by Buber to be a remarkably sensitive education by which individuals were held in communion with one another. By the measure of the spiritual stature of the men created in the Hasidic communions, under conditions that crushed other groups into insensibility, they were perhaps not failures at all.

CLEM HAS BEEN HERE

Second Thoughts on the American Soldier in Europe

KARL FRUCHT

WHAT do American veterans think of the rest of the world? On this question the experts split all the way from Smith, who knows that the main hope is Allied unity, to Jones who wants America to keep the peace with plenty of atom bombs. Of the GIs heard from so far, few have echoed the "pre-Pearl Harbor isolationist" expert, and yet, if he went abroad now, a survey of the inscriptions left behind by our troops might well delight him.

"Limeys are yellow . . . Dagoes are — . . . CLEM HAS BEEN HERE . . . — the DPs . . . Frogs smell . . ."

This is a fair sample of what American soldiers in Europe have read for years now, on tables, house walls, monuments or latrine doors. Wherever GIs passed on the long way home, Clem had been first, and everywhere his signature was ringed with abuse. Sometimes it was abuse of "the brass" or of certain of Clem's fellows in the U. S.

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN-BORN KARL FRUCHT told the story of his experiences with a Prisoner of War Interrogation team of the First Army, from Normandy to Torgau and back, in the January issue of COMMENTARY. He here pays his respects to that complex person, GI Joe, about whom he found many civilians running quite an alarmist temperature when he returned to the States two months ago. Before he came to this country, Mr. Frucht earned an LL.D. from the University at Vienna in 1935, was a contributor to Austrian and Swiss papers, and a research worker for Austrian trade organizations. Mr. Frucht served with the Military Intelligence Service of our Army soon after his arrival here in 1941. At present he is peaceably employed in doing research in medieval history for a historical publishing company. A book on the German people at the moment of their collapse, by Mr. Frucht and a team-mate from First Army headquarters, will be published late this year by Readers Press in New York.

Army, like "niggers" or "kikes." Mostly it was abuse of his allies, or of the liberated peoples. Never—well, hardly ever—was it abuse of the enemy. On the subject of "krauts" Clem had so little to say that he was rumored never to have seen one.

By now the folks back home have heard of Clem, too. They have seen drawings of the little fellow with the big ears showing over the rail of a transport; his antecedents have been discussed in the press. The 82nd Airborne Division has boasted of having the "real low down": Clem, it said, came from an ad in Liverpool harbor. From afar, the 50 ft. initials of Camell's Laird Engineering Management read C-L-E-M. But most veterans will believe that tracking down Clem was too tough a job for even the 82nd. Perhaps he was once a GI from Arkansas who liked to tell the world where-all he had been. Perhaps he was no one and came from nowhere. What matters, about Clem as about anyone, is not so much where he came from as where he went, what he did, and what company he kept there.

It is interesting to compare Clem with his older buddy, GI Joe. This popular typification of the American soldier of World War II originated in the Army, too—in the training camps where strangers called each other "Joe," as they had done as civilians. But the expression "GI Joe" was snapped up by the press and radio correspondents, and from their stories graduated into the refined spheres of the editorial page, the war bond poster, and the campaign rally. As a result Joe has since been on perfect behavior. He gripes but remains printable. He is the big brother of the oppressed, incapable of trading on his role as liberator. He never forgets that he won the war by fighting shoulder to shoulder with his allies.

The circumstances in which his name was publicized made GI Joe represent an ideal—the American fighting man at his best.

Clem was under no such compulsion. By the time his name got into print it was known to every enlisted man in the ETO. No Congresswoman ever spoke about Clem. In fact, with some exceptions of low grade, he shunned feminine company. He grew and flourished in spots where men are men and drop their inhibitions. If Clem happened to be the GI at his worst, there was no reason why he should not show it in this privacy. Wherever he appeared, he clung to his stubborn primitiveness and monosyllabic style. He would tell no more in any place than the fact of his presence, sometimes his present business, and his outspoken, bluntly phrased dislikes.

Unquestionably, the GI as Clem expressed more of his true feelings than he did as Joe. Some Americans are certain, too, that the latrine wisdom now pencilled all over Europe by Clem shows what the veteran really thinks, his real sympathies and antipathies. This logic skips a main point. Clem's reactions were due to a lot of things, but rarely to thought.

An incident which took place in the Saar, shortly after V-E Day, illustrates the dangers of snap judgment. At a show, a GI chorus sang the national anthems of the four principal Allies before an audience largely drawn from a Pennsylvania National Guard division. "The Star-Spangled Banner" was heard standing and warmly applauded at the end. "God Save the King," also heard standing, received scant applause, and the "Marseillaise" none at all. But to the "Internationale" the boys gave a spontaneous ovation which would have shocked their native Philadelphia suburbs unless they had known the story of the outfit. The division had gone overseas late in 1943, too late to see the English under fire; it had missed the invasion and seen the French only briefly at their worst moment, a few weeks after the liberation, and it had not seen the Russians at all. But it had fought its way toward them clear across Germany,

and felt the enemy weaken at each Russian push. Next fall, back in the suburbs, those veterans will vote Republican and damn the Communists like everybody else. If anything remains from the days when they watched the Eastern line draw closer on the situation map, it will be little more than a vague friendly instinct. But overseas, only a few weeks after Germany quit, the memory was still strong enough to make them cheer what they would normally hiss at home.

CLEM's philosophy stems largely from emotional reactions of a noncombatant army on foreign soil. The important word is noncombatant. Neither Clem nor his ideas were conspicuous in the fighting lines. He was distinctly a creature of the "repple-depple"—the Replacement Depot (which after V-Day became a Redeployment Center), usually a tent city located miles from nowhere and loathed by every GI who ever spent a week or a year in one. Here the soldier found himself "sweating out" an assignment or a shipment home, unable to make friends, not with any outfit, not on any payroll, not in Europe and not in the States. Repple-depples were hells, with the damned not soldiers but numbers—numbers acquiring neuroses. They were Clem's home grounds and the most fertile soil for his way of thinking, or not thinking.

The favorite jibe against the "Limeys" was that they could not fight. Most frequently adduced as "evidence" was their delay in capturing Caen, the pivot of the Normandy breakout. But at St. Lô, where we lay in the hedgerows waiting for Caen to fall, there was little griping about this delay—certainly no more than about our own failure to take the all-important supply port of Cherbourg as fast as expected. We were too grateful to the British for keeping the counter-attacking Nazis off our flank to entertain any notion that they were "yellow." It was only later, from replacements fresh from English camps, that we heard Caen cited in support of this notion, with the full aplomb of those who were not there.

To some extent this silliest of canards was a defensive reaction. When we occupied England—and for all practical purposes our visit was an occupation, though by consent—none of us had yet done any fighting. The English had been fighting for years, had whipped the Nazis in the air, at sea, and in Africa, and were justly proud of it all. Their pride hurt ours. After all, we were the big brothers. We had come to deal with the bully they could not handle. We were prepared to be nice to them, considerate and sympathetic, if a little condescending.

When we arrived, the island had beaten the Blitz. Goering no longer had many planes to send over, and he had no rockets yet. We did not actually see British civilian courage. We saw the ruins, of course, the meager rations and wide distress, and we felt pity. We also felt rich. We used to throw handfuls of silver to children and laugh goodnaturedly when they scrambled for the shillings, and the adults hated us for "throwing money after people."

We had heard much, before we occupied England, about the horrible prejudices of an ossified society. We found a country where German bombs and a draconically egalitarian rationing system had cut deep into the old class lines and where a number of us were in fact surprised by the lack of prejudice and discrimination. The difference was not so great in regard to anti-Semitism (few American soldiers showed any open antipathy to the Cohns and Jacobowskys in their units), but in the attitude toward Negroes it was striking. I remember an overnight stop in a blacked-out town in the Midlands which had been taken over by colored troops—"niggers" as Clem would say—and the row started by a GI whose name might have been Clem, when two of his colored compatriots in Uncle Sam's uniform passed in the narrow street, with laughing British girls hooked under. And I remember the look on the girls' faces when Clem started ranting about "those Limey—who don't know better'n to mix with the black. . . ."

In general, if we got along all right in occupied England, a major part of the credit was due to the girls. At first they gasped at any breezy, "Hiyah, babe," but they soon got used to that. With their own men gone for years, for no one knew how much longer, the girls of England welcomed a flood of boys who were friendly and brash and a bit scared underneath and craving feminine companionship. And thousands of them married Americans.

INHERITED prejudice, girls, comparative wealth, tact or the lack of it, and judgment of the extent to which others had contributed to victory: these were the five points determining the GI view of all foreigners. In the British case they worked out rather well. In France they did not. First, and worst of all, the French did not conform to preconceived American ideas, inherited from GIs of World War I. But the old AEF came to France just as we came to England—as friends relieving a fighting ally, a country which was hard pressed but still standing, where the *poilus* had been at the front for three years and the girls were happy to show the Yanks a good time. Our arrival in 1944 was different, and so were the French.

The ones in Normandy were battle-shocked. With their homes ruined and members of their families killed or wounded by our invasion, they did not show the enthusiasm we expected of the newly liberated. The Parisians were enthusiastic enough, at first, but injected a sour note into the heroes' welcome by talking as if they had freed themselves. They ran about excitedly, wearing FFI armbands, brandishing pistols, and the prevalent GI reaction was, "Baloney." The girls were not as advertised, either. No shortage of men had preceded our entry; there had been plenty of Frenchmen around, both resisters and collaborators, and a few hundreds of thousands of idle German soldiers. Besides, the return of the French war prisoners and deported workers was thought to be imminent. The girls were willing but often rather critical, opinionated, obstinate

—quite unlike Mademoiselle of Armentières.

Too, the French had expected to be liberated, not reoccupied. When it appeared that the war would last awhile and that the Yanks would stay even longer, when the repple-depples sprang up everywhere and USFET took over the big ports and the big hotels and half of the Riviera as a playground for GIs on leave, when the French found out that they were still to have a foreign army in the country, comparisons became inevitable. They were not always favorable to our friendly occupation. When we used I.R.T. rush-hour tactics in the Métro, the Parisians gasped and moaned, "*Même les Allemands ne poussaient pas comme ça*—not even the Germans pushed like that!" It was upsetting to feel that in France, which we had fought to free, we were not even as welcome as in England.

Nor, finally, were we as rich as we had been in England. Goods were scarce in France and rationing had broken down under the pressure of a black market fostered by both the Germans and the Underground, who had used it against each other. To keep us from buying up what little was left, an exchange rate had been fixed under which an American private had to spend a month's pay in taking a girl out to dinner. We suddenly were poor, and it was no great wonder that many started picking up some of the easy money offered by the black market.

Out of all this came the wave of GI Francophobia which in the end stirred the War Department into putting out a pamphlet by a best-selling author: "112 Gripes Against the French," complete with answers—a remarkable advance for a form of literature whose native habitat was the latrine, and in which authorship originally used to be acknowledged only by Clem. From insufficient plumbing, and the untilled fields (to which the answer was not that French farmers were lazy but that they were in German prison camps), the gripes ranged to indignation over a French claim to have given Americans their Statue of Liberty. To this the pamphlet merely replied, "It's true."

The author did an excellent job, but its effect may be doubted. GIs will gripe against France and the French as long as they cannot amuse themselves there as their fathers did in World War I—and they will do that simply because this is World War II. However, it is doubtful whether even 112 gripes will lastingly affect whatever is American opinion of Lafayette's country. Our boys in France have operated on the black market; they do hang out in bars and raid the dives of Montmartre. But they also study at the Sorbonne, take courses in Biarritz under the Army Educational Program, and flock to the Opéra, the Comédie Française, the Louvre. And frequently these are the same boys who gave the Place Pigalle its new name of "Pig Alley," and whose loud, if not too euphonious dawn-patrol choruses in the streets of Nicé caused old French ladies to sigh through open windows, "*Oh, ces Américains*—"

THE odd reactions began in Germany. It was odd—unless you closely considered the background—for graduates of U. S. Army indoctrination courses to wonder why we ever had to fight such a fine people. It also was strange for men who had seen the concentration-camp movies, if not the real, unfumigated thing, to opine that all these so-called enslaved people really were "inferior" and needed stern rule by their betters. And yet such opinions have been heard around every displaced-persons camp in the American zone. It was certainly odd for an American officer in Berlin to tell a German girl that the Jews had started the war—an observation to which the girl, no less surprisingly, replied, "Don't say such things here, please. They've got us into enough trouble."

It was odd—unless you considered the background. And the background factors were the same as in the Allied countries: a noncombatant army, girls, money, inter-Allied vanity, and previous prejudices. Socialite and would-be socialite GIs felt that after all, people with German names were a better class than those with Polish, Czech or Greek,

not to say Jewish names. And then there were the plumbing and the Reichsautobahnen, the cleanliness, the efficiency, and the war machine whose technical perfection and fanatic spirit soldiers admired—especially if they had not faced it in combat.

All these seeds of a liking for the enemy had been sown at home. They had lain buried during actual hostilities and really began to bloom only some time after the start of the occupation period. That in fact they did exist before was proved more than once by the rather shamefaced testimony of freed American prisoners—above all, those taken in the December breakthrough. They told about the first slave-workers they had seen, who gave them the V-sign as they were marched to the rear, and how they had despised these future DPs and felt that they, the PWs, were way above such "scum." They told of a sudden feeling of respect when the slave-workers walked past on the outside while they sat behind barbed wire. It took this demonstration of the relativity of liberty to make them think. And they told of their final conversion when the "super-men" starved and maltreated them and the "subhumans" gave them of their own starvation rations.

Not many GIs who were German prisoners will be pro-German or sneer at Germany's victims. Nor will many of the combat troops who fought their way from the invasion beaches to the Elbe and the Alps. Most of them have seen too much on that way which they will never forget. But they are now mostly civilians, and the more numerous rear area units following in their wake saw very little, while the replacements which will soon make up four-fifths of the occupation force saw nothing at all. Last fall the replacements were polled by the Army, with results that were kept secret for months. Fifty-one per cent thought that Hitler "did the Reich a lot of good before 1939." Thirty per cent preferred the Germans to both the French and the English. Twenty-four per cent were willing to concede a German right to rule Europe and 22 per cent were satisfied that the

Germans had "good reasons" for their persecution of the Jews, with another 10 per cent undecided. Even to AMG authorities the survey "appeared to indicate that the American soldier in some cases had fallen for the propaganda of Germans echoing Dr. Goebbels." He certainly had—because he had seen little and been shown less.

These occupation troops found Europe a place where friends could be bought with a cigarette or even a chocolate bar. It worked everywhere, but it fetched the most pleasingly servile gratitude in Germany. Outside the Reich all sorts of people boasted of their part in our victory, whereas the Germans willingly acknowledged that they had been licked by American power alone. The black market also was more lucrative in Germany, and easier to get into. To make a killing in France, a man might have to embezzle Army stores and risk ten years at hard labor; in Germany he simply "liberated" automobiles, typewriters, cameras, jewelry and whatever else struck his fancy.

THE girls in Germany were in a class by themselves; and for the most part relations with German womanhood descended to Clem's level; the writing space which he devoted to girls multiplied after D-Day. "We come as conquerors," General Eisenhower warned his men as they moved into Germany. But in the approach to the other sex, the difference between liberators and conquerors was nil.

We found that, virtually uninhibited after years of Nazi education for free love, the girls in Germany were ready, willing and able to carry on the war for the Fatherland with weapons of their own—and that without distinction of age, looks, married status, wealth or social position, and with no more than a snicker for the Allied fraternization ban.

The case of a friend of mine is an illustration of the working of Goebbels' feminine delayed-action bombs. Mac was a corporal in a combat unit, had been in the front lines since D-Day, had witnessed the SS

atrocities in the Ardennes, had seen Buchenwald a day after its capture, and had learned to despise the Germans as much as any man I knew. He finally landed in a small Hessian town where he was to screen German war prisoners for discharge. Soon thereafter we met again, and he told me about his new girl. Her name was Grete and she was very pretty. Her husband was a PW in Mac's cage; Mac would probably get his case. "I'm afraid," he said, "I'll have to recommend him for discharge. There seems to be nothing we might hold him on." Grete herself, he told me, loathed the Nazis, though her sister Liese was still proud of being one. It was a pity, because Liese spoke English fluently and was a good typist and stenographer. Mac had given her a dressing down, but without results. "Give me time," she had said. "I've been a Nazi all my life. Do you want me to change in a week, just because you're here now?" Mac told the story with a grim face, but in his voice was a touch of admiration.

Three weeks later he drove me over to his little town. Everything was going famously, he said. Grete's husband had been discharged but it had made no difference. She did not like him, anyhow. Mac was her real love. Liese was now working for the Army. They had decided she was too capable to let her past political affiliations stand in the way of their using her. Efficient help was essential to reconstruction, and the Germans had to be shown that we could put them on their feet faster than the Russians, or they would all go Communist. Besides, we would need their help when the war with Russia came along.

A stalled civilian car came in sight on the Reichsautobahn. Mac slowed down, until he read the English inscription, "Jewish-operated vehicle." Then he stepped on the gas. When I remonstrated, he laughed. "Don't be silly—I bet he isn't even Jewish. They're all producing Jewish grandmothers now. I'd rather trust an honest Nazi and knew who I'm dealing with."

In Mac's town, on a wall of the house where he was billeted, I noticed an inscrip-

tion which had not been there a month before. It said, in block letters, "CLEM HAS BEEN HERE."

IN GERMANY, Clem could give free rein to the prejudices he had felt, but seldom expressed back home. In our Army anti-Semitism was not a serious problem (at least not in the European theater), while anti-Negro prejudice was a very serious one and often led to clashes. Yet it would be naive to conclude that there were no Jew-baiters among our troops. The difference in attitude was probably due to the segregation of colored GIs in Jim Crow units. Jewish GIs benefited from the company spirit, the comradeship that goes with every soldier's pride in "the outfit." But in Germany the boys met Jews who did not wear American uniforms but rags and yellow patches, Jews unmistakably marked as such, without rights or standing. Then it became very clear that serving in all ranks of the U. S. Army were men who did not like Jews any better than Negroes, and that others who had nothing against Negroes still did not like Jews.

Those were the officers who kept the Jews in their original, barely cleaned-up concentration and slave-labor camps and balked at executing General Eisenhower's order to house these German victims by evicting Germans. Those were the enlisted men who waxed indignant—not over the Jews' continued imprisonment but over having to pull guard at Jewish DP camps—and vented their indignation on the inmates, as if these had not yet suffered enough. Of course, some of our Clems declared such miserable wretches weren't kept locked up for nothing—the Poles in England had known the way to treat them—the British probably knew why they wouldn't let them into Palestine—after all, that country belongs to the Arabs, tough guys, sort of like our own American Indians, and no one ought to try to take their country away from them—well, why not just give all the Jews to the Reds? Maybe the Germans weren't so all-fired wrong . . .

It became a familiar line. How much

energy was required of Headquarters to keep the line from becoming a policy is known to only a handful of men. But the fact that it did *not* become policy seeped all the way down to the latrine level. Though many unkind comments on DPs at large have since appeared around Clem's signature, direct attacks on Jews so far have remained few and far between. Here is an almost unique case of voluntary self-censorship by an individual accustomed to the ultimate in freedom of speech, as befits a free American.

For that is what Clem is. We may call the tenor of his writings un-American; the fact of his writing them is strikingly American. We need merely glance at the works of similar type which the "krauts" left behind in France. There is always of course the official anthology, complete with dirty remarks about enemies of the Reich, Jews or "Jew lackeys." Yet mudslinging covers a mere fraction of the Nazi walls. The main space serves for positive, patriotic utterances. With hardly a slogan missing, it almost seems as though in the Wehrmacht physical functions too had suffered a kind of *Gleichschaltung* and been coordinated with the Fuehrer's words and aims. A German soldier was a robot even in the latrine. Clem was free. Clem was an American.

Always and everywhere in World War II the GI was both Joe and Clem. He ran the gamut of American traits, good and bad. He was matter-of-factly heroic up front, and drunk and disorderly when out on a pass. He was smart and a sucker, generous and a racketeer, now eagerly appreciative of the values of the Old World, now boorish and vulgar toward its people. The "ill will" the boys are said to create abroad must be considered in the light of what used to be said there about Americans in peacetime. The same charges, almost word for word,

are now made against the Americans in uniform. But if no permanent ill will resulted from earlier anti-Yankee outbursts, present criticism of the GIs is not likely to produce it either.

Allowing for changed conditions, the attitudes of the Americans also were much what they had been in peacetime—when in fact they had largely developed. Of the millions of jibes that Clem wrote on the walls of Europe, few might not just as well have been penned by some crabby, contrary, and often foul-mouthed pre-war tourist. Even Clem's prime and singular purpose has been that of the disgruntled traveler: to get home in a hurry.

In a flood of gripes and abuse Clem has completed the Odyssey of the American soldier of World War II. He has sweated out transports in repple-depples and staging areas and ports of embarkation. He did his last KP here, cleaned his last yard there, spent his last day in the guard-house over yonder. He spat out his last K-rations, and after one of the last westward crossings of the Queens his name was found in two hundred places abroad. Gripping, bitching, raising his own frustrated hell with pencil on private walls, he has reached the one and only goal he shared with millions of others. Clem has come home.

So Clem and his gripes reach the parting of their ways. Henceforth, the veterans will have to make up their minds about the world they live in. As GIs they could simply blow off emotional steam on a wall or latrine door, for the decisions were out of their hands; but those days are gone with the uniform. Clem, the ever-unreasoning, will meanwhile go to a GI Elysium and blissfully sweat out an eternal last night as a soldier. Unless his disembodied gripes should get out of hand and start another war, he will probably remain there.

THE FREEDOM OF THE CHESSBOARD

Jewish Achievement in the Royal Game

MILTON FINKELSTEIN

IN 1941 the *Deutsche Schachzeitung*, the official German chess publication, printed a series of articles which dealt harshly with what was described as the "Jewish idea of defense," which had, it was claimed, vitiated the chess world for half a century. Jewish chess players, it said, were lacking in courage and devoid of creative ability. Chess, the *Schachzeitung* argued, contained two main streams of development—the spiritual and the material, the aggressive and the defensive, the artistic and the grasping—the Aryan and the Jewish. World champion Alexander Alekhine, at the time an unwilling guest of the Germans, represented the former influence, while Dr. Emanuel Lasker, a former champion who died in 1940, epitomized by his style and actions the Jew.

The 1937 title match between Alekhine and Max Euwe, a Dutch schoolmaster and liberal, marked the final triumph of the Aryan principle. Proof of this lay in the fact that Alekhine's second had been the Austrian Aryan, Erich Eliskases, while Dr. Euwe had been assisted in his preparations

Aficionado of chess, MILTON FINKELSTEIN has been playing, teaching, thinking and writing the game for the past ten years. He has already attained a reputation of stature in the strict hierarchy of chess circles, being regarded as one of America's younger masters. Formerly captain of the team of the august Marshall Chess Club, he has participated in the United States open championships and has directed tournaments all over the country. When he is not poring over a chessboard, Mr. Finkelstein is a student of American history. He has written for *The New Leader* and *Social Research*, and at present is engaged in editing chess manuscripts and translating classical chess literature. He taught handicapped children in the New York City school system for some years. He is twenty-five years old.

and analysis by an American Jew, Reuben Fine. The *Schachzeitung* discovered an active conspiracy by the "Jewish World" to keep a friend and supporter in the game's top position. Yet Aryan supremacy had again been vindicated, albeit by the victory of a Russian-born Frenchman.

The *Deutsche Schachzeitung* articles have been ascribed to Dr. Alekhine himself. He claims: 1) He did not write them. 2) He wrote an entirely different article, which the Nazis rewrote and printed under his signature. He has been "forgiven" by the British Chess Federation, but has been blacklisted by the rest of the democratic world. He has been unable to obtain a visa to the United States, and the Russians have rechristened the system of opening play initiated and developed by him, and known as the "Alekhine Defense," the "Moscow Opening."

The content of these and similar defamatory articles are probably only interesting as curious reflections of Nazi thought-processes. But one quickly notes in any survey of the chess field that Jews have been prominent in it for three-quarters of a century. International tournaments have been studded with the names and achievements of Jewish chessmasters; Wilhelm Steinitz and then Emanuel Lasker held the world title for 55 years; the roster of national champions has for decades been predominantly Jewish—Reshevsky, Fine and Denker in the United States, Koltanowski in Belgium, Botvinnik and Levenfish in Russia, Yanofsky in Canada, Koshnitsky in Australia, Steiner in Hungary, Rubinstein and Najdorf in Poland, Spielman in Austria, etc., etc.

For the statistically inclined, the lists of players at major tournaments give over-

whelming proof of Jewish dominance. The four most important pre-war tournaments were the Nottingham (1936), Stockholm Team (1937), AVRO (1938) and the U. S. Championships. At Nottingham, five of the fifteen competitors were Jewish, and these finished first, third, fourth, seventh and eighth. The Stockholm event was won by the United States, whose five-man team included four Jews. A total of thirteen out of the twenty-five in the five top teams were Jewish (U. S., Hungary, Poland, Argentina, Czechoslovakia). In the AVRO tournament, comprising the then recognized eight greatest players in the world, four Jews participated, one of them, the American Reuben Fine, finishing in a tie for first place, and the other, Reshevsky, tying for third. In the 1938 United States championship tournament, fifteen out of seventeen players, including the winners of the first ten places, were Jewish.

More recent matches tell the same story. In a radio match held over the 1945 Labor Day weekend between teams representing Russia and the United States, nine of ten American players were Jewish, four of the ten Russians.

In the 1945 Pan-American tournament, held at Hollywood in August, seven of thirteen competitors were Jewish. The first place and the championship of the hemisphere was gained by Samuel Reshevsky, Polish-born American master.

"Chess, as a former district attorney of New York once remarked, is "Jewish athletics." Why is it that Jews play chess as much and as well as they do?

CHESS in the Middle Ages was a diversion of the nobility. Brought to popularity by the Moors, it caught on along the Mediterranean coast, moving northward with the passage of time and the growth of towns. It remained a "gentleman's pastime" until the middle of the 19th century, when the rise of professionalism in chess opened up a new and amazing popularity for it throughout Europe.

For with the appearance of the profes-

sional the game found itself in the hands of a group of persistent exponents—men whose self-interest demanded that they make their chosen field of endeavor profitable. In the year 1851 the first of a long series of international tournaments was held in London. Its success precipitated a tidal wave of activity. The professionals organized chess clubs, published or edited magazines devoted to the game, conducted tournaments, sought and found great and small patrons, and made Europe so chess-conscious that by 1900 there were few large towns in all Western Europe without chess clubs, and few that had not been at some time or other the seat of an important chess tournament.

JEWs, like others, learned to play chess, and grew to enjoy it. And it was chiefly the Jews of Europe who became its chessmasters, for socially, economically and psychologically they stood to gain most in this field. As it happened, it was in just those areas where Jews suffered that chess prospered most, and it was there that the greatest Jewish chessmasters arose. No chessmaster was subject to disabilities of residence or travel; hence escape on honorable terms from an oppressive environment was easy for them. The renown of chess players—as well as of great rabbis—was international, with recognition from Jew and non-Jew alike. The games of a chessmaster, once recorded and printed, are as lasting as the writings of a scholar, and equally subjects of study.

It is interesting to note that countries such as England and France, where Jews enjoyed earlier and fuller emancipation, have produced few chessmasters and no Jewish players of international stature.

European Jewry has always prized intellectual achievement above any other; the rabbi, the scholar, the teacher, these occupied the honorific positions in Jewish society. Chess was a common enough pastime among them, and regarded as a suitable activity for their students and disciples. The Talmud (*Ketuboth* 61 b) has reference to a

game which Rashi's commentaries described as chess, and which it is permissible for a wife to indulge in. Akiba Rubinstein, the greatest chessmaster produced by Poland, was a yeshiva student before his chess talent became apparent. He left the yeshiva despite great social pressure, but was later acclaimed by all of Polish Jewry.

Sometimes chess could even benefit an entire community. The story is told of a small town in eastern Poland that was visited by a devout and wealthy butcher from Lodz who offered a gift of 500 rubles to the synagogue should any of its members defeat him at chess. The rabbi, the local innkeeper and a tailor were bested in their turn; then someone thought of a student who tutored the children of a nearby nobleman. Fetched in haste, he defeated the butcher and became a local hero.

Living in the eternal shadow of his disabilities, the Jew thus found in chess one of the few fields that provided equality of opportunity, equality of mobility, and in which ability alone could grant success. The coffee-houses and inns of Europe formed the perfect expression of this equality; the chess sets they provided their customers gave those who were otherwise "inferior" full freedom of play. The better man won, and no special advantages were required to become the better man. How many Jews could hope to be invited to the homes of the local gentry, government officials and the representatives of the military? Chess players frequently were, to play and to teach. Wilhelm Steinitz took his greatest delight in defeating such men as Johannes von Zukertort, a Junker-born English chessmaster. A feud is said to have developed between these two. Zukertort is said to have remarked that Steinitz was not a chess player, but a Jew. To which Steinitz replied that Zukertort was apparently neither. Zukertort never recognized Steinitz' possession of the world championship. A dinner attended by the two was made memorable by the spectacle of both men rising to a toast to the greatest chess player in the world.

Proficiency in chess, because of the European system of grading players, was quickly rewarded by recognition. A novice was admitted to a "minor" tournament. Should he win this, he was permitted to play in "major" (or "premier") tournaments. Victory in these gave him the title of "Master," and admission to international play, with the chance to win the title of "Grandmaster." Recognition once achieved, the master travelled freely and was welcome wherever chess was played. Exhibition tours were common, and provided most masters with a steady source of income.

CHES players regard their game as an art which can reflect style, originality and depth of expression. The chess artist finds a school of play, becomes an authority on technical matters and a leader in the international chess community. Every closed circle makes its own heroes, important within its own confines even when unknown outside. Capablanca, who did not lose a single game in eight years of competition, became a legend. His eventual defeat by a German Jew, Richard Reti, made the latter a hero the world over, and especially in Jewish circles.

Wealthy Jewish families acted as patrons of the game and its Jewish masters. Steinitz was a welcome guest at many homes in London. The Rothschild family donated valuable prizes to a number of tournaments before the First World War. Germany, with its numerous resort towns, was the seat of many of the early tournaments, and later, German-Jewish chessmasters spread Yiddish and German phrases which have become part of the language of the game. Examples, in addition to the familiar "kibitzer," are *Luft*, *Sitzfleisch*, *Sitzkreis*, *Patzer*. European chessmakers from different countries often had to resort to Yiddish in international tourneys as the best means of understanding one another. (The writer recently spent an afternoon in the company of a Belgian and a Hungarian, both chessmasters. English was tried, then French, and finally, for greatest clarity,

Yiddish.) This period—the late 19th and early 20th centuries—was indeed a golden age for the Jewish chessplayer.

The Nazis at various times announced the death of most of the Jewish chessmasters of occupied Europe. A number of these men, however, appear to have escaped, largely through the assistance of sympathetic non-Jewish chess players. Rubinstein, reported dead in 1939, was discovered safe in Belgium in 1944. Sapira, a Belgian, reappeared in Brussels after three years of incognito existence. Salo Flohr, champion of Czechoslovakia, escaped to Russia, as did the Hungarian Lilienthal (they both represented Russia in the Labor Day matches). Lajos Steiner, an announced target of the Nazis, appears to have survived. The full story of the rescue of these and others is yet to be told, but the information available seems to indicate a breakdown of Nazi coordination where chessmasters were concerned. Rubinstein, for example, was confined in a sanitarium in Poland, was ordered killed by the German authorities, was actually so reported, and, when found, was discovered to have been shipped to Belgium and the safety of another sanitarium. He is again playing chess, partly with the financial support of American chess players.

Chess prospers most in urban areas, where large numbers of players have opportunity for frequent play; and urban centers are,

of course, the usual centers of Jewish population. Here in the United States, New York is the leading chess center, and Chicago, Philadelphia and Los Angeles the "provincial" ones. The dominance of Jews in the chess circles of these cities—a development of the last thirty years—seems likely to continue. We have outstanding masters here now. Their prowess will not decrease, and it is already the highest in the world. Thus, for their lifetime at least—and they are all young men—Jewish players will continue to lead in American chess.

Indeed, the postwar period may see the transfer of international play to the New World, and the development of new centers of interest in chess and the emergence of many more American masters. Meanwhile, the game has received its greatest enrichment from those masters who were driven from Eastern Europe by poverty and oppression. Their contribution is summarized by the American master, A. E. Santasiere (a Catholic), who wrote in one of a series of essays on the game:

Steinitz, Reti, Spielman, Nimzowitz, to mention only a few . . . were all bold, passionate experimenters, ardent with an urge to beauty, disdaining personal material gain as the more important motivating force. Chess will always be indebted to their original and brilliant creations. This is not propaganda—it is truth, to be verified by evidence which is easily available.

THE ARAB LEAGUE: TOOL OR POWER?

BERNARD D. WEINRYB

A NEW political phenomenon burst upon the scene of Middle Eastern politics just about one year ago—the Arab League. Disparaged as a tool of the British Colonial Office, denounced as a Fascist threat and hailed as a step to Arab unity, its character, origins, strength and future possibilities have not yet been made clear to the Western world.

Formed in March 1945, the Arab League—consisting of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen—made its international debut at the UNO conference in San Francisco soon after, and went on to open offices in London and Washington in October. The object of these offices was officially stated to be to supply information on aspects of modern Arab life, but the Washington office registered with the State Department as a foreign propaganda office, and Mr. Ahmed Shukairy, its head, declared that he was here to counteract Zionist propaganda.

The Arab League protested President Truman's letter to Prime Minister Attlee asking him to let 100,000 Jews into Palestine; it protested Russia's proposal that it become trustee for Tripolitania, and was active against the French during the Levant

crisis. Its greatest success, perhaps, was at the UNO conference in London, just ended, where, acting together, the five Arab League members of the UNO were successful in getting a Syrian elected as Chairman of the Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly, a Lebanese elected to the Social and Economic Council, and secured for Egypt seats in the Security Council and the International Court of Justice. Again and again they revealed a not unenviable skill in parliamentary tactics.

The worried reader may be assured at this point that the League is not yet a fascist threat, as has been claimed—at any rate, not at this time—and it by no means possesses the strength that these international "successes" would indicate. Undoubtedly, some of its success has been a newspaper success; to color-hungry unpolitical reporters the Arab delegations, with their dramatic costumes, their glamorous princes, and their retinues of servants and milch goats are a godsend.

Yet, taking every discount, the Arab League has arrived. It is now one of the most important factors in Near Eastern politics, and may in the future become even more important. Certainly, it is well worth a careful, realistic appraisal.

Strivings Toward Unity

LIKE European movements of national unity and independence in the 19th century, the Arab movement began as a cultural revival, and only later was it coupled with political nationalistic aims. The idea of Arab revival was born among the Arab intelligentsia in Syria and Egypt and had its roots in both Islamic traditions and modern nationalism. Its carriers in Syria were Lebanese Christians, educated in the then American College (now University) of Beirut and in mission schools, who launched

BERNARD D. WEINRYB, historian, economist, and political expert on the Near East, was born in Poland in 1900, graduated from the Jewish theological seminary in Breslau, Germany, and received his Ph.D. from the University of Breslau. After Hitler's rise to power, he went to Palestine where he lectured on economics at the School for Social Workers in Jerusalem. He came to America in 1939, and has been director of the Jewish Teachers' Seminary and People's University since 1940. Dr. Weinryb has written studies of Jewish economic and social history in German, Hebrew and English; his latest book, *Palestine—A Society in Transition*, is due to come off the press soon. He has been editor of the quarterly *Jewish Review* since 1942.

the cultural revival in the 1870's. In Egypt, a leaven of Syrian exiles and immigrants, combined with the preponderantly French culture of the upper classes, led to the adoption of some Western ideas of nationalism. In both countries, cultural aspirations drew strength from and at the same time helped inspire political opposition to the foreign rulers—Turkish and British.

The Young Turk revolution of 1908 in the Ottoman Empire, which then included all the Arab countries except Egypt, gave impetus to the Arab national revival. In the parliament elected in accordance with the constitution adopted by the revolution, a bloc composed of all the Arab delegates laid the foundation for the idea of total Arab unification (then visualized in terms of an autonomous state inside the Ottoman Empire). Later, when the Young Turks developed an exclusivist Turkish nationalism, the Arabs went into open opposition to Turkey. Arab officers in the Turkish Army and secret societies agitated against the Turks and for national freedom.

The Arab independence movement, coupled with the dynastic interests of Hussein ibn Ali, the Sherif of Mecca, plus English gold, paved the way for agitation for revolt against Turkey during World War I. The British encouraged the pan-Arabic aspirations of the influential Sherif, but even while negotiations with him were under way, secret agreements divided the Middle East into British and French zones of influence. At the San Remo Conference (April 1920), Iraq and Palestine were allotted as mandates to Great Britain and Syria went to France. Hussein's sons, Feisal and Abdullah became, a year later, King of Iraq and Emir of Transjordan (which was divorced from Palestine) respectively.

Hussein's territory was later overrun by the Central Arabian tribesmen of Ibn Saud and Hussein driven from his country. Ibn Saud emerged as a power in Arabia. In an attempt to spread his hegemony over the peninsula, Ibn Saud convoked a Pan-Islamic conference in Mecca in 1926, without result. But he succeeded in consolidating his king-

dom by signing a treaty with Great Britain in 1927 and concluding treaties with Iraq and Transjordan at the beginning of the 1930's.

In the other Arab countries, politically divided and struggling for independence, the cultural trends toward Arab unity became stronger. Growing Arab nationalism, now percolating down to the masses, found an outlet in uprisings, rebellions and riots (Syria, Iraq, Palestine). Often it was exploited by local leaders for their own political aims. The British Colonial Office, eager to preserve British domination in the Middle East, developed the strategy of making concessions to popular nationalism, while at the same time using the ruling groups in each Arab country as pillars of British domination. Among British officialdom the idea of Arab unity or pan-Arabism, with its anti-foreign and anti-Christian tendencies, became the notion of Arab federation. This was to comprise a loose confederation of cooperating independent Arab states. By this plan, its British sponsors sought to eliminate or blunt the anti-British tendencies of the pan-Arab movement and to appear as promoters of real Arab unity. The plan found response among extremist as well as more moderate groups; the former hoped to achieve at least a part of their aims, and the latter realized that regional loyalties were still strong and a single large Arab state would be weakened by its large minorities and sheer geographical size.

From Plan to Reality

DURING World War II and especially after the Iraqi revolution in 1941, Great Britain counted on the Arab federation plan to combat Axis sympathies among the Arab peoples. When the war turned in favor of the Allies, Great Britain saw her old rival, Russia, again becoming interested in the Mediterranean (in Secretary Bevin's words, "coming right across the throat of the British Commonwealth,") and the Arab federation now appeared to its British promoters as a force which would aid Britain against Russian advances in the Near East.

Foreign Secretary Eden had stated back in 1941 that Great Britain would view efforts to create an Arab confederation with sympathy. There followed negotiations, missions, statements and denials. The old difficulties in the way of Arab unity—the discord between the Hashemite dynasty (Hussein's family—the present rulers of Transjordan and Iraq) and the Saudi-Arabian King, insistence on the independence of each single state, the divergent interests of the different politicians—all these were still there. But some of the negotiators started to preach gradualism, to seek forms of unity maintaining the status quo.

Since 1943 Egypt had taken the initiative in the discussions on Arab unity, while Saudi Arabia had been reluctant to take part in the talks. Ibn Saud based his hesitation on the fact that the Palestine question was not yet solved and Palestine was not an Arab state. Again the idea of a Greater Syria arose, and was discussed by Syria and Iraq with the support of British circles. But the suspicions of the Hashemite dynasty still blocked the project.

The Egyptian premier, Nahas Pasha, finally succeeded in convincing Ibn Saud to refrain from pressing the Palestine issue, and in having the plan for a separate Greater Syria dropped. He urged the Arab parties in Palestine to form a single delegation. In September 1944, the Arab parley opened in Alexandria. Musa el-Alami, from Palestine, was admitted first as an observer, then as a delegate of the Arabs of Palestine. The protocol of this parley was then ratified by each of the Arab states. Finally the foreign ministers of the Arab states, together with Musa el-Alami, met in Cairo on February 14, 1945 to draft the constitution of the Arab League. After five weeks of secret negotiations the charter was adopted on March 22nd.

On the Road to Unity?

ANY appraisal of the League and its potential for greater Arab unification and increasing power must take into account a wide variety of factors—cultural, religious, eco-

nomic, political, social—working often in conflicting directions. The common language, in spite of variations in the different countries, without a doubt exerts a unifying influence. Various pan-Arab conferences of intellectuals and youth groups undoubtedly further the idea of national unity. There have been yearly conferences of Arab lawyers and physicians (both met in 1944), interparliamentarian conferences (1938 in Cairo), student conferences (London 1942), a congress of women (1944), scout camps (1944 in Syria), etc.

An important unifying factor is the common Islamic religion and its heritage. The "totalitarian" character of the Islamic religion, its complete exclusiveness, may serve as a bond between the Arab groups, although the pan-Islamic idea as such failed to gain wide support. On the other hand, the religious divisions—between the Sunnites and Shiites and between these and the orthodox primitive Wahabites—should not be overlooked.

The religious divisions parallel a wide political heterogeneity, from the theocratic regimes of Yemen and Saudi Arabia to the secular or semi-secular governments of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Still more marked is the contrast between the Bedouins and the cultured city dwellers, the nomad herdsmen and the settled cultivators. Most of the seven Arab states have to cope with these age-old antagonisms within their own boundaries, in addition to formidable racial and religious minorities.

In Lebanon, for example, the Moslems include three main groups, Sunnites, Shiites and Druses. The Christians are divided into Maronites, Orthodox and Catholic; the Orthodox Church has Roman-Orthodox and Armenian-Orthodox divisions and the latter is subdivided into two groups, one attached to, the other opposing, the Russian Church. The Catholics are divided into Roman and Latin Catholics, and there are in addition smaller denominational minorities. To a lesser extent the same applies to Syria. In Iraq the Arabs are divided into Sunni and Shiite Moslems, while almost one-

third of the population is made up of Kurds. In Egypt there are besides the Moslems the Christian Copts.

The racial minorities make "Arab" unification a doubtful possibility, while the religious differences may devitalize Islam as a unifying force. In addition, domestic weaknesses in each Arab state necessitate strengthening local nationalism within each state. All these countries have in common a medieval system of land ownership, a similar economic and social heritage and common characteristics of geography and socio-economic structure. But, as far as unification is concerned, this resemblance has negative rather than positive results. These states are for the most part engaged in agriculture and processing agricultural products for their own use, so that the exchange of commodities between them is negligible. Their economics do not supplement each other, and up to the war, the Middle East did not constitute an economic unit. In 1937, for instance, only 6.6 per cent of the trade in this region between one Middle Eastern country and another.

During the war, it is true, this situation changed. The Middle East was cut off from its regular sources of supply, and the Middle East Supply Centre (first a British, since 1942 a British-American agency) was set up to strengthen economic relations between the countries. But after the coming of peace the MESC was dissolved, apparently with the consent of the Arab states (the London *Economist* and pro-Arab circles had demanded the transfer of the functions of the MESC to the League, so as to create a common agency for economic development). The situation of the prewar years is likely to return, and we may again see Arab countries building up tariff walls against each other. For example, the introduction by Egypt of high customs duties on the import of soap in the 1930's led to a decline in the production of soap by Arabs in Palestine; the centuries-old Syrian crafts were locked out of their markets in Iraq and Egypt. The Arab states' recently proclaimed boycott of "Zionist products" from Palestine, whatever its political motive, may be viewed as part of

the postwar anti-import policy advocated in Egypt and other Arab countries.

The London *Times* (September 26, 1945) correctly states:

The difference in political, religious, and economic structure between, say the Lebanon and Saudi Arabia is much more pronounced than between, say Germany and France. Tribal, religious and dynastic antagonisms are more embittered and fanatical in the Oriental than in the European world, and so the Arab League has been more occupied with traditional eloquence than with the elaboration of constructive programs. . . . Just now the main, if not the only unifying force in the League is an ingrained and traditional xenophobia, directed, according to circumstances, against the French, the British or the Jews.

It is against this background of regional differences, dynastic animosities, and the divisive vested interest groups that one must evaluate the potentialities of the Arab League. A comparison with the West would be instructive. Neither in Germany nor in Italy did unification result from good will, cultural trends or loose confederations. Physical power was required to unite and hold together the parts. The Arabs are probably no different from the Germans or Italians, and history gives no indication that centripetal forces are stronger among them than among other peoples. Even in the most splendid epochs of Arab history unity was shortlived. A hundred years after the foundation of the Arab empire in the 7th century, the Arab state in Spain broke loose from Baghdad and a century later, autonomous Egypt and North Africa formally freed themselves from the domination of the Baghdad Caliph.

The goal of unity seems still far off, unless one of the three major blocs constituting the Arab League (Saudi Arabia-Yemen, Egypt, and the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq and Transjordan) exploits the popular sentiment favoring unity to bring it about by force. And in such a case, of course, one of the big powers competing for influence in the Middle East would have to back up this attempt with its prestige and military equipment.

Failing this, unity is hardly likely to be achieved.

Nuisance Value

THE founders of the Arab League and their British sponsors realized the inevitable weaknesses of their organization and built accordingly. The League, with the seven Arab states as full-fledged members and a representative for the Palestine Arabs, was organized as barely more than a loose association for the agreed purpose of "strengthening bonds of friendship between the members and the coordination of their political action with the object of safeguarding their independence." Great caution has been exercised to avoid imposing binding commitments on the members of the League. Thus, states are free to withdraw at any time; the council of the League has no army or police force, nor any means of making it obligatory for a state to follow any of its decisions; Article 7 states that only "unanimous decisions by the council are binding on all members of the League; those which are taken by a majority of votes will bind only those states which accept them." Each state, in other words, is *always* at liberty to act according to its own will and is not obligated to follow the majority.

The diversity of governmental forms in the Arab states is recognized by the provision that "every member state of the League shall respect the form of government obtaining in the other states of the League."

The League sets forth two main types of function to be undertaken by the League: 1) political, and 2) economic, cultural and welfare.

To the first group belongs "political action . . . to safeguard their [its members] independence and sovereignty, and . . . [interesting] itself in general in questions concerning Arab countries and their interests." To the second group belong the provisions for cooperation between the states in economic and financial questions, cultural matters, social problems and public health.

So far every action taken by the League has been concerned with external political matters which demanded only verbal repre-

sentations. It has been "a League of opposition" for foreign consumption. In no case have the internal problems of any state or of the whole League been tackled.

The official or semi-official statements of the League have often threatened violence and war by the "armies of the Arab states" to expel the French, or the Jews, as the case might be, with the combined might of thirty million Arabs. Sometimes as many as seventy millions are mentioned. Naturally, the spokesmen of the League know that all these threats are no more than "Oriental show." Iraq and Egypt alone have regular armies, each about 20,000 strong. But both are ill-trained, ill-equipped and unable to stand up to any modern army group. Ibn Saud's primitive warriors are certainly unsuited for modern warfare. Great Britain was able to subdue the pro-Axis rebellion in Iraq in 1941 with only about 1,000 soldiers, despite the widespread anti-British feeling among the population; and the Iraq government recently had to call on British military help to deal with a rebellious Kurdish chieftain.

But the chief weaknesses of the Arab states and their League spring from internal dissent and the dependence on Great Britain. Both factors were illustrated during the Syrian crisis. It was rumored that Syria refused to accept military help from Iraq, afraid that the Iraq forces might afterwards remain in the country. At the meeting of the Arab League Council in June 1945, a Syrian proposal that the Arab states break off relations with France if she failed to withdraw her troops was not carried—apparently because the consent of Great Britain was lacking.

Almost all the Middle East is economically dependent on Great Britain. Most of these countries belong to the sterling bloc, controlled by Great Britain, and most of their capital is now tied up as "war balances" in London. During the war Great Britain paid for commodities and services in the Middle East by borrowing from the banks of the different states and placing at their disposal in London sterling obligations. The importance of these sums may be gauged by the

fact that Egypt's war balances amount to about fifteen times its pre-war exports and twelve times the yearly state revenue, and those of Palestine to about twenty-five times yearly exports and twenty-two times yearly revenue. The Middle Eastern countries, with a greater degree of political freedom than they have had in many centuries, are economically more dependent on Great Britain than ever before.

Basic Weaknesses

THE weakness of the League was even more apparent when it tried to deal with an internal political issue in one of its member states. As we know, one of the chief aims of the League was to assist the Palestinian Arabs in fighting Zionism. A special meeting of the League's Economic and Agricultural Committees met in July 1945 to consider ways and means of rendering economic assistance. But the committees had to meet without any representatives of the Palestinian Arabs themselves since the different Palestinian Arab factions could not agree on what plan of assistance to accept. The Hussein Party, (led by a member of the Hussein family, not to be confused with Hussein of Mecca) had formerly controlled the Moslem Supreme Council funds collected in Arab and Moslem countries. It feared that the Umma fund, an Arab counterpart of the Jewish National Fund, would, if it were transformed into the central fund-raising institution of the Palestine Arabs with backing in Arab countries, become a powerful instrument in the hands of the rival Istaklal (Independence) and Reform Parties. The Hussein Party consequently opposed making the Umma fund the main financial institution of the Palestine Arabs, and proposed a "Five Year Land Rescue and Development Plan." The League was unable to bring the Palestinian groups together and passed a resolution which did not satisfy either group.

Palestinian Arabs have had other reasons to take exception to the League. The Palestine Arab weekly *Al Wihda* asserts (October 6, 1945) that "the Arab League

and its Educational Committee have proved injurious to the Arab students seeking entry into Egyptian educational institutions." Since the establishment of the League, it seems, the number of non-Egyptian students admitted to Egypt has been greatly reduced.

Other conflicts among the Arab states are not hard to discover. The Egyptian daily *Al Masri* (Oct. 15, 1945) points out that "the political and economic relations between Syria and Lebanon . . . are far from being satisfactory despite the apparent cooperation between the two countries. In fact, these relations are dominated by a deep feeling of fear and mutual suspicion." The author, the well known Egyptian journalist Habib Jamati, states that politically the Lebanese become suspicious every time the Greater Syria scheme arises, while economically the two countries are at odds concerning their respective shares in the revenue from the services which were formerly held by the French and transferred to the countries themselves with their independence. The differences in economic structure between these countries lead to different attitudes on tariffs. "The relations between Syria and the Lebanon . . . contain many strong elements making for ultimate discord. . . . High sounding talk of 'brotherhood', 'good neighbors', etc. . . ., merely serve to screen strongly conflicting interests and trends."

Recently, after Foreign Secretary Bevin announced that Transjordan would be given sovereignty, new schemes were abroad for uniting Iraq and Transjordan, with or without a greater Syria. Ibn Saud, according to reliable information, may upset the Hashemite dynasty's project by asking for a strip of Transjordanian territory that would give him a common frontier with Syria—and at the same time drive a wedge between Transjordan and Iraq.

The Arab League appears in no way to have outgrown its dependence on Great Britain. What once appeared to be a flirtation with Soviet Russia and communism is apparently over. In Egypt, the principal country of the League, a special body within the police force has been created to combat

communism and communist propagandists have been rounded up. Iraq and Syria have recently followed suit. In the clash between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. on Greece at the UNO session in London, it was the Egyptian delegation which introduced the resolution maintaining that the presence of British troops did not endanger peace or security. And in the closing sessions of the UNO Security Council, Mr. Vishinsky's championing of the case of the Levant states against Britain and France was only partly supported by Arab representatives. Finally, Emir Abdullah in a recent interview with a Turkish journalist stated that "Iraq and Turkey are directly threatened by Russia and the fear of this power is being felt in all Middle Eastern countries. . . . Great efforts are being made . . . with a view to setting up a defense bloc. . . ."

The inner weakness of the League, the fact that its military, economic and even political potential is negligible and that the states are economically dependent on Great Britain, does not render it entirely ineffective. It has a nuisance value, "for export." It impresses public opinion in the Western world and may serve as an instrument in the hands of one of the big powers competing for dominance in the Middle East.

What of the Future?

THIS does not mean that the League cannot develop into something more in the future. It is not paradoxical to expect the effectiveness of the League in some ways to be in inverse proportion to its actual strength. Because of its internal weakness, it *must*, in order to exist, "put up a show," make extreme demands, continue to voice threats and claims, at any rate for "export." The less internal achievement it is able to show, the more it will have to base its demands on xenophobia, on appeals to the "national instincts of the people," on extremism.

Soon after its organization the League had to deal with the disappointment of the Arab press at the League's ineffectiveness. Some papers referred to the tens of thousands of pounds spent by the delegations to the San

Francisco UNO Conference as "thrown into the Atlantic." The press was similarly disappointed at the inactivity during the Syrian crisis. The Egyptian weekly *Al Mussawar* (August 10th) feared that Arab public opinion would think "that the Arab League is nothing but a tool in the hands of foreign powers, or that the outburst of enthusiasm with which the League was originally greeted is slowly dying down."

The opposition groups in the Arab countries may also help drive the League to extremism. For instance, at a meeting of lawyers in Alexandria, Nahas Pasha, the former Egyptian Prime Minister, sharply criticized Azzam Bey, the Secretary of the League, for his failure to demand an immediate solution of the Palestine question.

Perhaps the most important motive for "playing to the gallery" is the widespread social unrest in the Middle East. The ruling groups, absorbed by political strife during the inter-war years, "forgot" the needs of the people and the social structure of Ottoman times remain unchanged. Because of the inflation and other economic developments during this war "the rich got richer while the poor got poorer." Contrasts between the classes have become sharper, and have led to the demand for social reforms. The League, representing the ruling groups, will need to divert attention from social to political issues. And the techniques to be employed need not be invented.

As a matter of fact, techniques taken over from Hitler and the Nazis are already in use. We have seen the method of putting up a show, threatening the use of non-existent strength and might, resorting to nonsense for propaganda purposes and repeating this nonsense with such vigorous certainty that it becomes accepted as truth. The "unity" ideal, in its "exclusivist" aspect, can be exploited for fascist purposes and the "unity" drive of the Arab League seems to be approaching that pan-Arab trend which Professor H. A. R. Gibb, of Oxford University, a friend of the Arabs, termed a few years ago "an ignorant, intolerant, explosive force; it substitutes wishing for thinking, fiercely

resents not only Christian domination but anything that savors of Christian practice and ideas, dreams of driving European and Jew into the ocean and restoring the glorious empire of the caliphate."

We have already seen efforts to camouflage the movement's own weakness by sowing hatred, inciting to murder and pogroms, and assailing as enemies all those who are not on the League's side. We have seen anti-Jewish riots in Egypt and Libya, the murder of statesmen, student riots against Great Britain and the Egyptian government, the slurring attack of the Arab press in Palestine on President Truman. It is now only a short step to acknowledging Nazi and fascist theories openly: the Palestine Arabic newspaper *Falastin*, for instance, attacked the Nuremberg trials, asserting that the Allies had no right to try nazis and nazism since this was a political ideology just as democracy and socialism are.

The Arab League may not necessarily have caused the anti-Jewish pogroms by incitement, nor be behind all the present agitation, for it may still be too weak to wield that much influence. But "radical" attitudes and actions, although not now officially a part of the League program, will become incorporated into it the more it becomes necessary to seek justification and mass support against the background of the League's actual ineffectiveness. Thus the present "nuisance value" of the League can develop into a potentially serious force which, given the right soil and circumstances, might become a menace in the Middle East to world peace. It might pave the way for a Fuehrer in the Middle East or for "unity" to be achieved by means of conquest and upheaval. Everything depends, of course, on the world situation, and on how seriously the Western world will take the "Oriental show" which

the Arab League is at present staging.

The rivalry in the Middle East between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain plays into the hands of the League leadership. The U.S.S.R. is apparently seeking to win over the Arabs. While a few months ago the British Communist M.P., Galacher, came out in favor of a Jewish Palestine, Philip Piratin, Communist M.P., now submits a memorandum to the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee on behalf of the Party, opposing Jewish immigration into Palestine. And at UNO sessions in London, the Russian delegation was strongest in demanding the withdrawal of French and British troops from the Levant.

The Arab states have made the most of this situation to gain influence in the UNO Assembly. With the help of the scarcely concealed support of the Soviet Union, they blocked the Turks from obtaining the chairmanship on one of the committees and were instrumental in keeping Turkey and Iran out of both the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council. Great Britain and the United States, though recognizing Turkey's right to a seat in the Economic Council, were reluctant to push this claim against the League.

Thus, Turkey may either be forced to join the Arab League or will be isolated (together with Iran), leaving Arab League members as the main representatives of the Middle East in the international arena. In either case the Arab League is liable to gain influence which, added to pressure methods, may enhance its importance in the political setup in the Near East.

By and large, the League's next moves and its future course and strength—at least in the stages just ahead—are dependent upon and await the policy of the great powers interested in the Middle East.

FROM THE AMERICAN SCENE

THE JEWISH DELICATESSEN

The Evolution of an Institution

RUTH GLAZER

WHEN I was sixteen my father became convinced he would never make his fortune as a milkman and decided to give the free enterprise system a chance to show what it could do for him. Armed with a capital of some \$2,000 scraped together from a meager bank account, loans on insurance policies and advances from friends and relatives, he began to look about for a suitable business. Finally, after lengthy visits from the aforementioned friends and relatives bearing sound advice consisting mainly of shining examples from their own life stories, plus some complicated reasoning and intuitive thinking of his own, he decided to move out to a new community

For her portrait of an important Jewish cultural institution in the American scene, RUTH GLAZER draws on six years of week-ends behind a delicatessen counter. (Recognizing that this preliminary study by no means exhausts the subject, the editor invites COMMENTARY readers, in the interest of science, to send in any data not included here which might help to broaden this field of knowledge.) Born in the Bronx in 1922, raised there and in Brooklyn, the author attended Hunter College High School, Hunter College, and, after her family moved to Long Island, Queens College, where she received her B.A. Her professional activities—all in the labor movement—have included the posts of educational director of a local of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and editorial assistant on the magazine *Labor and Nation*, as well as various free-lance research and writing jobs. COMMENTARY hopes in later issues to print studies of other American Jewish institutions, among them the candy store, the social hall, the dairy restaurant, and so forth.

in Long Island and open "a real Jewish delicatessen."

Now, "a real Jewish delicatessen" in New York, where it assumes its most specialized form, can mean at least three different things. In this respect, New York and a few other old Jewish communities on the Eastern seaboard are unique. Nowhere else in the country does the delicatessen exist in its pure, pungent form, an entity built around the sale of ten meats. (Excepting perhaps in Los Angeles, where recently two such institutions are rumored to have been established to meet the needs of the Broadway émigré group in Hollywood, tired of flying in delicatessen from the Gaiety.)

In Chicago, a metropolis with 300,000 Jews, you can get a hot pastrami or corned beef sandwich in eateries which call themselves delicatessens. But they are sad imitations. They even have a soda fountain in the front! In Washington, I have seen an attenuated delicatessen hidden away behind a grocery store. In interior New Jersey, you can get your franks and beans in stores whose main business is the sale of liquor. Reliable sources from the hinterland inform me that when the craving for salami becomes too strong to bear it is sometimes possible to have one imported via the kosher butcher in town. But there is cold joy in a salami sandwich eaten outside the steamy atmosphere of a New York kosher delicatessen.

MY FATHER, then, had his choice of three types of delicatessen. The most primitive is the *shlacht* store, generally found in the market sections of the great old Jewish settlements in the lower East Side, in

Brownsville, in the East Bronx. Now and then one will crop up like a poor relation on Upper Broadway or even the Grand Concourse.

Its essence is in its simplicity. Around the walls of what is generally a small square store are ranged open wooden counters. Suspended from hooks hang salamis, cold pastramis, rolled beefs and bundles of frankfurters. On the walls are a few shallow shelves containing a meager supply of the traditional accessories—beans, ketchup, some crackers, sometimes soup. The proprietor stands in the midst of this dominion using now one counter, now another, depending upon the location of the particular meat called for. The main attraction of these stores—for there is little of the warmth and geniality of the other types in this form—lies in their cut rate prices, sometimes as much as one-half of the going rate. Generally the meat is "Jewish" but not kosher. A nice distinction, which has grown in popularity.

My father, though, had no taste for the rough and ready quality of the *shlach* store. So he said the neighborhood was too "refined" for it. But another unspoken reason motivated him. Now that he was becoming a "businessman," he wanted a new, shiny, "up-to-date" store, something which by its opulent exterior would reflect the wealth and economic position which he hoped to attain.

He passed on to consider the second, and major variant—the kosher delicatessen proper. In the last twenty years it has seen many changes. But outside of superficialities like fluorescent lighting, refrigeration and curved glass storefronts, it has deviated little from the pattern set down by some unknown progenitor, and it has shrugged off most of the advances of modern science. The food is still bad for the digestion, vitaminless and delicious. In the window is a steaming grill, warming knishes and frankfurters to be eaten on the spot. Then comes a diminutive beer bar, generally crowded with various extraneous items—plates for the frankfurters or cigar boxes, producing a very unbarlike effect despite the brass rail. Past the bar is a high combination showcase and cutting counter. In your ordinary *goyish* delicatessen the meat lies coldly and palely behind the frosted glass of a refrigerated

case. The customer points to a spiritless and limp roll of yellowish-gray meat and says, "Give me a quarter of a pound of liverwurst."

Contrast the kosher delicatessen! Facing a clear glass (sometimes, it must be confessed, not so clear) lies a succulent variety of rosy and warm meats in a never-varying order. You may visit every delicatessen in New York and not one will fail to have *first* in line its battery of ten or fifteen salamis, on the little raised platform facing the glass, ranged in three or four rows, one on top of the other; followed by rolled beef, the tongues, a few cold pastramis (for decoration, since it is always served hot, sliced to order, from a steam box); the two trays of frankfurters—one of "specials," the short fat ones, one of the "regulars," the long thin ones; and finally a turkey. A smaller and rarer variety of frankfurter (extinct since the war) came in two sizes: the cocktail frankfurter, about as big as your thumb, and the "lilies," about half that size. "Lilies," research reveals, is short for "lilliputians." Sometimes the pans of cole slaw and potato salad are incorporated into this display. More often they are on the "back bar," the narrow counter behind the proprietor. Lying on the wooden cutting board is the inevitable corned beef which is always just about one-half gone. And invariably on the glass-topped counter is a plate with small chunks of salami. In the old days the plate always carried a sign, "A Nickel a Shtickel." (A most convenient—and profitable—way of disposing of the ends of the salami, too.) This immortal rhyme succumbed during the war to the free verse of "Have a Nosh—10c." The poetic spirit of the industry was not to be quenched by this loss, however. A substitute slogan appeared all over the city right after the outbreak of the war: "Send a Salami to Your Boy in the Army."

While the delicatessen is to be found in neighborhoods of every economic level, the meats that are sold are luxury products. Even during the depression they averaged about a dollar a pound.

MUSTARD may be something you can take or leave, but in a work on the delicatessen store it requires some mention. To put it flatly, mustard is as necessary to delicatessen as—ham is to eggs, to revert to

the American scene. Many is the customer who has come back mournfully to report, "The delicatessen was probably wonderful. But I couldn't even enjoy it. No mustard." Let me hasten to state here that the mustard which is given away free with every order is of a kind which is impossible to duplicate in any mere manufactured, bottled, commercial brand selling one million jars a year. And the storekeeper knows it. He can't say, "Oh, you must have had a jar around." There is no use evading the point. The corned beef, the pastrami, the tongue may have been the most succulent which ever left his store. But without mustard only the lightest whisper of its possibilities emerges. What is the secret of this mustard, its sharp, sour delicious tang? A little cold pickle brine. Stirred into the crock of thick prepared mustard, its original function was what our genteel Shopping News ladies would call, genteelly, a "stretcher." But the unwitting originator created that for which men will fight. Haven't we all seen letters from the South Pacific saying, "All I want is a corned beef sandwich, and don't forget the mustard"?

Traditionally, mustard is distributed free with all purchases of delicatessen. The purchaser of a large quantity of meat will get a gill's worth in a little white cardboard box mysteriously labelled "Ice Cream." But even the customer who comes in for a quarter of a pound is not forgotten. He is given a "toot" of mustard. A "toot" is made of a square of waxed, mustard-color paper, which is twisted into a cone, filled with mustard and then folded shut. Every delicatessen storekeeper makes his own with great speed and uniformity. I must point out that "toots" are made not only with an eye to mechanical perfection, but also with an eye to, shall we say, thrift. A little extra tug at the bottom of the cone before it is finished will reduce the volume by as much as 50 per cent.

The counter, though, is only one half of a real delicatessen establishment. The other half is the "restaurant." This is made up of a few tables and chairs, depending on the amount of room left after the counter has been installed. Originally marble-topped, the tables have attempted to improve along with fluorescent lighting and refrigeration. Now we see colored plastic tops,

and some elaborate establishments even use tablecloths.

But the kosher type of delicatessen did not suit my father, either. He had long been anti-clerical and was even known to have eaten ham sandwiches in his youth; and "anyhow," he said, "I don't want to have any business with rabbis snooping around my store to inspect whether it's kosher or not. I'd like to have a nickel for every kosher delicatessen that sells packages of bacon under the counter. Believe me, this'll be more kosher than some of those stores run by those *alte yiddlich* with *yamelkes*."

MY FATHER'S third alternative, the non-kosher but Jewish delicatessen, is now probably the most numerous. This type differs, deliberately, in only the most subtle ways from the kosher delicatessen. It looks exactly the same, smells exactly the same, and the pastrami sandwiches lack neither juiciness nor flavor. But the neon kosher sign is missing from the window. For many years proprietors of this new type of delicatessen were in the habit of substituting the word *Wurshigesheft* in Hebrew characters. This formidable word strung across half the window would seem to leave no room for doubt in the minds of the uninitiated that this was a very kosher delicatessen indeed. But, a few years ago, in response to pressure by a group of rabbis, acting for the kosher delicatessen storekeepers, a city ordinance forbade this practice as misrepresentation. The new terminology which is rapidly gaining favor in the trade is "kosher-style."

While the kosher delicatessens will serve only tea or soda pop in bottles as beverages, in the non-kosher delicatessen you can get coffee with cream, and butter on your bread if you insist on it. But the resistance by the proprietors has been fierce. In the six years that I spent behind a delicatessen store counter I rarely heard the cry, "Hot pastrami. Butter the bread." When it happened, we would ask to have the individual pointed out. My father, whose respect for tradition was very strong, would refuse to engage in such obscene practices, and would generally tell the waiter—"Give her a pat of butter, and let her butter the bread herself." Added to the display of

meats in the *Wurstgesheft* is also a roast beef (a non-kosher cut of meat). Most will not go so far as to include a ham, but I have seen even that in stores located in newer neighborhoods.

In earlier years the menu of the delicatessen was simplicity itself: franks and beans, any kind of delicatessen meat fried with eggs, sandwiches and that aristocrat of dishes—a plate of cold cuts (consisting principally of hot meats). As time has gone by the number of dishes available from the kitchen now cover three or four pages of a printed bill-of-fare. "Delicious home cooked meals, kosher style, like mother used to make" is a sign featured in most delicatessens today.

WITH the growth of the restaurant, various by-products of the counter which had formerly been sold at a discount found their way into the kitchen. Take tongue, for example. Tongue has always sold at a premium, averaging twenty-five cents more on a pound than the other meats. There is a very good reason. A beef tongue is perhaps three inches high for two-thirds of its length. It then tapers off to a thin point, perhaps a half-inch high. Whereas the meat in the wide section is light pink and fine grained, the tip is dark red and tough. Every customer who comes in for even a quarter of a pound demands with justice, "center-cut." Isn't she paying \$1.50 a pound? The problem was disposal of the tips of the tongues. It became customary to sell them to people who had dogs, at 10c a piece. But then some genius hit upon the omelette. Consider the difference between the frank "tongue and eggs, pancake style" and the ever so subtle omelette. In the former each slice of tongue gazes openly into the diner's face, its origins clearly discernible. But hidden in the folds and fluff of the omelette, the ancestry of the bits of meat are hardly so evident.

Since dairy dishes are not forbidden to the kosher-style store, a full selection of salads, fruit with sour cream, cheese and fish dishes are featured. All are served with bread and butter. But my mother could never get used to the idea of cutting a swiss cheese on the machine where a salami had lain but a moment before. After a while we all decided that we absolutely had to have

another slicing machine—for the corned beef. We finally got one which was admirably suited for the purpose, tilted at just the proper angle to maintain even pressure against the blade and with a little trough for escaping juice. The "corned beef machine" was used exclusively to slice cheese. "You can cut corned beef so much better by hand," my mother would explain.

The three-decker sandwich is the newest addition to the ancient art of serving delicatessen. While the old kosher delicatessens scorned to gild the lily, their imitators seized upon it as another means of keeping in step with the times. It must here be understood that whereas your ordinary three-decker American sandwich of toasted white bread is considered a frivolity for leisured ladies at Schrafft's, there is nothing more serious (or deadly) than a three-decker sandwich of three slices of good rye bread. Its sheer weight makes superfluous the delicate toothpick. The delicatessen three-decker is served, meaningfully, with knife and fork. Compare, too, the contents. While the toasted sandwich can rely heavily on vegetable matter like lettuce and tomato to expand it to a respectable height, the delicatessen three-decker, by custom, is all meat. Obvious combinations like corned beef and pastrami have been succeeded by complicated variations, culminating in four kinds of meats topped with lettuce, tomato, cole slaw, russian dressing and pickle, with an olive on top. Yet a rigid uniformity prevails even in this seemingly imaginative matter of combination sandwiches. Turkey for example, is always combined with tongue. But these two aristocrats never mix with the heartier meats.

Trends indicate that despite the havoc a combination sandwich can wreak on the digestion (I have illustrated only the most delicate), it is on its way to supplanting the simple one-meat sandwich. The combination sandwich fits well with the elaborate modern interiors, which have eliminated the hot frankfurter and the knish. We have only to sit back and wait for the ultimate—"A Banquet Between Three Slices of Bread—50c."

TO DECIDE upon the type of delicatessen the neighborhood called for, my father took his own Gallup poll. He proceeded to

visit the owners of most of the other stores to discuss business conditions in general and the possibilities for his own in particular. He then scouted out the shopping area for a radius of several blocks to see what competition he would have, measured the proportion of transient traffic to "home trade," investigated the national, religious and financial composition of the neighborhood, consulted with local real estate men and bank presidents, and finally made his decision. He became the proprietor of a "kosher-style delicatessen."

While the economic factors were important, the social composition of the neighborhood was the decisive factor pointing to the kosher-style form. Although the population of the area was about 50 per cent Jewish, there was a significant percentage of mixed marriages, and an old established Christian community which had already begun to look askance at the growing Jewish group. It would be too blatant, there would be too great danger of antagonizing the non-Jewish section of the community, my father was advised by community leaders, if he used Hebrew characters in his window sign. And then the Jewish section of the community was "modern" and "emancipated." They didn't care about such things. My mother, who came from an orthodox family, was appalled by the driveways leading up to the main temple in the neighborhood to accommodate members of the congregation who arrived by car for Friday night services. Besides a temple, the Jewish community supported a large, modern, extensively equipped Community Center, where almost all the social activity, secular and religious, was carried on. Residents of the community were well organized, claiming branches of the Jewish War Veterans, Hadassah, Young Israel and various local Sisterhoods and Junior Leagues.

My parents were faced with the problem of handling that anachronism, the modern Jew. They were to satisfy his taste for traditional food in traditional surroundings without offending a newly acquired dignity and propriety. The metamorphosis of this particular *Wurshigesheft* was a reflection of some of the painful minutiae of social adjustment.

We had come originally from a rough and tumble neighborhood. Shopping for

daily necessities was a wild adventure where she who did not elbow was elbowed out; and a stentorian voice able to make itself heard above the shrill ruckus in the markets was the mark of an experienced housewife. The comparative silence and orderliness of the stores in the new community amazed my mother. "They say good-morning to you," she reported after one of her first shopping trips. My father, who applied every dribble of information to the operation of his store, decided that he had better be careful in his choice of waiters. It is well known that a delicatessen waiter's sole function is to frustrate the hungry, intimidate the cautious and rule the diets of his daily patrons with an iron hand. Such a technique, felt my father, would not be quite *juste* for this neighborhood. So he proceeded to hand-pick a suitable staff. For his efforts there was little to be said, except that he got delicatessen waiters who, by definition, acted like delicatessen waiters. The one immutable institution.

FREQUENTLY the help in a delicatessen is augmented by members of the owner's family. A large business is generally run by two or three partners and their respective families are not called upon to help. But in a smaller, one-man store, everyone pitches in. As soon as the youngsters of the family are old enough to hold two "toots" in one hand and a ladle of mustard in the other, they are pressed into service. The next step, acting cashier during the dinner hour, is assigned to those sufficiently certain of their addition and subtraction. But being allowed to wait on trade is the real cachet of maturity. Learning to handle the meat knife with its fourteen-inch blade so that you can cut a slice of corned beef that is almost transparent requires months of practice. The trick of making sandwiches so that they look twice as thick as they really are calls for appreciable finesse. Carrying tubfuls of pickles or cases of beer from the cellar develops a respectable amount of muscle.

The values of coming from a storekeeping family cannot be denied. Besides, in this case, the obvious advantage of "all the delicatessen you can eat," there is a kind of education to be had from standing behind a counter learning to talk the language of

all kinds of people. There is the discipline of the cheerful, friendly, public face. There comes first-hand appreciation for hard work, for the cut-throat realities of commercial life, and some understanding of the value of money. It produces, early, a maturity of demeanor. By and large, it is not at all a bad prep school to leaven the abstract tendencies of the incipient Jewish intellectual.

But the ennobling effects of part-time labor are not unmitigated. Businesses like the delicatessen are open seven days a week and sixteen hours a day, and working in the store sometimes becomes a substitute for home life. Frequently you will notice in delicatessens one table in the back, reserved for family activity. A few children may be doing their homework. One of the parents will be reading the paper or entertaining friends. But somebody is always behind the counter.

Until meat rationing forced delicatessens to close on Tuesdays, the one-man owner had two days off a year—Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur (kosher delicatessens did close on Saturdays, but reopened Saturday evening). The children of the family may be well provided with clothing and food, but their home is a dark place where they go at bedtime. Their meals, their spare time, their source of parental affection are all bound up with the store. But all this is material for another kind of sociological work on a somewhat larger subject.

THE variety of foods that made their way over the counter in my father's delicatessen store rapidly increased as word spread in the community that a Jewish delicatessen had been set up. The important word to the community was not "delicatessen," but "Jewish." Uncertain, in a precarious world, of the articles of their faith, the Jews of the neighborhood could make one affirmation unhesitatingly. Jewish food was good. Requests for lox, sturgeon, white-

fish, for sour cream, bagels, cream cheese, for gefilte fish and potato *latkes* besieged us, and were heeded. The store, recognizedly a symbol of traditional Jewish living, became a center for the dispensation of knowledge on Jewish cookery, too. On Passover women would come in to ask how to make *matzoh brei*. "My husband had some here, and he insists I learn how to make it." We closed on Jewish holidays, served *matzoh* with meals on Passover, and gefilte fish on Friday.

But the pull was not all in one direction. The Gentiles of the neighborhood regarded my father's store as a curiosity at first. They would come in at the urging of a Jewish friend and order "pastrami," pronouncing it in a way that made my mother giggle. Some wandered in by accident, thought it strange that we didn't have some staple like boiled ham, but would generally settle for something else. Undeniably the food was good, satisfying, but different. After a while it even ceased to be different. Without a tremor of strangeness, they would order gefilte fish on "fish night."

But assimilation in reverse was only a small part of the picture. How to satisfy those who asked for ham and cheese sandwiches, or bacon and eggs? How about those who wanted Christmas dinners in a Christmas atmosphere? What to do about the request for pork chops and baked ham? Here my father could not be so yielding. It was all right to feature clam chowder on Friday night, to hang some holly on the door at Christmas, to serve bologna and cheese sandwiches, as a compromise. Yet beyond a mysteriously fixed point he could not pass. His sympathies, principles and prejudices shaped the atmosphere of the store and left no room for *treyf* meat. Unkosher cuts of meat—roast beef, leg of lamb, yes. Meat from a pig, no. A lamentable rigidity of adjustment, perhaps. But he had gone as far as he could. The next generation could begin serving the hams.

THE MONTH IN HISTORY

The Dilemma

THE historical fact upon which hung the Jewish interest as well as every other specific interest in the world was the sharpening conflict between the Soviet Union's expansionism and Britain's effort to harmonize socialist evolution at home with colonial nationalism abroad. The United States had no immediate interest in Britain's special internal problem. But it had a considerable interest in preserving certain political principles and economic arrangements which Soviet policy might undermine. Hence the U. S. was on the British side of the great struggle—at first passively, then actively.

The conflict was deeply disturbing to men of good will. They knew that if it were not resolved, civilization was not likely to survive. But they had little faith that the noble ultimate ends of either Russian communism or British socialism would survive the immediate compulsions of political totalitarianism or economic imperialism. Yet responsible men had to take sides.

For Jews who believed in Zionism the frustrations in this dilemma were compounded. It was possible for them to support British policy in the over-all conflict and also feel that Britain's application of this policy in the Near East was inimical to the immediate and long-term interests of the Jews. Yet there was no alternative. It was also possible to support the Soviets and find in their policy no hope for Zionism.

"Why should the Jewish people again be made the scapegoats?" Dr. Abba Hillel Silver asked at the American Jewish Conference in February. "We do not wish to be made the shuttle-cock of power politics. We do not wish to be crushed between the upper and the lower millstones."

The effect of the power struggle was broad and deep.

It was determining whether Palestine would become an independent Jewish state.

It was determining whether a Jewish

tailor in Vienna would retrieve his sewing machine—the Allied powers could not agree on a definition of material subject to seizure for reparations.

It might in the end determine whether Jews of American nationality would go to war with Jews of Russian nationality.

The Middle East

MORE than ever, the Middle East was the vortex of the struggle. The Soviet Union pressed down into the northern areas of Iran, laid claim to two border provinces of Turkey, stirred the Kurds, reached into Egypt with propaganda among the fellaheen, flirted with the Arab League. Cutting clear across the Eastern Mediterranean, the Soviets laid claim to a trusteeship for Tripolitania.

To stop the Soviet glacier, Britain maneuvered to preserve its pre-eminence in this area.

On January 17, Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin solemnly told the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization that Britain would make Transjordan "a sovereign and independent state." Formerly part of the Palestine mandate, Transjordan had about 400,000 inhabitants, a corrupt ruling family, and a treasury consisting largely of grants-in-aid from the British government and subsidies from the Palestine government. The UNO Trusteeship Committee politely applauded Britain's intention, though the clamor of Transjordan's impoverished inhabitants for complete independence rather than mandatory status had failed to reach outside observers.

Transjordan as a "sovereign and independent state" would be no less responsive to Britain than Transjordan as a mandate. Britain had given "independence" to the former Iraq mandate twenty years earlier and had had no trouble. But an independent Transjordan would look better, and it would mean another vote for Britain in the UNO. It would also enable Britain to freeze its in-

fluence in Transjordan by means of a treaty between two sovereign powers rather than risk it in the uncertainties of the new trusteeship system.

An independent Transjordan would strengthen the Arab League. It would also be easy to attach to it the Arab part of a partitioned Palestine.

On February 15, the Jewish National Assembly of Palestine adopted a resolution protesting the severance of Transjordan from Palestine.

Pipeline Politics

Much more useful to the British in the Near East than an independent Transjordan dependent on the British, was an American corporation dependent on the Near East for oil. Last December the United States and Great Britain signed a treaty in London providing equal facilities for the two countries in the Middle East oil fields. As a consequence of this treaty, the British Colonial Office approved a concession to U. S. oil interests to bring a proposed pipeline from the Persian Gulf across Palestine to an outlet on the Mediterranean. On January 8, the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company, a subsidiary of the American-Arabian Oil Company, which is jointly owned by the Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Company, formally signed the agreement to this effect with the Palestine government. The pipeline, covering more than 1,000 miles, would cross Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine and debouch at Haifa on the Mediterranean. It would cost about \$160,000,000 and carry about 300,000 barrels a day. It would make Palestine the fourth largest oil center in the world, following the United States, the Soviet Union and Venezuela. Haifa was already the outlet for oil from Kirkuk piped by the Iraq Petroleum Company, owned by British, French and Dutch interests.

The U. S. interest in the Middle East was further indicated by the possibility of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Yemen and by the departure of a three-man government mission for a four-and-one-half month visit to the Near East to survey the possibility of long-term projects which governments in the area might initiate independently or in collaboration with the U. S.

The mission was under the sponsorship of the U. S. Departments of State and Agriculture. It was to visit Lebanon, Syria and Iraq and possibly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Palestine was not on its itinerary.

The UNO

THREE items were of special interest to Jews at the first part of the first session of the General Assembly of the UNO in London. These were the matter of human rights, the establishment of the trusteeship system, and the reshuffling of inter-governmental bodies to handle refugees and displaced persons.

Of the three, only the first escaped embroilment in the great ideological conflict of the day. On January 29, the General Assembly unanimously instructed the Economic and Social Council to establish a Commission on Human Rights. On February 18, the Council named nine experts as the nucleus of the Commission.

There was some indication, however, of the kind of problems that would have to be settled when the UNO actually got down to defining human rights. During a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on January 15, the Cuban delegate moved that a discussion of human rights be placed on the agenda of the Assembly itself. The motion was lost by a vote of twenty-seven to twelve, with ten abstaining. This could not be taken as an indication of lack of interest in human rights; the Assembly was simply not yet ready to take it up.

Only one delegate took the floor to oppose the motion: Dimitri Z. Manuisky of the Ukraine. He declared that he was strongly in sympathy with the proposal, but that it should be postponed because of the extreme complexity of the issues involved. Many documents would have to be studied, he said, including the Magna Carta, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Declaration of 1917 of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

"Some countries," Mr. Manuisky pointed out, "have recognized very widespread rights; not only the right, for example, to employment, the right to work, but also the right to an education. Other countries define more or less narrowly the different rights which we may consider as human rights."

Trusteeship Trouble

One of the most delicate operations faced by the UNO in the transference of the Palestine mandate to its own jurisdiction would be providing for appropriate representation of the obvious interest of the neighboring Arab states without permitting them enough power to liquidate the Jewish position in Palestine. The UNO charter provided that the terms of trusteeship "shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned." The Arabs at first asked that the provision be interpreted in a manner which would assure their participation in any trusteeship for Palestine. But the Assembly avoided making any general ruling on this point, and the Arabs failed to press it. The whole issue of Palestine in relation to the UNO was postponed pending the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.

Rules for Refugees

It was the refugees and displaced persons who came closest to being victimized by the vagaries of power politics. The principal concern of the Soviet Union and the states within its sphere of influence on this point was to bar international assistance for Polish and other opponents of the Soviet regime. To achieve this they made a series of proposals which threatened the rights of all displaced persons. The Yugoslav delegation proposed that all displaced persons except German Jews and Spanish Republicans be forced to return to their homelands. This proposal was supported by the Ukrainian delegation. The Soviet spokesman proposed the prohibition in refugee camps of propaganda or political activities designed to dissuade refugees from returning to their homelands or against any of the United Nations. Another proposal would have required a refugee to obtain the permission of his native government before he could be resettled. The Soviet delegation also proposed to place the administration of refugee camps mainly under personnel from the refugees' countries of origin and to provide that quislings, traitors and war criminals hiding as refugees should be returned immediately to their countries. For Jewish refugees adoption of these measures might have meant a prohibition of Zionist propaganda and, except for German Jews,

forced repatriation to the countries of Eastern Europe.

All these proposals were voted down by the UNO Humanitarian, Social and Cultural Committee.

The Assembly's final decision provided for the appointment of a special committee by the Economic and Social Council to study the problem of refugees and displaced persons and report to the next meeting of the Assembly. The compromise, sponsored by Mrs. Roosevelt, recommended that the following principles be taken into consideration in planning a refugee setup:

1. The problem is international in nature and scope.
2. No uprooted person who objects to returning to his country of origin should be compelled to do so, but his return should be encouraged.
3. There should be safeguards, so that extradition of war criminals would not be prevented by protection set up for refugees.
4. The future of the uprooted persons who express valid objections to returning to their homelands should become the concern of whatever international body will be recognized or established.

The special committee appointed consisted of representatives of the following twenty nations: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Byelo-Russia, Britain, Canada, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, France, Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Soviet Union, the Ukraine, United States, Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Position

SHORTLY after the end of the war, Joseph Stalin was reported to have told Dr. Emil Sommerstein, Polish Jewish leader, that he was "certainly and seriously" interested in an international solution of the Jewish problem. Just what Stalin had meant was still not altogether clear. But it was becoming increasingly clear what he had not meant: for one thing he had not meant Zionism.

As usual the Soviet attitude could only be pieced together from fragments. There had been nothing at all from official Soviet sources, and there was only one unofficial indication from within the borders of the Soviet Union itself.

On February 3 the Moscow periodical

New Times published an article dealing with the Arab League which contained the following sentence:

"It is clear that the creation of normal conditions for the life and future of the Jews in Europe does not depend on the quota of Jewish immigration into Palestine but on the energetic extermination of fascism and liquidation of racial fanaticism and its consequences—on real help to the Jewish population."

Approach to the Arabs

The article attacked the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in a context which highlighted the Soviet Union's advances to both the exploited Arab masses and the exploiters of the Arab League:

"What are the lawful foundations for the functioning of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine and who gave it authority to solve the problem without the participation of the directly interested parties? The Arab public is indignant at the attempts made to solve the Palestine problem behind its back. It is hardly possible to justify the necessity for the existence of the Anglo-American Committee, especially at a moment when the mechanism of the United Nations Organization has started to function. . . .

"On the other hand the problem of Palestine has acquired such a sharp character because the difference of interests of England and America in the Near East is reflected in it. It must be recognized that during the short time it has existed the Arab League's activities have not yet produced really positive results from the viewpoint of defense of the interests of Arabian countries.

"In the sharp political situation which is forming in these countries the near future will show to what measure the League will justify the hopes of those who wish to see in it active support for the unity and independence of the Arab lands."

The Soviet Union was carrying out the themes in action. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry announced that it would not visit the Soviet zone of Germany because the Soviet authorities said that there were no concentrations of Jews there. The Committee was also unable to visit Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. The reason for this,

Philip Noel-Baker, Minister of State, told the House of Commons, was that the Soviet government felt the visits were unnecessary since in each case the armistice terms forbade any religious discrimination.

Observers at the first meeting of the UNO Assembly commented on the Soviet Union's support of the Arab states whenever such support could be harmful to Britain and its friends. Observers also noted the increased activity of the second secretary of the Soviet embassy in Cairo, who was a Moslem, and the appointment of a Moslem as Yugoslav ambassador to Egypt.

The Communist Parties

The Palestine Communist Party announced that it would not appear before the Committee of Inquiry because it was "devoid of any legal status." The illegality, for that matter, extended to Palestine itself since the Soviet Union had never recognized the British mandate. The Communist delegates in the Jewish National Assembly of Palestine opposed the Jewish Agency's appearance before the Committee and urged what seemed to be the international Communist line: the establishment of a bi-national Palestinian state, and a mutual declaration of non-domination by both Jews and Arabs.

The Communist Party of Britain, however, submitted a memorandum to the Committee stating that since Palestine was not a free country, it could not admit refugees. It would not be in the interest of refugees to change their citizenship from that of a free country to that of a country with colonial status according to testimony given by Philip Piratin, a Communist member of Parliament. The Communist memorandum asked for a bi-national state.

"We reject Zionism," Piratin declared, "because it denies the possibility of solving the Jewish problem on the basis of equal rights in countries where Jews live." Displaced Jews, he felt, should be told to seek rehabilitation in their countries of origin, while those who cannot return to their native lands should be admitted to other countries and be made free citizens.

This blunt rejection of Zionism was not peculiar to the British Communists. On November 10, 1945, Alexander Bittelman, editor of *Freiheit*, the Communist Yiddish

daily in New York, said in a report to his board of directors:

"We must broaden the fight against the White Paper into a movement of all Jews and all progressive forces of the world, and that means that the demand for a Jewish state in Palestine—the Zionist program—cannot be part of the demands of the broader struggle against the White Paper."

Disenchantment

Among Zionists who hoped for Soviet sympathy there was recognition that something had happened.

"From stray and, as yet, inconclusive incidents, it might be inferred that the Soviet Union, like Great Britain, may also be interested in winning over the Arab world to its side by offering up our legitimate national rights in Palestine as part payment for such an alignment," Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver told a meeting of the American Jewish Conference. However, he continued to hope that the handwriting on the Kremlin wall might change. He took issue with those "who resent every approach made to win over the sympathy of the Soviet government to the Zionist cause."

"They call it flirting," he said, "and they point the finger of derision at Zionists whenever some anti-Zionist statement or act emanates from Soviet or pro-Soviet sources. This is an amazing phenomenon in Jewish life, which can only be attributed to a blind and bitter partisanship, which carries over from an area which is not related to Jewish life to a specifically Jewish issue of greatest moment."

He emphasized that he was not asking the Zionist movement to align itself with the Soviet Union, but, he said, the Zionists were not discouraged in their efforts to win over Great Britain even though they have been grievously disappointed time and again; nor were they discouraged in attempts to win over the President and the State Department, even though they have encountered considerable misunderstanding and resistance there. Therefore he saw no reason why the Zionist movement should regard itself as being in any way inhibited from trying to win Soviet friendship.

"The Arabs," Dr. Silver pointed out, "are certainly not adverse to carrying on their propaganda both in the direction of Great

Britain and of the Soviet Union. My regret is not that we have tried, but that we have not tried hard enough, or soon enough. At the moment, the attitude of the Soviet government does not seem to be favorable to us, but there is nothing final about it. Some of us recall that up to a few months ago definite evidence seemed to point to a favorable and friendly attitude. The present attitude may, or may not, change again in the future. We may not succeed, but we certainly owe it to ourselves to do everything in our power to see that that attitude does change, and in our favor."

The Infiltrates

WITH winter making escape across devastated areas of Europe virtually suicidal, the infiltration of Polish Jews into the Western zones of Germany slowed down. The respite was temporary. Thousands of Polish Jews were being repatriated from the Soviet Union and most of them were not expected to remain in Poland. The Jews in the Balkans were finding life less and less bearable despite their new-found equality. With the return of warm weather, the exodus of Jews from Eastern Europe seeking a haven in Palestine or elsewhere was expected to become a major problem.

The occupying powers in Europe were still without a policy for these new refugees or even a definition of their status.

Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, chief of operations in Germany of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, who had called attention to this situation in a few telling and ill-chosen remarks, was back on his job. He had appealed his dismissal to Herbert H. Lehman, Director General of UNRRA, who restored him to duty.

Lehman stated that he had given "the most serious consideration" to all the circumstances and concluded that he was "justified in continuing to place confidence" in Sir Frederick. Mr. Lehman added:

"I believe he did not intend to impute sinister motives to individuals or organizations seeking to improve the sorry plight of groups of displaced persons, and that he does not hold religious prejudices; that when restored to duty he will treat all groups of displaced persons fairly and in accordance

both with their needs and UNRRA principles; and that he will at all times deal with all displaced persons with understanding and sympathy. I have also been impressed with Lieutenant General Morgan's deep concern for his work and his desire to return to carry it forward."

It would be possible for about 2,000 destitute Jews to obtain immediate admission into Palestine. The British government announced on January 30 that it would issue 1,500 certificates monthly while the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was conducting its investigation. From the total of 4,500 certificates thus made available for Jewish immigration (300 additional were made available for Arab and other immigrants), 1,350 had to be deducted for "illegal" immigrants reported by the government since the close of legal immigration under the White Paper; 500 had to be deducted for arrivals in January and 550 were earmarked for immigrants due soon. This left 2,100 for future immigration.

The Inquiry

IN ITS hearings in Washington and London, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry turned up little that it could not have found in a public library. It listened to spokesmen for all non-Palestinian Zionists except the Revisionists, who refused to testify. It heard from Jewish non-Zionists and anti-Zionists and from Gentile anti-Zionists and pro-Zionists. It heard Americans who supported the Arab point of view completely. It gave time to a few earnest and unknown characters who thought they had a solution that no one else had ever thought of.

The official and unofficial Zionist organizations—American Jewish Conference, Zionist Organization of America, American Zionist Emergency Council, Hadassah, Poale Zion, World Jewish Congress, Board of Deputies of British Jews—all demanded a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.

Defining the Commonwealth

Naturally, a precise definition of a Jewish commonwealth was one of the principal lines of inquiry for members of the Committee. Witnesses were inclined to be elusive on this point. Perhaps the most honest effort to find the meaning of a Jewish state in terms of the current Zionist line was

made by Dr. Hayim Greenberg, spokesman for the Labor Zionists.

The Jewish commonwealth, he explained, was a "political term" and not a phrase to be included in the constitution of an independent Palestine.

"The term Jewish commonwealth today has more the character of a regulative principle," Dr. Greenberg declared. "It is to say plainly to the world that Palestine must be designated by the international forces as a country for the solution of the Jewish problem and for the establishment of a Jewish numerical majority in that country."

Defining the Majority

Dr. Greenberg insisted that a Jewish commonwealth would be meaningless without a Jewish majority. The possibilities of achieving a majority became another important line of questioning for the Committee. On this point careful attention was given to the testimony of Robert R. Nathan, consulting economist, who reported on an extensive study he and his associates had made on Palestine's economic potentialities. Mr. Nathan said that in ten years Palestine could absorb at least 615,000 immigrants on the basis of "modest" economic assumptions. This would mean an annual increase of 3 per cent in the Jewish population.

Under more favorable economic assumptions, he felt Palestine could absorb 1,125,000 immigrants in ten years, which would mean a 5 per cent annual increase in the Jewish population. On the basis of the larger immigration and taking into consideration the normal growth in the Arab population, the Jews and Arabs would be equal parts of the population of Palestine at the end of ten years, Mr. Nathan concluded. Among the economic prerequisites for such an achievement were a capital outlay of \$2,290,000,000 available at low interest rates, and active assistance from the government in its monetary, fiscal, foreign trade and irrigation policies.

Mr. Nathan said that it would take six to nine months to absorb the first 100,000 immigrants.

Getting the Majority

Mr. Nathan spoke as an economist, not as a political Zionist, and he declined to say what he thought the Arabs would be

doing during the decade in which the Jews might try to achieve population parity. The Zionist view was that the process would be beneficial to the Arabs and that they could be made to see it. However, it was conceded that the Arabs might not see it and in that case, the Committee inquired, what did the Zionists suggest?

The most direct answer to this question came from Nathan Jackson, spokesman for the British Labor Zionists. The British chairman, Sir John E. Singleton, asked: "Do you think it is the duty of the mandatory power to look after the situation in Palestine until a Jewish majority is attained?" Jackson replied that it should, with the help of an international authority. Judge Singleton asked if he meant an international police force. Jackson said yes, if one were created.

On the general problem of handling the Arabs, Dr. Daniel A. Poling, who appeared in behalf of the American Palestine Committee and the Christian Council on Palestine, went further than most Zionists. Asked how far he would go in handling Arab objections to Zionist aims he replied: "I would definitely feel we should go as far in this, and with even greater justification in this, as we go now in the occupied areas of Germany and Japan."

Frank W. Notestein doubted that the Jews could ever become a numerical majority under any reasonable set of circumstances and regardless of the Arab attitude. Mr. Notestein, Professor of Demography and Director of the Office of Population Research at Princeton University, testified that a Jewish majority could be maintained indefinitely only by continual Jewish immigration which would cause serious economic distress in Palestine. The Arab birth rate, he pointed out, was twice that of the Jews.

Varying Views

In London, interchanges between Committee members and witnesses grew more heated, but the inquiry lost the anti-British tone it had had in Washington. Professor Selig Brodetsky, spokesman of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, insisted on one million immigrants and a Jewish state. But, he added: "If there was the possibility of the Jews believing that they could get justice in Palestine and that Great Britain would be at the head of this justice, I have not the

slightest doubt that the Jews in Palestine and all over the world would want it to be part of the British Empire." In Washington, Dr. Emanuel Neumann, American Zionist spokesman, had pointed to the advantages for Great Britain of a strong, modern, democratic Jewish state in the Near East.

Viscount Herbert Samuel, first Palestine High Commissioner, revealed in the course of his testimony that the original draft of the Balfour Declaration contained the term "Jewish State," but it was later changed to "Jewish National Home." Dr. Chaim Weizmann and Dr. Nahum Sokolow, who saw the draft, did not object to the change, Lord Samuel declared.

The most eminent witness to appear before the Committee was Albert Einstein. In a brief and confusing statement, he questioned the motives of the British and opposed a Jewish state. "The state idea is not according to my heart," the great scientist said. "I cannot understand why it is needed. It is connected with many difficulties and a narrow-mindedness. I believe it is bad."

Dr. Leo Baeck, former Chief Rabbi of Germany, also testified. He said he hoped for immigration of 100,000 Jews annually to help create a new conception of statehood, not one of narrow, nationalistic sovereignty, but one in which "every state is part of the great world community and every nationality is a treasure-house of humanity."

Diminishing Division

Perhaps the most surprising testimony given—at least to newspapermen covering the inquiry—came from Joseph M. Proskauer, President of the American Jewish Committee. Uninformed observers at the hearing who entertained the popular notion, gained largely from Zionist characterization during recent years, that the American Jewish Committee was violently anti-Zionist had to listen carefully to detect the difference between Judge Proskauer's remarks and those of Zionist leaders. One reporter noted that the "only" difference was that Judge Proskauer didn't advocate a state. The reporter's minimization of the difference may have been a portent. Many observers felt that the Zionists would not be able much longer to maintain their uncompromising demands for a state now. This feeling seemed to be confirmed by the failure of Zionist spokes-

men to denounce the American Jewish Committee's refusal to declare for an immediate Jewish state—as Zionists had made a practice of doing since this issue caused the withdrawal of the Committee and other groups from the American Jewish Conference.

The memorandum which Judge Proskauer presented in Washington contained recommendations which had long been the American Jewish Committee's policy. On the subject of Palestine it urged recognition of the continuing validity of the principles of the Balfour Declaration and the mandate. It favored economic absorptivity as the only brake on Jewish immigration and land purchase in Palestine. It urged establishment of a United Nations trusteeship over Palestine to safeguard the existing Jewish settlement and Jewish immigration into Palestine and to help the country become a self-governing, independent and democratic commonwealth with cultural autonomy for all communities.

These and other recommendations—such as the immediate entry of displaced Jews into Palestine—could have been presented with Zionist or anti-Zionist overtones. Judge Proskauer did it the first way. In his fervent statement to the Committee he took pains to quote Zionist statements that were close to this position—by Selig Brodetsky, Henrietta Szold and the Council for the Jewish Agency. He called for the kind of state in Palestine that Dr. Weizmann wanted in 1936—a state in which neither Jews nor

Arabs "should dominate and neither be dominated by the other, irrespective of their numbers." He admitted in reply to a question that the Jewish national home could, under favorable conditions, be successful though the Jews were not a majority in Palestine. But he made it very clear that he would not advocate any form of restriction which would in the normal course prevent the Jews from becoming a majority.

In his final remarks, Judge Proskauer seemed to put himself in the ranks of cultural Zionists—or, at the least, he made it impossible to include him in the ranks of the anti-Zionists, or of those who saw Jewish continuity or survival in terms of creed only.

"To you British I will say that Matthew Arnold put it gently when he said that the great contribution of the Jews to civilization had been the concept of a God of righteousness and the attributes of right conduct. That is what we want to flourish again in Palestine," Judge Proskauer said.

"And so I raise my voice here not chauvinistically, not for any kind of state in which any group dominates any other group, but for a democratic nation where all men shall live in peace and in harmony, and where we Jews can revivify ourselves for the task of making our great contribution to the history of civilization on its long road from savagery to the realization that we are all human beings created in the image of an Almighty God."

SIDNEY HERTZBERG

CEDARS OF LEBANON

A NEW CONCEPTION OF JEWISH HISTORY

SIMON M. DUBNOW

SIMON M. (MARKOVITCH) DUBNOW, the most enterprising and creative of Jewish historians since Graetz, was born in the small town of Mstislavl, in the Mogilev province of Russia, in 1860. He received a *heder* education from his grandfather and the elements of a secular education from the local government school. Unable to enter a *gymnasium*, he got the rest of his schooling by his own efforts, grounding himself in ancient and modern languages, mathematics, science and modern philosophy.

Very much the youthful positivist, he was drawn to the contemporary enlightenment movement and went to St. Petersburg, the Russian outpost of Westernism—for Jews as well as Gentiles—where at the age of twenty-one he became very productive as a writer and journalist. And here he began his famous *History of Hasidism*.

After the failure of his attempts to legalize his residence in St. Petersburg, where Jews were officially permitted only in commercial functions, he moved with his family to Odessa, then the center of the Jewish national renaissance, where he came in contact with Ahad Ha'am, Bialik, Ben Ami, Jabotinsky, and other such figures. Dubnow's thirteen years in Odessa were filled with prodigious activity. Articles, studies, monographs and books poured from his pen—among them a *General History of the Jewish People* (1901), which is available in English. While under Graetz's influence, he wrote *What Is Jewish History?* as a prospective introduction to the former's *History of the Jews*. The introduction became a book, was translated into many languages, and made its author famous throughout the world. Dissatisfaction with Graetz's omissions later led Dubnow to write a *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, which covered the thousand years from the Khazars to the First World War.

From Odessa, Dubnow moved in 1903 to Vilna in Lithuania, the renowned and historic center of Jewish religious tradition and learn-

ing since the close of the Middle Ages. There he prosecuted his plan for a *World or Universal History of the Jews*, which he had already begun in Odessa. In Vilna, however, he was troubled by the unrest and the pogroms that stained the period of reaction following upon the abortive Russian Revolution of 1905. Never one to separate himself from the day's events or the fate of his fellow Jews, he became involved in multifarious activities as a political adviser, although he had little sympathy with the socialism that had caught the imagination of the most militant of the Jewish fighters in Russo-Poland.

In 1907 he returned to St. Petersburg to lecture at the Institute for Oriental Studies that the Jewish millionaire, Baron Günzburg, had founded. He continued to live in St. Petersburg—or Petrograd, or Leningrad—through the First World War and the Revolutions of February and October 1917, suffering the same hardships as the rest of the inhabitants. He was violently opposed to the Bolsheviks and though they do not seem to have treated him badly, he bent every effort to leave Russia, finally succeeding in 1922. He went to Berlin, where he finished his *Universal History*, the complete ten volumes of which first appeared in 1929 in German instead of the original Russian. It was only later that they were published in Russian and then in Hebrew. An English translation of the work is still lacking.

Hitler's ascent to power in Germany drove Dubnow back to the East, to Riga in Latvia. There the Nazis found him in 1941. In the December of that year he was evacuated from his home in the Riga ghetto and shortly after, according to a report from Sweden, was murdered in the vicinity of the city.

Modern Jewish historiography begins with Dubnow. He secularized Jewish history, conceiving of it as the history of a nation rather than that of a religion. Instead of con-

fining himself to the intellectual and scholastic life of Diaspora Jewry, as others had done, he tried to trace the whole life of the Jews, social and national. Perhaps, as Dr. Raphael Mahler has argued (in the June 1944 *Youth and Nation*), he neglected the economic factor unduly and overemphasized the Jewish will to nationality.

Dubnow was not a Zionist; he held that the Jews had maintained themselves as a nation

all through the Diaspora and could continue to do so. His ideas on this question have been likened to those of Ahad Ha'am.

The essay below, which forms the introduction to Dubnow's *Universal History* and appears in its first volume, was written some time in the twenties. It is here given for the first time in English, translated directly from the Russian by Shlomo Katz. A part of Section III is omitted in this version.—EDITOR.

THE title *Universal History of the Jewish People*, is an unusual one. But, it fully corresponds to the content and scope of this unusual segment of the history of humanity. The term "universal" is applicable to the common history of the cultured nations of the world, as distinguished from the history of the separate nations and countries. But the destiny of the Jews took such a turn that they possess their own universal history, in the literal sense of that term, over nearly the entire area of the cultured world (save India and China) and throughout the historical life of humanity. Jewry represents a historical microcosm. It is thus possible to speak of a universal history of the Jewish people—*Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, or *Histoire universelle du peuple juif*.

Just as in a universal history of humanity, synthesis is the method that should prevail in a universal history of the Jews. To reveal the common paths of the historical life through the changing centuries and lands, to establish the organic relationships between these fractions of time and space in the three-thousand-year-old evolution of the nation—such is the chief problem of the historian in this case. Although dealing with material already compiled and more or less worked over, the historian who employs the method of synthesis is not relieved of the duty of independent analysis. He must weigh the sources and check the facts, which could not but be defective in correctness and completeness (thus perhaps giving rise to false generalizations) since they cover such a long period of time.

But his main aim consists in revealing the common historical processes concealed under the mass of facts, in working out an exact architectural plan and constructing his many-storied structure of history on the basis of this plan. Before undertaking such a work

of synthesis, one must have a clear conception of Jewish history, a definite image of its subject—the Jewish people—unclouded by dogmatic or scholastic notions. These will in their turn determine the scientific methods of research in this field.

UNTIL recently a correct understanding of the history of "the most historical" people encountered the greatest difficulties. In the ancient parts of this history—enjoying as they do the privileges of "sacred history"—a *theological conception* dominates even today the minds not only of the Orthodox, who accept completely the religious pragmatism of the historical books of the Bible, but also of the partisans of free Bible criticism.

Study of the history of the Jews in the Middle Ages and later periods is dominated by a one-sided *spiritual conception* based on the assumption that, having lost its government and country, the people could be an active subject of history on the spiritual plane, but on a social plane could appear only as a passive object of the history of the nations among which it lived. This is why the historiography of the schools of Zunz and Gieger adopted the theory of the existence of two factors in the history of the Diaspora: intellectual creation and the heroism of martyrdom (*Geistesgeschichte und Liedensgeschichte*). The main content of the life of the people is reduced to its literary history on the one hand and its martyrology on the other. The historical horizon is bounded by these limits.

To this one-sided understanding of the history there was adapted a corresponding subdivision into epochs: Talmudic, Gaonic, Rabbinical, Mystic, Enlightened—epochs and divisions based on literary history and not on national-social factors in the broad sense.

Only recently has there become discernible a transition to a more thoroughly scientific

conception of Jewish history that could be defined as *sociological*. It is based on the idea, emerging from the correlation of all the manifestations in our history, that the Jewish people at all times and in all countries has appeared as the subject, the creator, of its history, not only on the spiritual but also on the social plane.

During the period of its dispersion, as well as during its existence as a sovereign nation, the Jewish people represented a sharply defined *nation*, not just a religious group amid other nations. This ever vital nation always and everywhere defended its autonomous existence in a communal way as well as in the realms of culture. The Diaspora, which developed widely even while the Judean state still existed, everywhere had its autonomous communities, and in many places central organs of self-government and legislative and judicial establishments, too—Synhedrion, academies and patriarchs in Roman-Byzantine Palestine; Exilarchs, Gaons and law-making academies in Babylonia; *Aljama* and congresses of communal delegates in Spain; *Kahals* and *Vaads*, or parliaments of *Kahals*, in Poland and Lithuania, and many others.

As a logical successor in this historical process, the newest national movement among Jews, uniting autonomism with the contemporary principle of the "rights of national minorities," bears witness to the indestructibility of the eternal force of Jewish history, which survives even in an age of assimilation and of major changes in the national milieu.

THE causes for the one-sided understanding of Jewish history in the recent past are quite clear. Our scientific historiography arose in Western Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century, in a place and time dominated by the dogma of assimilation: "Jewry is not a nation but a religious group." The study of history succumbed to the views commonly held then, and devoted itself more to Judaism than to its living creator, the Jewish nation. Even such opponents of the accepted dogma as Graetz could not swim against the current.

The deep change in the field of national consciousness that characterizes the present period should arouse a corresponding change in the understanding of historical processes.

The secularization of Jewish national thought should be followed by a secularization of the study of history; its liberation from the tight vise of theology should be attended by a similar liberation from spiritual and scholastic approaches.

A new understanding of Jewish history more in conformity with its actual content and scope is indeed ripening. It is becoming clear that in the course of thousands of years the nation not only "thought and suffered" but also molded its own life as a distinct social unit under every condition possible. To reveal this process is the chief problem of the historian. The object of our scientific historiography should be the people, *the national unit, its appearance on the scene of history, its growth and struggle for existence.*

In the course of many centuries, the national embryo, formless at first, assumed shape in the tribal environment of the ancient East; it acquired a definite national image, established and lost a kingdom; it adopted and in its own way adapted elements of the common culture, and finally rose in spiritual creativeness to the peak of Prophetism. The moment of the final formation of the national type coincided with political catastrophe—the Babylonian Exile. Following epochs—Persian, Greek, Hasmonean and Roman—were marked by competition between theocratic and secular sovereignty.

The second political destruction under the blows of Rome provoked within the atomized nation new forms of struggle for national unity. The irresistible drive toward an *autonomous* life and toward the maximum of social and cultural individuality among the nations continued under circumstances other than those of sovereignty. The entire spiritual activity of the nation was applied to the attainment of this goal. *Judaism is molded in the image of the social existence of the nation, and not the other way round.*

From a realistic sociological conception of Jewish history there emerges the need to re-evaluate many of its significant manifestations that were incorrectly explained from the theological or scholastic point of view. Let us cite several examples of the difference between the new conception and the old in this illumination of some of the weightiest problems of Jewish history.

The old historiography became hopelessly

confused on the question of the Pharisee and the Saduccee parties, whose common activities governed Jewish national life during the Hasmonean and Roman eras. Even historians emancipated from theology explained the emergence of these parties on the grounds of their religious and dogmatic differences. Basing themselves on Josephus Flavius' Hellenic-philosophical embellishments and on later Talmudic legends from which the political element had vanished, historians transformed into a battle of "sects" and "schools" what had originally been the greatest national dispute, a dispute over the very nature of the nation: whether the Jews should be a secular or clerical nation, an ordinary or an exceptional member of the family of nations.

THE dispute between the two parties also had a social undercurrent. It was a struggle between the Saduccee aristocracy, which clung to state power, and the Pharisee democracy, which treasured its spiritual domination over the mass of the people. This sociological view of the rise and activities of these parties, which is brought out in the present *History*, emerges from a study of all the instances of conflict between the Saducees and Pharisees in the political and social arena and from all their activities from the epoch of the Hasmoneans until the fall of the Jewish state. Their differences on religion and customs were additional to the fundamental national and social conflicts that divided them. Their differing attitudes toward the "oral Law" grew out of their different views on the question of the desirability of Jewish cultural isolation and exceptionalism in the Greco-Roman world.

Another example of the distortion of the historical perspective can be seen in the usual evaluation of the Synhedrion in Jabneh. At the moment of the greatest crisis in Jewish history, following upon the destruction of the Jewish state by the Romans, there arose a center of self-rule in a city near destroyed Jerusalem. Trusting the naive if beautiful legend about Rabbi Jochanan ben Zakkai, who with the permission of the Romans fled from besieged Jerusalem and in Jabneh established an academy for the study of the Torah, historians have variously evaluated the significance of this academy for the future destiny of the Jews. Some praise

this exploit, which raised the banner of learning on the ruins of statehood; others see in it the beginning of the national death of Jewry and the petrification of Judaism within the letter of the Law. Both are mistaken, because the fundamental view taken of the academic center in Jabneh is incorrect.

Actually, there occurred here a major act of national-social reorganization. Not a theoretical school was established in Jabneh, but a center of *nomocracy*—rule by the discipline of the Law. The institution that interpreted the Law was here merged with the legislative establishment, the Synhedrion; which, after the destruction of the state, was called upon to fuse the scattered segments of the people with the cement of homogeneous laws that would regulate their entire inner life along autonomous lines. From this issued the slogan for the reorganization of the defeated national army: the establishment of a new communal discipline instead of the statehood that had been lost. This is a page, primarily, from the history of national life and only secondarily a part of the history of religion, scholarship and literature.

In the light of the sociological conception, other confused historical problems become clear. We begin to understand the antinomy of nationalism and universalism and the conflict between the political and spiritual factors in the activities of the biblical prophets. This conflict between two origins, evoked by Israel's position among the countries of the ancient East, culminated in the great synthesis of Prophetism—the nation as the kernel, the state as only a shell. The shell may break but the kernel remains. If the kernel is healthy, the nation will always be able to resist heteronomy imposed by the surrounding environment and stand as a "banner unto the nations"—an example of spiritual stability.

An exactly opposite view was later preached by the Christian Apostles: the religious individual is valuable in himself, not the collective historical entity that is a nation. These new prophets pushed the Jewish nation toward the brink of extinction at the very moment when it was desperately fighting for its life against the universal despoiler, Rome. A healthy instinct of self-preservation compelled the people to shy away from these heralds of national suicide.

The meaning of *Talmudism*, with its iron national discipline beneath a wrapping of religion, thus becomes clear in later history. The Talmud appears, first of all, as the written monument of the national hegemony of the Jewish autonomous centers in Roman-ruled Palestine and Persian-ruled Babylonia, a monument to the age-long efforts of the leaders of the people to build a hard shell of laws around the dispersed national kernel.

THE conception here outlined appears to be the only foundation for an objectively scientific method of dealing with Jewish history. It leads our historiography out of the labyrinth of theological and metaphysical opinions and puts it on a firm *bio-sociological* basis. The object of our study appears not as an abstraction, but as a living organism that has developed from the initial biological embryo of the "tribe" into a complex cultural and historical being, the nation.

The method of study is based on a firm adherence to the principle of evolution. First the period of the formation of the nation is examined, then the struggle of the strengthened entity for its independent existence, for the preservation and development of its characteristic national traits and accumulated culture. Describing this dual process of the formation of the entity and of its struggle for individuality, we assume it to be an axiom that a sharply developed national personality produced by history is not just a natural phenomenon but also represents a great cultural value.

But this does not imply that the historian should consider as valuable all the paths, straight as well as devious, that led to the preservation of the collective personality. For instance, although we regard the normal accentuation of individual traits as a normal condition of national life, the historian is bound to point out those cases in which cultural isolationism was pushed to sad extremes—often out of necessity, for the sake of self-defense. This process, however, sometimes went to the point where the people became completely estranged from the best achievements of human culture. The historian should describe the inescapable conflict in every national organism between centrifugal and centripetal forces, and the tragic clashes they cause in the depths of national life. It is self-evident

that, starting from the premise of the cultural value of a national identity, the historian should evaluate differently the results of the centripetal creative forces and of the centrifugal destructive ones.

The sociological method naturally compels the historian to assign a proper role not only to communal and national factors, but also to socio-economic forces which the old school of history disdained. Nor does this imply bending over in the direction of "historical materialism," which interprets all the manifestations of history in the light of the evolution of the economic order. We should not abandon the old historical spiritualism only to be caught in the vise of the opposite doctrine of historical materialism, which is no less one-sided in its distortion of the perspective of the past. The economic order is just as much a *product* of the natural and social conditions of national life as the spiritual and cultural order. All the social and spiritual factors created by the nation regulate its life. They compete with as well as reciprocate each other; but all the various functions of national life cannot be subordinated to any one function.

The full meaning of this new conception of Jewish history can be appreciated especially by those who, like the author of this book, once wandered in the maze of the old paths of Jewish historiography. At one time I, too, paid tribute to commonly accepted "axioms." In the search for a synthesis of Jewish history, which occupied me from the first day of my scientific activity, I passed through all the above-mentioned phases of historical thought. My immature youthful debut, embellished by a definite religious-reformist tendency, represented an application of the theological method wrong-side-out.

In a series of later works, in which the tendency toward the secularization of Jewish history became marked, I still could not free myself from the ideological approach of the school of Zunz and Geiger. My innovation consisted in the attempt to force the national-social approach into the framework of previous historical conceptions.

Only after many years of detailed study of general Jewish history from its sources—when I myself had to write it as the history of a people and not of a literature—did the shortcomings of the old methods become

clear, the framework and integration broaden, the historical horizon expand and there come to the fore factors formerly hidden in the fog of scholasticism. The conclusions I reached by the inductive method I later verified by deduction. Starting out with these as premises, I found them confirmed when applied to the historical material.

Subdivision of the Material

THE new sociological conception involves a fresh approach to the subdivision of the material of Jewish history and a new classification of its epochs, i. e. *periodization*. The definition of the periods and epochs in the history of a nation should be based on socio-national features and not on religious or literary ones. These features are determined by the historical environment in which the people finds itself at a given moment and by the hegemony of one or another sector of the nation in one of the changing national centers.

The history of the period of national sovereignty—which to this day is frequently divided into "the epoch of the First Temple," and "the epoch of the Second Temple"—should be subdivided according to *political* landmarks connected with the situation of Palestine between the great monarchies of the ancient East: Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, the Hellenistic kingdoms of the Ptolemies and the Seleucids, and, finally, the Roman Empire. In the post-sovereignty era, when the Jewish people lacked a single center, the subdivision must of necessity follow geographic lines in accordance with the alternating hegemonies of the various centers of Jewry. In every epoch the dispersed people had one main center; sometimes two, which by reason of the extent of their national autonomy and the level of their cultural accomplishments gained leadership over the other parts of the Diaspora.

Out of the universal history of the Jewish people there emerge first of all two major periods: a) the Oriental Period, when the main centers of the nation were located in the Fertile Crescent and North Africa—Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt and (b) the Western Period, when these centers were shifted to Europe. . . .

Within the limits of the Oriental Period three separate epochs must be distinguished, from the viewpoint of the political and cul-

tural environments in which they ran their course: 1) the purely Oriental epoch, the period of the conquest of Canaan, of the Judean and Israelite kings, and of the subsequent domination of three world empires—the Assyrian, Babylonian and Persian (circa 1200-332 B.C.E.); 2) the epoch of a mixed Oriental and Western environment and of Greco-Roman domination, interrupted by the interval of Jewish independence under the Hasmoneans, until the fall of the Jewish state (332 B.C.E.—73 C.E.); 3) the epoch of the two hegemonies, Roman-Byzantine Palestine and Persian-Arab Babylonia.

In this last era following the fall of Judea in the struggle against Rome, we note the successive hegemonies of different dominant centers. The Palestinian hegemony of the pagan-Roman period (2nd and 3rd centuries C. E.) gave way to the dual leadership of Palestine and Babylonia during the concurrent dominance of Byzantium and New Persia in the East (4th to 6th centuries). These were in turn followed by the sole hegemony of Babylonian Jewry under the great Arab Caliphate (7th to 9th centuries). It is by means of such universal historical crises that the changing epochs of the second millenium of Jewish history should be defined; whereas in earlier historiography this entire period was presented as a unit under the general title of "The Talmudic Period," and was scholastically subdivided into the epochs of the *Mishnah* and *Gemarah*, the *Tannaim*, the *Amoraim*, the *Saboraim* and *Gaonim*.

The second millenium of the Oriental Period of Jewish history, which coincides with the first millenium of the Christian era, was the period of the *colonization* of the European Diaspora and prepared the way for the transfer of national hegemony from East to West. The 11th century of the Christian era appears as the dividing line between the great Oriental and Western periods in Jewish history. National leadership began to move in the direction of the greatest accumulation of Jewish masses in Europe.

In the Middle Ages this hegemony was shared first by Moorish and later by Christian Spain (11th to 14th centuries), by Southern and Northern France (11th to 13th centuries) and finally by Germany (13th to 15th centuries). From the 16th to the 18th century Germany shared it with the autono-

mous Jewish center that existed in Poland.

Under the influence of the rising tide of enlightenment a dual cultural hegemony arises. German Jewry takes the lead of the Western, progressive movement, while Polish-Russian Jewry remains the citadel of the old, independent culture until the middle of the 19th century, when it too is drawn into the vortex of modern history.

All of modern history (1789-1914) passes amid profound social and cultural crises provoked by brief recurring epochs of emancipation and reaction in political life and a parallel struggle between assimilation and nationalism in the internal life of the Jews of both Eastern and Western Europe. The very latest phase of the modern period (1881-1914), the epoch of growing anti-Semitism on the one hand, and of the Jewish national movement on the other, witnesses a radical change in the fate of the people—an exodus from Europe begins.

One part of the emigration in the course of three decades establishes a large Diaspora center in America; the other, the considerably smaller part, lays the foundation for a renewed national center in the old homeland, Palestine. The devastating [First] World War and the Russian Revolution (1914-1920) delivers a blow to the largest of all former Jewish centers—the one in Russia—and now, on a new threshold of history we are confronted by a Janus-headed sphinx, one face of which looks to the East and the other to the West.

Following the two great periods of Jewish history, the Oriental and the Western, it is possible that the future will bring a dual hegemony of the East and the West, of Palestine and European-American Jewry, if not the full hegemony of the East in the form of a rejuvenated Palestine. The historian of our time should stop at this threshold stained by the bloody deluge of the World War. Our history is therefore brought only up to this fateful limit.

GREAT difficulties are encountered in assigning a proper place to the material accumulated over many centuries by the history of a universal people. These difficulties are not very great in ancient history, in which we are concerned only with the synchronization of the Judean and Israelite kingdoms and deal with the small Diaspora

of the epoch of Persian domination. But they mount correspondingly as the Diaspora grows first in the East and later in the West. Even during the Greco-Roman period the attention of the historian is divided between Judea and a large Diaspora, while in the Roman-Byzantine and Persian-Arab periods he must deal with two centers of hegemony—Palestine and Babylonia—in addition to a growing European Diaspora.

Writing the history of the Western period, the historian must keep his eye on a multitude of countries in which the fate of the Jews is bound up with varying political and cultural environments. Here the historian is confronted with two equally unsatisfactory methods. Either he writes the history of the Jewish people in each country separately, in which case the result is a mechanically connected series of monographs, or he tells the history of the Jews in all countries concurrently.

In the latter case historiography is transformed into mere chronicling, presenting an inventory of events coinciding in point of time but completely different from each other in terms of local conditions. The first architect of our historiography, Graetz, usually preferred the latter method. In his broad study one is often struck by unexpected jumps—*kefitzoth haderekh*—from one country into another within the limits of one chapter. Such an artificial joining of distant events may have synoptic informative value, but it lacks the vital element necessary for scientific synthesis: the relation of events to local conditions. In chronicle form these conditions are scarcely discernible. In Graetz's account the confusion is even more confounding because in one and the same chapter political, social and literary facts are mingled.

To avoid these shortcomings it is necessary to divide the material according to a triple pattern—time, place and subject matter. The history of each epoch should be told by countries, and in each country attention should be paid to the sequence of internal and external events in the life of the people and the causal relationships between them. Within the limits of a given epoch the history of the various parts of the Jewish people is presented—first of the chief center of hegemony and then of the various other countries in the order of their impor-

tance for the general history of the people.

Sometimes it is necessary to begin with an account of the central event of a period, a political or social movement that swept several countries and left its imprint on the entire epoch. Such events, for instance, are the first Crusades in France and Germany, the migration of the Sephardic Jews after their expulsion from Spain, the Messianic movement of Sabbatai Zevi which spread from Turkey, the first French Revolution and the beginning of the emancipation of Jews, German anti-Semitism of the last decades of the 19th century. In the present *History* a general review is devoted to each epoch, stating briefly its outstanding characteristics in the center as well as in the periphery. So far as possible, external political events, internal social manifestations and literary developments are kept apart. The material contained in a chapter dealing with one specific country is generally arranged in the following manner: the political situation, self-rule in the Jewish communities, spiritual life and literature.

Literary history enters into the composition of *The History of the Jewish Nation* only to the extent that literary manifestations influenced the social dynamism or were themselves products of social movements. We are not concerned so much with individual literary creations as with literary trends that characterized the direction of social thought. The plan of this history, however, does not include a special history of literature in the narrow sense of the word.

History of this History

... SO FAR as my general conception is concerned, I have explained before why I consider it the only scientific one, and the honest critic can check the correctness of my opinion in the light of historical facts. In judging individual manifestations I cling to principles stemming from the one universal, all-compelling criterion: the ethical.

The old aphorism declaring that "History should inform, not prove" (*scribitur historia ad narrandum, non ad probandum*) should be complemented by the remark: "but it has the right to judge." The historian appears simultaneously as investigator and judge. First he severely cross-questions the witnesses of the past, he checks the historical material in order to extract the truth from it. But

having reached a definite conclusion, he is within his rights in weighing and judging manifestations or actions. Actions can be judged in two ways: according to their *motives* and by their *results*. Having clarified the true causes of a given historical manifestation, of having established the motives behind the actions of a given historical personality, the historian is duty-bound to evaluate them from the point of view of the epoch described. But he is free to judge their results as he sees their reflection in events of later epochs.

A historian may thus recognize as wrong many opinions and dogmas that were held to be above doubt in the course of centuries, since he sees their negative consequences in later times. At the same time he may recognize them as legitimate with respect to the motives of the epoch in which they arose, provided that these motives were not clearly unethical. The ethical criterion in evaluating facts and personages of the past is compulsory for the historian since he is a judge of conscience and the spokesman of "the court of history." A poor historian is one who "looks with indifference on both good and evil," whose attitude is the same toward persecutor and victim, inquisitor and martyr, despot and fighter for freedom, militarist and pacifist. . . .

There exists an ethical decalogue whose clear commandments are binding on the truthful and honest historian. Biblical Prophetism, the fruit of the Jewish national genius, gave us this ethical philosophy of history, which will always accompany scientific historiography. The prophet Amos outlined the historical fate of the nations according to their moral qualities, and when listing the vices of Aramea, Moab and Edom he did not fail to mention the vices of Israel and Judah. The substance of Prophetism consisted in its application of higher ethical norms to all the manifestations of history, in advancing the idea that moral law reigns in historical life, that breaking this law is punishable by ultimate national destruction, after a long reign of violence—but obedience to it endows peoples with an indestructible power of the spirit. Even a contemporary Jewish historian has no right to abandon this ethical conception of history, especially since it is fully compatible with a scientific conception of Jewish history.

THE STUDY OF MAN

DICE, DR. HAYEK AND THE CONSUMER

Notes on Recent Economic Theory

BEN B. SELIGMAN

IT MAY seem a far cry from shooting dice or playing chess to predicting how a battle between great economic combines will work out. Yet it is in the mathematical laws governing games that economists now hope to find the answers to problems raised by monopoly, economic coalitions, and other deviations from early capitalism's free market of buyers and sellers—problems which orthodox economic theory has to date been unable to handle.

Mathematics, of course, has never been a stranger to economics. It was introduced on a major scale in the late 19th century in an effort to eliminate the hedonistic assumption of earlier economic thought, which stated that the phenomena of the market could be explained if it were assumed that each "economic" man *rational* chose courses of action that avoided "pain" and produced "pleasure." In the hands of such contemporary writers as J. R. Hicks and A. C. Pigou an elegant theory utilizing the concepts of the infinitesimal calculus has been developed which seemed to make this assumption unnecessary.

But from the first it appeared questionable whether the infinitesimal calculus, no matter how used, could tell very much about real

economic behavior. The smooth curves it inevitably produces conceal the fact that actual economic life with its very sharp ups and downs proceeds along anything but smooth lines. The device of employing equations—in the form of equilibrium statements—for an economic system that never was in equilibrium seems highly dubious. And these equations are usually incapable of yielding additional theorems, which might reveal the implications of the equation.

These new economic tools seemed finally to have so subtilized economic theory that it bore no relation at all to economic life. Economists admitted that existing tools of analysis could not tell them much about the division of the product or income in a contest between two large aggregations of capital. This was, of course, a serious admission in a world where monopolies are common features.

In their truly path-breaking volume, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton University Press, 1944), John von Neumann, a world renowned mathematician, and Oskar Morgenstern, an equally well-known economist, have ventured into a new sphere of mathematical theory in order to illuminate economic problems and bring economic theory and economic reality together. They assert that economic and sociological problems involve "questions of parallel or opposite interest, perfect or imperfect information, free rational decision or chance influence." These are the problems with which people are confronted when they play games. A theory of games, consequently, is the only suitable mathematical theory for a social economy. This novel approach is clearly applicable to political science, sociology and military tactics, as well as to economics. (The analysis itself employs rather advanced mathematical concepts, but a less technical summary of the theory by Leonid

BEN B. SELIGMAN, who contributes this department's first review of current developments in economic thought, has taught economics in the New York schools, worked for the OPA as economist and, most recently, was an editor of the magazine *Labor and Nation*. He is now a research associate with the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds. He writes on current economic subjects for the *New Republic*. His "Portrait of a Labor Leader" appeared in the December **COMMENTARY**. Mr. Seligman was born in Brooklyn in 1912, went to Brooklyn College, and did graduate work at Columbia University.

Hurwicz appears in the December 1945 issue of the *American Economic Review*.)

The theory of games attempts an exact description of an individual's economic behavior. The basic assumption is that he will try either to maximize his gains or minimize his losses—just as he would do in playing chess or poker. This appears not very different from the hedonistic assumption of earlier economic theory, and economists may argue that the tools formerly developed are adequate for handling this problem. But whereas these tools assumed the simplifying—but non-existent—condition of perfect competition, and abstracted the individual from all social influences, treating him as an isolated unit of economic behavior, a Robinson Crusoe, the individual treated in the theory of games exists in a social economy. And though, like the economic Robinson Crusoe of earlier economic theory, he too wants to maximize gains and minimize losses, in order to do so he must enter into exchange relations with others. The authors state: "If two or more persons exchange goods with each other, then the result for each one will depend in general not merely on his own actions but on those of the others as well. Thus each participant tries to maximize a function of which he does not control all the variables. This is certainly no maximum problem [the way earlier economic theory might have treated it], but a peculiar and disconcerting mixture of several conflicting maximum problems. Each participant is guided by another principle and neither determines all the variables which affect his interest."

A THEORY of games of strategy, starting with a small number of participants and gradually including more and more players, can discover the general principles underlying all economic behavior in a social economy. The mathematical treatment requires the development of a set of rules describing how each participant can behave in every possible situation that may arise. With these rules, a theory can be constructed to account for all the factual background data and for the possibility of irrational behavior on the part of participants. A consistent mathematical theory of this kind will give not only numerical results, but a precise account of the interplay of economic interests and political powers. The emphasis shifts from differential equations to the theory of combinations and sets.

Professors von Neumann and Morgenstern begin with a one-person game. Such a game is theoretically analogous to a rigidly created communist society in which the pattern of distribution cannot be disputed. Since, in communism, the interests of society are theoretically identical

with the interests of the individual members, the economic situation is comparable to the one-person game. In a two-person game, a participant's maximum profit depends upon both his behavior or choice of strategy and his opponent's. It should be quite possible, knowing what the rules of the situation or game are, to predict the outcome. The number of available strategies is finite, and consequently, all possible combinations are known. Thus, if there are three possible strategies available to each participant, there are nine possible combinations. And if the players act rationally, if they follow the principle of maximizing gains or minimizing losses, the moves can be predicted.

Professors von Neumann and Morgenstern develop the theory with much greater precision than any verbal formulation can give it. They discuss cases in which the selection of a strategy is not so clear-cut and in which probability and expectations must be introduced. Yet even where the element of chance has been encountered, it is possible to provide a solution and to predict the selection of strategies.

"A major achievement of the *Theory of Games*," says Professor Hurwicz in his expository article, "is the analysis of the conditions and nature of coalition formation." This is indeed an important contribution to social and economic theory. Traditional doctrine merely postulates economic coalitions without investigating the conditions for their creation. The theory of games, however, tries to show in precise mathematical form how coalitions are formed; it consequently approaches reality more closely than older theoretical structures. As Professors von Neumann and Morgenstern remark, "It is clear that if certain groups of participants will—for any reason—act together, then the great number of participants may not become effective; the decisive exchanges may take place directly between 'coalitions.'" The important role that trade unions, trade associations, cartels and political associations play in modern economic life underscores the significance of a theory that can describe the behavior of these groups.

Collusion or coalition, in this approach, is possible even in a two-person situation, provided the total gain for both is a variable quantity. In that case, both participants may combine and agree upon a joint strategy which brings them a greater gain. If, however, the total gain is always a constant sum regardless of the distribution, no coalition is possible. But where more than two persons are involved, coalitions are possible even if the total gain does not vary.

Professor Hurwicz explains: "We might, for instance, have a situation where there are two

sellers facing two buyers. It is conceivable that a buyer may bribe a seller into some sort of cooperation against the other two participants. . . . When only two persons enter the picture, it was seen that a coalition would not be formed if the sum of the two persons' profits remained constant. But when the number of participants is three or more, subcoalitions can profitably be formed even if the sum of all the participants' profits is constant. . . . Thus a three-person economic situation can be quite complex, for the participants may act either independently or as members of three possible two-person coalitions.

Let us compare the traditional with the "games" approach in a given three-person situation in which there are two sellers and one buyer. The most that traditional economic theory can tell us is the relation between the quantities disposed of by each seller and the prices. But one of the sellers may have been bribed to withdraw from the market, thus resulting in a redistribution of profit. The task of an adequate theory would then appear to be a detailed description of all possible distributions. And that is in fact what Professors von Neumann and Morgenstern do. "The *Theory of Games*," says Professor Hurwicz, "does offer a greater generality of approach than could be attained otherwise. . . . The potentialities seem tremendous and may lead to enriching in realism a good deal of economic theory."

DESPITE these efforts to reconstruct the theoretical foundations of economics, the classical 19th-century approach displays a remarkable tenacity. Many economists are loath to surrender the easily manipulated propositions of *laissez-faire*, for the appeal of their simplicity is quite potent. An illustration of this desire for an easy logic is F. A. Hayek's essay, "The Use of Knowledge in Society" (*American Economic Review*, September 1945). Though at first sight a venture into the realms of philosophy, Professor Hayek's article is essentially a new vindication of classical competition, "free enterprise." He concedes that the assumptions of orthodox theory are unreal; the economists' calculus, he says, cannot solve the basic economic problem of allocating scarce resources to alternative ends. "The reason for this is that the 'data' from which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole society 'given' to a single mind which could work out the implications, and can never so be given." Economic knowledge exists in but scattered parts, in a dispersed and incomplete form in the minds of many individuals.

Now, in a planned society, Professor Hayek argues, such knowledge would have to be trans-

mitted to the central planning agency, for one of the main problems of an efficient economic order is ". . . what is the best way of utilizing knowledge initially dispersed among all the people. . . ." But this knowledge, we are told, is not viable, communicable "scientific" knowledge: it is knowledge of "time and place" and it is not the kind of information that can be subjected to testing, measurement and verification by a single agency. Illustrative cases are knowledge of a particular skill, of the existence of a surplus stock of goods, of a new type of stationery, of a sudden need for tile roofing. This is "knowledge of the kind which by its nature cannot enter into statistics and therefore cannot be conveyed to any central authority in statistical form."

Yet when Professor Hayek develops his theory he is compelled to admit that such information is in capitalist economy actually transmitted via the mechanism of the price system. The individual business man, he argues, need only concern himself with bits-and-pieces knowledge. This gives him a momentary advantage and he acts through purchase and sale. "The marvel," Professor Hayek exclaims with ecstasy, "is that in a case like that of a scarcity of raw material, without an order being issued, without more than perhaps a handful of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of peoples whose identity could not be ascertained by months of investigation are made to use the material or its products more sparingly." This system, he adds, is beyond human design, for "the people guided by it usually do not know why they are made to do what they do." And there is no need to understand how the economic order works; it is sufficient to know that we have stumbled upon a method of operation which effectively coordinates economic information, and preserves individual freedom.

The competitive price system—or more accurately, "decentralized planning by many persons"—provides too for a kind of change unthinkable in a planned economy. Centralized planning employs only scientific or statistical data, and such information is largely of a technological nature. "Is it true," Professor Hayek rhetorically asks, "that once a plant has been built, the rest is all the more or less mechanical, determined by the character of the plant, and leaving little to be changed in adapting to the ever-changing circumstance of the moment?" The conclusion is obvious: only knowledge of "time and place," knowledge which mysteriously enters the price system, provides what we need to know for economic changes, and so it is better to leave decisions about change in the hands of those who possess this knowledge—individual business men.

HOWEVER Hayek's contention that knowledge of time and place is the most significant kind of economic information does not destroy the rationale of economic planning. Planning is, in fact, a purposeful attempt to counteract a condition of imperfect knowledge. And it is interesting to observe that many of Professor Hayek's business men seek scientific knowledge rather than knowledge of time and place. Market research tries to ascertain the "why" and the "how" of the market economy; few corporations are content to accept the price structure as merely a datum in guiding their economic behavior. In actuality, an effort is always made to get behind the forces which influence prices, for no business man wants to consign his future to the realm of total ignorance.

Moreover, there is a basic inconsistency in Professor Hayek's theory. He asserts that knowledge of time and circumstance is not transferable, yet argues quite contradictorily that the economic behavior of business men based upon such information is ultimately reflected in price movements. The latter argument, that the price system reflects actions based upon bits-and-pieces information, would seem to be more reasonable. If that is so, then scientific statistical knowledge can be derived from knowledge of time and place. Such information is translated into purchases and sales and into money prices, and this is sufficient to provide the groundwork for economic measurement and the guide lines for economic planning.

The approach adopted by Professor Hayek is based upon a kind of supernaturalism characteristic of the 18th century. But modern man refuses to accept social operations as given; he wants to understand the prime movers of civilization, and he has no desire to adopt an atavistic fatalism. He has learned over the past 175 years that the marvel of the price system is a marvel of despotic impersonal techniques which subjects everyone and everything to the cash nexus. He has learned too that the adjustments of the price systems are neither so quick nor so gentle as Professor Hayek would have us believe; the experience of the thirties is an eloquent reminder of that.

The use of knowledge in society can in no wise ignore consequences. That is precisely what Professor Hayek forgets. The business man is no longer held unaccountable for his industrial stewardship. Elevating bits-and-pieces knowledge, if in fact such knowledge is significant, to the first magnitude of economic data implies a restoration of 18th-century *laissez-faire*. It would compel us to scrap in its entirety contemporary social controls. It would require too that large aggregations of capital, which so

dominate our economic order, be sundered beyond recognition. Can we really expect history to move back two hundred years?

Professor Hayek's quasi-philosophic disquisition on knowledge in society represents an extension of the position set forth in his well-known book, *The Road to Serfdom*. This volume was hailed as the final answer to those who urge the adoption of planning in modern economy. Professor Hayek argued that any plan, regardless of its scope or intent, is bound to culminate in a loss of individual freedom: only competition preserves liberalism and guarantees our liberties.

A CLOSELY reasoned and effective reply to Professor Hayek's line of thinking has been presented in two recent books, *Freedom Under Planning*, by Barbara Wootton (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1945. 180 pages. \$2.00) and *Road to Reaction* by Herman Finer (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1945. 228 pages. \$2.00). Both Professor Finer and Mrs. Wootton call Hayek to account for his signal failure to employ precise definitions. As Mrs. Wootton shrewdly remarks, freedom in the abstract has no meaning; we must rather, she says, speak of specific freedoms. "A random list of typical contemporary freedoms is useful as a reminder that freedom has to be perpetually reinterpreted into freedoms. You can philosophize endlessly about freedom; but in daily life it is freedoms that you want." Furthermore, absolute freedom, if it did exist, would create chaos. We can hardly expect a community to permit a factory to spread coal soot over the surrounding countryside. Freedom in this sense demands some sacrifice of personal advantage; it demands, essentially a reconciliation of social welfare with individual freedoms.

Freedom, Professor Finer states, "cannot come to men, in all the abundance potential of our time, unless they collectively manage a large proportion of the social resources and economic equipment." And this requires, according to Mrs. Wootton, a "conscious and deliberate choice of economic priorities by some public authority." If this approach will broaden specific freedoms and eliminate frustrations, then it will have been worthwhile.

Professor Hayek's outmoded rationalizations proclaim the consumer as king of a nebulous market, where his *diktat* is said to register like an adding machine. Mrs. Wootton, however, shows that consumer sovereignty, the ability to influence production, is merely a fiction. Consumer sovereignty can be meaningful only if it implies an ability to "get what we want when we want it." It cannot mean that consumers tell producers what to make. Such a theory is

based upon untenable premises, for we can only draw conclusions about consumer influence if goods are actually produced in the most economical way and are offered at the lowest possible prices. But we can seldom be certain about that, says Mrs. Wootton.

Professor Hayek's theory must assume a perfect market, fluid prices and ease of entry into industry. But what of the huge investment necessary to go into business today? In reality, says Mrs. Wootton, the pattern of production "... was never quantitatively and qualitatively shaped to suit even the relative money demands of consumers, much less their wishes. . . . When sellers and manufacturers are able to get together and agree upon a common interpretation of . . . 'a sufficiently profitable price' [it] usually turns out to mean something comfortably above our 'minimum competitive value.'"

Freedom for the consumer is indeed crucial, but Professor Hayek does not even pose the question properly. According to recent economic theory, investment and employment are ultimately determined by the spending and savings habits of the people. If, then, consumer freedom means erratic spending, employment too becomes erratic; and if the total amount spent by the community is insufficient to absorb all its resources, there will be a standing margin of unemployment. It follows, says Mrs. Wootton, that "... there is here a possible, and serious, conflict of liberties. . . . The liberty of the consumer to distribute his spending as he likes through time is thus a potential threat to the liberty of the worker to more than look for work." A possible solution for this seemingly complex problem, however, lies at hand in the Beveridge and Wallace proposals for a new kind of national budget. These suggestions do not envisage limitations on private spending, yet they would achieve an even flow of total spending.

A LARGE part of Mrs. Wootton's discussion is concerned with the preservation of cultural and political freedoms. She does not believe that these freedoms, so vital to Western

civilization, are necessarily destroyed by planning. As modern economic society grows more complex, she says, individuals find it more difficult to pursue their own ends without assistance by government. A democratic society will have to plan for general cultural freedoms, but such planning, of course, must know where to stop. Means for cultural expression can be provided without dictating the content of culture. To borrow her analogy, a municipality may build and operate trolley cars, yet it does not have to specify the conversation of the riders. Nor does planning destroy trial by jury or *habeas corpus*. Professor Hayek's weakness here, Mrs. Wootton shows, is a failure to distinguish between *can* and *will*. State power *can* be employed as a destructive force; whether or not it *will* is another matter.

Mrs. Wootton thus realizes that successful planning with freedom depends, in the final analysis, upon the temper and moral fiber of those who do the planning. It depends upon the measure in which positions of power are occupied by persons who care for freedom and in whom "this love of liberty is not subsequently stifled by the habit of authority." Now, the fulfilment of these conditions raises the question of relations between the governed and those who govern. Modern efficiency demands centralization of governmental functions, yet that may very well create a gap between officialdom and the people. That gap, however, can be closed, insists Mrs. Wootton, by decentralizing the operations of the government. The experience of local community participation in wartime activities illustrates the kind of public service that should become widespread as safeguards of freedom under planning. Yet freedom will never be secure, Mrs. Wootton urges, until there is a larger measure of social and economic equality. And the latter is itself "... the product of deliberate planning . . . it is the citizens of a wisely planned society who are least likely themselves to fall victim to the dangers of planning . . . and it is the responsible, the alert, the active, the informed, and the confident men and women in the street who hold the key positions."

LETTERS FROM READERS

Nuremberg Will Serve Justice

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

"Will Nuremberg Serve Justice?" by Milton R. Konvitz in the January COMMENTARY is an amazing revelation of how far legal minds can remove themselves from the wellspring of law: moral indignation. The Nuremberg trials are condemned by Mr. Konvitz as "a real threat to the basic conceptions of justice" because legal mechanisms being employed are technically imperfect. This "threat" does not arise out of any fear that innocent peoples will be punished or excessive penalties will be imposed or that the defendants will not get a fair hearing. On the contrary, Mr. Konvitz expresses a preference for *no* trial at all and for the summary death of defendants. His fears are compounded entirely out of abstract legal doctrine, uncontaminated by the moral realities which surround these trials.

The first charge against the Nuremberg trials is that they involve the use of *ex post facto* law. That is true only in the narrowest technical sense. If justice is to be served, not just orthodox legal procedure, then these facts must be recognized:

1. The crimes involved are horrible and gruesome "firsts" in the history of our civilization. Consequently there is no statute or codified law anywhere which sets forth the appropriate procedures to be followed in the trial of the Nazis.

2. At Nuremberg morality is being injected intravenously into international law. It is urgent that the "moral crimes" of the Nazis become quickly and unequivocally established as criminal in the eyes of the law so that all the law enforcement machinery in the world can be rapidly mobilized against any new outbreak.

3. The moral historical processes by which immoralities become illegalities are so slow that the Nazis or their equivalents will engulf the world in another war before their activities are outlawed.

Which is more important and urgent: that orthodox legal procedures be adhered to, or that law enforcement machinery be rapidly created and mobilized to help forestall or to cope with new fascisms?

The most disturbing feature of Mr. Konvitz'

concern with *ex post facto* law is his complete disregard of the basic moral issue which underlies these trials. Long before Nuremberg, men of good will everywhere put the Nazis on trial in a court of humanity, of morals—and found them guilty. At Nuremberg this universal moral condemnation is being translated into a legal verdict, and that is all. No *new* law is being made. Old, old moral laws are being shaped into an international legal code. The procedure is *ex post facto* in the most mechanical sense only. If Mr. Konvitz' view is sound then it is unjust to brand Cain a murderer, because the Ten Commandments had not yet been inscribed on tablets at the time he killed Abel.

Throughout his discussion of the trials, Mr. Konvitz fails to distinguish the Nazi crimes from ordinary crimes. He therefore assumes, logically but most abstractly, that a legal procedure used for this set of "murders" and "embezzlements" will become a precedent for the trial of individual murderers and embezzlers in the future. But that is absurdly unrealistic. The enormity and grossness of the Nazi crimes set them apart. Need it be argued, particularly in COMMENTARY, that the Nazi atrocity on the world is not merely a heterogeneous mass of individual murders of the Dillinger type? Surely no gangster, black marketeer, embezzler, or rapist need fear that Nuremberg procedures will be applied in his case and thus deprive him of "legal" rights. And certainly no law-abiding citizen is being put in jeopardy by the trials. Only those who transgress the basic moral code of the civilized world as barbarically as did the Nazis need fear the trials. For they do establish the principle that universally condemned acts against humanity will be punished as crimes even if precise statutes covering those crimes do not yet appear in national or international legal codes.

The layman's respect for legal procedure is stretched to the breaking point when an authority takes the position that the Nazis' undeniable crimes against humanity are not a proper subject of trial until and unless we have the consent of those selfsame Nazis. When should we have obtained it—before Hitler came to power, after Pearl Harbor or on V-E Day? Mr. Konvitz goes so far as to question the

"moral force" of the Nuremberg proceeding since it lacks the prior consent of the German government. I would counter with the query, what respect can a decent-hearted human being have for legal processes which are wholly unable to bring to judgment the Nazis whose moral guilt has been recognized by all civilized people? Unless the law can translate the moral judgment of people and do it quickly, it loses their respect and support and, therefore, its moral force. Mr. Konvitz should know that moral force is not a by-product of correct legal procedure. It is a human phenomenon which, though tempered with reason, gets its vitality from the emotion of righteousness.

The feebleness of Mr. Konvitz' theoretical complaint is most evident in his suggested alternative procedure. Unable to find a more correct legal procedure than that being employed, he suggests that there be no judicial process at all. Just kill off the defendants, or exile them. Death à la Mussolini, but with more efficiency and less vulgarity, is certainly not more just and in many important respects far less satisfactory than the current trials.

The death of some Nazis is all that Konvitz' procedure would achieve. That will also be achieved by the trials, but it is the least important contribution to justice. If these deaths were the prime objective no precautions would be taken to prevent suicides.

The trials create, for the first time, a permanent and official record of the Nazi crimes. True, this record is not a prerequisite to a contemporary judgment of the Nazis' guilt. But we all want the succeeding generations to get the full meaning of our miserable experience so that they may not do too little too late and thus find themselves in another war. With this record in existence, the punishment meted out to the Nazis will not be labeled as the mere vengeance of the victor. Without that record future generations would not be able to decide whether the Nazis were punished because they lost the war or because they were morally and justly condemned by civilized people.

Another benefit arising out of the trials is the creation of the very body of law and the very procedure which Mr. Konvitz prizes so highly. International law will have a mechanism which can cope with crimes of the Nazi magnitude. Any future trials would then be immune from the criticism that *ex post facto* law was being used.

The most important contribution of the trials to justice is their demonstration to people everywhere that everyone, even Der Fuehrer and his satellites, is subject to the law; that nobody is immune, even if he be the head of a nation or the commander in chief of an army. Only a

trial can prove this equality of all people before the law. And by so doing the respect of the ordinary man for law is maintained and perhaps increased. There can be no question that despite the deviations from orthodox legal procedure, the Nuremberg trials serve justice.

IRVING LIPKOWITZ

New York City

Rebuttal

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Mr. Lipkowitz seems to think that the Nuremberg trial is taking place so that we may in the future have law-enforcement machinery with which to meet new outcroppings of fascism. This seems to be the heart of his argument—as it is the heart of Jackson's rationale of the trial.

If this is the trial's purpose, then I say that the world is being tragically deluded.

Is Franco being confronted with the Nuremberg precedent? Is anyone talking seriously of trying him for denying basic rights to Jews and Protestants and for his reign of terror?

While the Nuremberg trial is going on, Uruguay, with the support of our own Department of State, is trying to get the twenty-one countries of the Western Hemisphere to sign an agreement to intervene collectively in any American country whose government commits crimes against humanity. We are not, therefore, using the Nuremberg indictment as a precedent to intervene in Argentina and arrest Peron and other fascists and bring them before an international tribunal charged with the commission of crimes against Jews and other helpless people and with the denial of basic rights to minority groups. We have already officially admitted that Nuremberg is not to serve as a precedent in international law. New international law still needs to be created by voluntary agreement.

If all that was wanted was to create new international law (and I am certainly in favor of a new and better international law), why could not the United Nations Organization be used for this purpose? Could not a little time be found between arguments with Russia over the desirability of freedom of the press, to pass a resolution embodying the essential elements of the Nuremberg indictment? Indeed, was not the UNO used to articulate the law of the present day regarding forced repatriation?

I have not questioned the need to punish the Nazi murderers. They could be tried and convicted, like Yamashita, for crimes against the laws and customs of war, or they could be dealt with politically. What I object to is their

trial on the basis of laws that are not laws. Morality, says Mr. Lipkowitz, is being injected intravenously into international law at Nuremberg. What is that morality? Is it that the victor may try the vanquished? Is it that law is inferior to force? Is it that there is one law for the winner and another for the loser? "Justice," said Joubert, "is truth in action." In Nuremberg I find only an attempt to present the *appearance* of justice based on fixed law; the *reality* presents another face altogether.

MILTON R. KONVITZ

New York City

Rejoinder to Dr. Gaster

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In the last number of COMMENTARY, Dr. Theodor H. Gaster reviews the Sabbath Prayer Book, published by the Jewish Reconstructionist Foundation. May I submit that Dr. Gaster has written about the book in a manner calculated to mislead many American Jews with regard to the purposes and the program of the Reconstructionist Movement.

Dr. Gaster criticizes the Reconstructionists for their attempt to reinterpret religion in the terms of modern thought and modern experience. It would take me far afield to discuss point by point Dr. Gaster's critique. I wish merely to confine myself to pointing out that Dr. Gaster completely ignores the purpose and function of the Prayer Book. He sees in it an attempt to impose "what is virtually a new creed."

This Prayer Book has no such purpose. It is intended for those Jews who find that they cannot in all conscience worship from the traditional Prayer Book or from any of the modern adaptations. It is frankly experimental. It is by no means the prayer book to end all prayer books. It is not even the last effort of Reconstructionists at formulating a prayer service. We believe that Judaism must be dynamic and we would be completely untrue to ourselves if, after preparing the text of the Prayer Book, we should offer it to the Jewish people and say: "This is the final version of Jewish religious worship."

Dr. Gaster asks why it is not possible for some of us to accept the doctrine of the Chosen People. We have expressed in articles and pamphlets many times why we believe that the doctrine of the Chosen People, no matter how broadly interpreted, is obsolete in our time. He asks why it is not possible to interpret the Messiah as a "symbolic figure of religious myth." Those of us who take the traditions seriously know how literally and how

seriously our ancestors understood the doctrine of the Messiah; and we have very good evidence in our own time of the extent to which the doctrine of the Messiah is understood literally by such men as Sholem Asch. We Reconstructionists feel that the doctrine of the Messianic Age is a more beautiful, more meaningful concept for our time, and there must be many others who feel the same way.

With regard to resurrection, Dr. Gaster undoubtedly knows what an issue the question of resurrection was in Jewish history and how deliberately the doctrine was introduced into the prayers.

If Dr. Gaster is somewhat puzzled how the average worshiper can attain to the thoughts and beliefs which, as he says, are neither simple nor literal, he must attend a service sometime at which this Prayer Book is used. A prayer book is in many respects like the script of a play. One cannot, without adequate imagination, know what the play really sounds like until it is clothed in production—a stage, costumes, scenery, actors, etc. A prayer book too must be heard in action to be understood. I think I may testify to the fact that some of the worshipers in my synagogue understand very well the thoughts and aspirations expressed in the Prayer Book.

If Dr. Gaster has criticism to make of the literary style, of the character of the translation, the eloquence of the poetry, the fervor of the prayers, he may be quite right in many instances. We have never tried to set ourselves up as successors to the Psalmists. We are not even in a class with Gabirol or Halevi, and we know it. It is, in fact, for that reason that we have introduced so few of our compositions and have drawn so copiously from the great storehouse of Hebrew literature throughout the ages. In all humility we recognize the literary inadequacies of a good part of our book, and through constant use of it we are becoming more and more aware of those prayers which are likely to transport the worshiper and those which are likely to leave him cold.

But we ask those who may not see eye to eye with us on literary taste to recognize the fundamental validity of what we are trying to do. We are seeking to arouse the religious fervor and piety of a generation of Jews who have utterly lost the habit of prayer. In many respects it may be said that we Jews are the most non-religious people. We are engaged in many good ventures and I should defend the Jewish people to the last on many scores. But, the one thing we must be painfully aware of is that our synagogues are empty, and that those that are attended are attended not for worship, but to hear the speeches of the rabbis

on all subjects under the sun. If this Prayer Book has succeeded in reawakening the piety of one Jew we should feel that it has been worthwhile. If it were to stimulate the preparation of other prayer books by other people, we should feel, too, that the effort was worthwhile.

(RABBI) IRA EISENSTEIN

New York City

From Brazil

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I am happy to say that COMMENTARY is a Jewish review everyone with inclination to clear and independent thinking had strongly missed before.

Let me tell you a small episode: Just on the day when COMMENTARY arrived I had to go to Rio de Janeiro in the company of a friend, a very cultured and well-read man. The room shortage forced us to share the same apartment in the hotel. By chance he took COMMENTARY from the table, and for the three days we stayed there COMMENTARY was blocked for me. He read and kept on reading and finished the last column just before our plane went down in Sao Paulo airport.

I suppose this reaction tells you more of the real want which existed and is being satisfied by COMMENTARY than any high-brow analysis.

ALFRED HIRSCHBERG

Sao Paulo, Brazil

Proposal on Germany

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

It is certainly no understatement to say that the Morgan case has in no way contributed to the enhancement of the effect of the Jewish voice in the world. In any case the incident now belongs to history.

But history does not take lessons from us. We have to endeavor to grasp its lessons. Therefore Jews who do not believe they can find a correct policy by drifting with the tide of their emotions must scrutinize events to decide whether actions and omissions on the Jewish side have not to a large extent contributed to the present confused situation.

In my opinion the Jews failed to prepare in time for the problems of the Jews in postwar Europe. We have indulged ourselves too much in depictions of the effects of the Nazi exterminations and there has been no realistic planning for the surviving remnant of European Jewry.

This is not an afterthought. Early in 1943 I already tried to get the support of leading Jewish figures for the step of attaching Jewish sections to the staffs of all armies of occupation which would work according to preconceived and uniform plans. In an article on the problem of Jewish settlement in Europe after the war, published in *Aufbau* on August 6, 1943, I developed the following propositions—which were based on the assumption that it would not be feasible immediately to resettle all the remnants of European Jewry in Palestine or elsewhere:

I suggested that offices for the resettlement of Jews be created (*Judensiedlungsämter*) within the framework of the armies of occupation. These offices would be entrusted with the task of reintegrating Jews in the social and economic life of their respective countries. This reintegration would not necessarily be carried out along the old lines. If necessary, new regional settlements would be organized. The coordination and interrelation of the offices of resettlement would reduce the difficulties with which any single one of them would be confronted.

Because of the state of international relations and because of the situation in the Jewish camp, there is probably little hope that such an organizational set-up could be established at the present moment. I do, however, venture to suggest that Jewish organizations concerned with assisting European Jews should urge the occupation authorities to set up a kind of coordinating office for displaced Jewish persons. Thus a planned and unified policy would be secured. Such an organization might prove helpful to the military authorities, displaced Jews and the Jews as a whole.

HUGO MARX

Forest Hills, N. Y.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Wasteland's New Priests

WASTELAND. By JO SINCLAIR. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1946. 321 pp. \$2.50.

Reviewed by ISAAC ROSENFELD

THIS \$10,000 prize-winning novel is an epistle to the Jews who are poor in spirit. Our St. Paul, who becomes Saul again, is Jake Braunschwitz, alias John Brown. Because he has a pain in his back, is ashamed of his family, and ashamed of being a Jew, and because his sister, Debby, insisted he should go, he consults a psychiatrist about his troubles. For eighteen years John has been hiding his Jewishness from his Gentile women, his Gentile colleagues at the newspaper where he is employed as a staff photographer, from himself and society at large. Nevertheless, he is unable to break away from his family and gefilte fish. Lacking identity, he can identify himself with nothing; at thirty-five he is still unintegrated and obsessed with a sense of waste, hence "wasteland." One reads his story as it comes out in weekly, and later in bi-weekly, interviews with the psychiatrist.

The poverty and degradation of the family are rather well sketched in—the stingy, dirty, irresponsible father, the beaten, semi-illiterate mother, sister Roz with her promiscuity, Italian boy friends and night clubs, brother Sig with his cars and cigars, and above all, sister Debby. Debby, who has taken over the male role abandoned by her father and become a Lesbian, keeps company with colored girls, listens to classical music, writes stories about the poor and oppressed, cripples, social outcasts, Negroes and Jews for the *New Masses* and literary magazines, and knows what the score is. She has identified herself, inwardly and outwardly, with the people, and it is the example of her courage and resolution, together with the psychiatrist's sympathetic understanding (clichés intentional) that pull Jake-John back on the road to life.

The therapeutic procedure followed by the psychiatrist is mainly that of prodding the subject with questions and suggestions, and

letting him talk it out. It works wonders. No sooner has John got down on record the story of his family's poverty and humiliation, and the hatred he feels toward it, than his *tzores* drop off one by one, the pain in his back disappears, and he calls himself Jake once again. The new Jake is a kindly fellow who photographs his parents and his brother Sig, takes his nephews to prize fights and hockey games and gets them jobs on the paper, introduces his sister Roz to his Gentile friends when they visit the night club in which she waits on tables, gives blood to the Red Cross, enlists in the army and asks the Four Questions at the *Seder*.

If there is any literary moral to be drawn from this drab but profitable little poem in celebration of the beatitudes of psychiatric social work, it is, perhaps, that naturalism is the best method of describing adversity, but God protect it from good fortune. The political moral, and the moral concerning Jewishness, are, however, of much greater consequence.

The noteworthy thing is that the secular priest who works redemption is now a psychiatrist. Not so long ago, in a novel of this sort, he would have been a Party organizer, and Jake, if he were to lead his family at all, would have led them to the barricades. The difference is significant, for whether or not Miss Sinclair is herself a fellow-traveler, and it's no concern of mine, the piety of her book is oriented toward the Jerusalem of a recent Party line, now known as Browderism.

Wasteland comes to an end in an ecstasy of belonging. Jake's Jewish blood has been accepted, it has mingled in the Red Cross station with the blood of America—Negro blood, it is hoped, will soon be allowed to join the stream—and Jake has become Everyman. (It doesn't hurt, by the way, to perpetuate a few little racisms on the side of blood; it makes the final mingling so much more poignant and exciting.) The only ghetto in America is your own. (In all the eighteen years of its concealment, Jake's Jewishness was never once suspected, and he had the good fortune, apparently, never to have heard an anti-Semitic remark.) As for the ghettos elsewhere, the war will wipe them out. Though

some have *Seders* and others have not, at heart all people are people. But everywhere belong! And as for psychiatry (in the critical work of this period, a good deal was made of the unification of Freud and Marx, with adjustment becoming a very respectable word), psychiatry will change the world into a playground and a settlement house.

There is a superficial attractiveness about this position that has, I imagine, proved tempting to many Jews. It blesses the bourgeois in all of us, and is kind, in particular, to the Jew's self-hatred, with an indulgence that passes for understanding. The line removes the stigma from assimilation, presenting it, to a degree, as a duty and a positive good, and is moderate in its demands on residual Jewishness (John becomes Jake, but Brown does not again become Braunowitz.) To show that it recognizes human frailty and has our interests at heart, the dispensation lets redemptive activity down to an easier level—one runs fewer social risks in working for brotherhood than in working for communism. And above all it dangles the eternal carrot of belonging before our noses with a "Bravo, old donkey, and an end to alienation!"

Fortunately, the human imagination cannot make too much of a good thing out of a bad thing. At least novels fail when they dish out this pap, and parties, too, have a way of succumbing to their own poison. For poverty is a friend of truth. What about the terrible poverty of Jake's family, which was so important in the diagnosis of his ailment—why has even mention of it disappeared from the cure? Are we really back to the origins of free enterprise, blaming poverty on shiftlessness and (new term) neurosis? No, not quite. Miss Sinclair has, or at least had, her answer for that one, too. WPA, we are told, was a respectable thing; it was in its own way a project for reclaiming wasteland. But now that you are back on your feet again, stay out of the red, plump for a people's government, learn to wear your Jewishness and your other differences correctly, as you would a suit of clothes, and you, too, can be a well-dressed man.

I AM aware that as far as novels at the imaginative level of *Wasteland* are concerned, the shift from Marx to Freud is no more than a shift in clichés; resumption of the earlier allegiance would not necessarily raise the standard of literary quality. The same, however, cannot be said of the social orientation of which popular fiction is but a single manifestation. Here, it seems to me, a real sacrifice has been made. The transformation of "change the world" into "adjust yourself to it" has had

the effect of abolishing concern with the kind of society that is worthy of our adjustment, and of removing the discussion of social problems from a historical context.

Treatment of Jewish problems in these terms absolves the world of responsibility for what the Jews have suffered as a people, and breaks up their integrity as a group by requiring them to adjust themselves as individuals. As in *Wasteland*, bourgeois society is taken for granted as possessing in itself all the norms of successful adjustment, all the conditions that the Jew, rid of the inner burdens of his Jewishness, shall be expected to meet. Nothing need be said of the historical context of anti-Semitism, of why the world permits and encourages it; for here we touch upon the guilt of bourgeois society, its alienation from humanity, and adjustment, as the program of the bourgeoisie, is designed to encourage forgetfulness.

Once again, the Jew is scapegoat, except that in this case, in return for the sacrifice of his interests, he is allowed to forgive the world by coming to terms with it. All of which tends to make liberalism synonymous with reaction, concentration on individual psychology and limiting the social problem to issues of racial brotherhood serving as a strategy for masking and maintaining social injustices at a deeper level. It is not inappropriate that a novel embodying this theme should have won the generous Harper Prize—for this theme happens to be the program of wealth in search of a conscience.

A Judeo-Christian Civilization?

ONE DESTINY: AN EPISTLE TO THE CHRISTIANS. By SHOLEM ASCH. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945. 88 pp. \$1.50.

Reviewed by THEODOR H. GASTER

ONE of the most dangerous features of contemporary thinking is the way in which irrationality is praised as an ideal when it serves so-called "good" ends, but denounced as a prejudice when it serves so-called "bad" ones. Nowhere, perhaps, is this tendency more glaringly exemplified than in the current movement of "inter-faith amity," and there more especially on the part of its Jewish exponents. So long as a man's attitude is friendly towards the Jews and issues in exemplary social conduct, nobody seems to care whether it is based on irrational and uncritical premises; the man is pursuing "noble ideals," and his half-wit testimony to Jewish excellence are paraded as documents of value

and significance. But let that same degree of mental equipment, that same pitiable low I. Q. once issue in a hostile attitude, and in no time our professional anti-defamationists and "psychological experts" are found enjoying a Roman holiday decrying its utterly irrational basis and stridently yelling "unclean, unclean!" In other words, value is assessed by expediency, inherent merit by contingent advantage, and no one seems to grasp the essential point that the primary attack should be directed against irrationality *per se*, against the tendency to base social judgment and social action—whether "good" or "bad"—on irrational, uncritical and purely impressionistic premises.

Sholem Asch's *One Destiny* is an almost classic object lesson in this ideological confusion. For what Mr. Asch has done in this curious "epistle to the Christians" is to substitute a palatable and comfortable irrationality for one that is unpalatable and hostile. Disturbed and harassed by the age-long persecution of Jews at the hands of their Christian neighbors, Mr. Asch here propounds the thesis that Judaism and Christianity are, in reality, necessary complements of each other, together constituting the indissoluble complex of a "Judeo-Christian civilization" upon which Western society is allegedly based. Both, he avers, are Messianic faiths, looking to the same ultimate establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth; both are predicated on the same moral and ethical postulates; both are mysteries of salvation through suffering. Jews and Christians therefore share a common destiny as co-workers in a common cause. Moreover—and this is Mr. Asch's essential point—both are tending more and more to merge in a common entity; "nourished upon the same religious substance, showered with the same blessings, and impelled by the same longing for God and his divine justice, a single nature is being produced within us, the nature of the Jewish-Christian man." On this basis, the persecution of the Jews is readily explained as an expression of that satanic Antichrist who is the enemy alike of the true Jew as of the true Christian.

In all of this Mr. Asch is, of course, merely echoing a philosophy which has, unhappily, gained an all too wide currency through the misguided, irrational and irresponsible zeal of interfaith partisans. Going to any length to promote concord between Christians and Jews—and that as a defense mechanism against anti-Semitism rather than as an urgent and inevitable expression of faith—exponents of interfaith amity have been perfectly willing to bolster their cause by the fiction of an ill-defined and actually non-existent "Judeo-Christian civilization." They have injected this concept like a

drug into the veins of a tired and naive community. Its effect is narcotic; the patient is lulled into a traumatic unconsciousness of his own individuality and becomes, as it were, barely distinguishable from his neighbor. Characteristic traits and features disappear in a common blur. Moreover, if the injection is repeated often enough, it becomes finally impossible for him to emerge from his trance condition, and he is beset with an urgent and disquieting desire to bring all others into the same state. Mr. Asch is clearly a victim of this trauma. He is speaking in a trance induced by his betters—some of them respectable dignitaries of the synagogue (or dignitaries of respectable synagogues), and it is upon them rather than upon him that the responsibility for this dangerous nonsense really lies.

DAINGEROUS nonsense? Why? In the first place, because the whole thesis is historically untrue. The similarities between Judaism and Christianity are, in fact, less significant than the differences, and in most cases no more pronounced than those which exist between *all* the so-called "higher" types of religion. If it is true that both are Messianic faiths, this fact is modified to an essential degree by the consideration that the Messiah of each fulfills quite a different purpose and is himself of quite a different character. The Messiah of the Jew is primarily the scion of Jesse, restorer of the Davidic dynasty and of the national status of Israel, whereas that of the Christians is the son of God who by his previous passion has rendered vicarious atonement for the original sin of mankind—a doctrine which Judaism utterly repudiates. If, further, it is true that both faiths are mysteries of salvation through suffering, there is this cardinal difference between them that in Judaism man is martyred for God, while in Christianity God is martyred for man. Lastly, if it is true that both faiths are predicated on the same moral and ethical teachings, it is also true that each envisages a different authority through which those teachings are expounded and enforced.

In the second place, this entire concept of a "Judeo-Christian civilization" is based on the mistaken notion that identity of objective (in itself questionable in this case) implies identity of character and destiny. The fact is, however, that civilization is determined not by aims and ideals, but by environment and experience; and it is precisely in these essential factors that Judaism and Christianity are so utterly distinct. What distinguishes them more than their doctrines is, indeed, the very fact that such ideals as they may have shared in common were viewed through different prisms, developed in

different environments and evinced through different experiences. Moreover, each has adopted ideas and outlooks from quite distinct milieus and cultures with which it came in contact, so that today what exist side by side are not a pristine, unadulterated Christianity and a pristine, unadulterated Judaism, sharing essential traits in common, but a developed Christianity on the one hand and a developed Judaism on the other; and the factors responsible for these respective developments have in many cases pulled them farther apart rather than drawn them closely together.

The truth must be that the religious basis of our civilization is not "Judeo-Christian" but Jewish and Christian, and that that civilization is best advanced when each of its component parts develops the full measure of its own distinctive identity. Moreover, it should be observed that among the teachings of each lies respect for the brotherhood of man, so that every true Jew and every true Christian is automatically an exponent of "interfaith amity."

Accordingly, all that is necessary to advance that ideal is that Jews and Christians each evince their own faith; the artificial stimulant of a special interfaith movement, or of an ideological amalgam such as that which Mr. Asch so bemusedly expounds, therefore, amounts to a vote of no confidence in the power of the two faiths themselves. To a true Jew, as to a true Christian, a special "Brotherhood Week" is as otiose and as absurd as a "No-murder" or a "No-adultery" week. And for those who are not yet true Jews or true Christians what is needed is not a Brotherhood Week but plain-all-year-round Judaism and plain all-year-round Christianity.

"Grass Roots" for Big Cities

REVEILLE FOR RADICALS. By SAUL D.

ALINSKY. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 228 pp. \$2.50.

Reviewed by DANIEL BELL

CHICAGO'S "back-of-the-yards" district is a smoky, sprawling area where nearly 100,000 packing-house workers live in old, dreary tenements whose rotting walls soak in the acrid stench of the stockyards. The people who live and work here are Slavic, Irish, Negro and Mexican, and national or racial affiliations count greatest as factors of identification. The pattern of their living could easily serve as a model for the standard denunciations of belt-line capitalism: the hard, terrible monotony of work; the frustrations built by the disparity of squalid living and the fantasy world of Holly-

wood; the long rows of cheap bars and gin-mills; the sense of violence hanging heavily over the neighborhood.

Into this situation, a young sociologist named Saul Alinsky stepped and organized the "Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council." Alinsky, whose specialty was juvenile delinquency and crime, had watched the fumbling efforts of established welfare agencies to get a foothold in the community. These organizations had come in as impersonal outsiders, seeking to direct the community from above. Obviously they had been resented and rebuffed. There was among the people a basic emotional hunger: the need to participate in person in the affairs that concerned them; a need to have a say in the decisions which affected them. The Back of the Yards movement took a new tack. It was not another organization competing with the established neighborhood groups, but a co-operative organization, taking root in the existing clubs, fraternal organizations, churches, trade unions and other interest groups. The Council took up as its main issues racial antagonisms, the lack of playground and recreational facilities, lack of schools, and other such matters vital to the community. Soon the Council grew so troublesome and challenging to the city administration that Mayor Kelly mobilized the local Democratic clubs to break up its organization. Through the intervention of Bishop Sheil—the district is largely Catholic and Church influence is paramount—Kelly's efforts were balked.

From this first Chicago experiment, other Councils, or People's Organizations as they are called, have been started over the country, and the membership has kited to nearly a quarter of a million persons.

The set-up and experience of these Organizations provide some important data for the democratic operation of a mass society. We know that one of the major effects of a highly industrialized society is the fragmentation of the old communal ties; that with increasing spatial mobility we see the creation of urban anonymity and functional rather than communal relationships; that is, people work together and (sometimes) unite on the basis of work interests, but they do not live together, nor remain rooted to the places where they live so that they can work together on community problems. (Clever politicians such as Fiorello La Guardia long ago recognized this fact and built their political machines through contacts with leaders of functional-interest groups, rather than on the old-style Tammany neighborhood organizations.)

Along with this urban anonymity, comes an increasing bureaucratization extending into all

major organizations with which people are identified. As societies grow more complex, the distance between the *loci* of power, the places where decisions are made, and the grass roots and pavements becomes greater. With the centralization of decisions arises a related growth of dependence and helplessness on the part of the people. We find created a life of ordered insecurities whose psychological concomitants are bewilderment and frustration.

Any experiment, then, that attempts to give people a sense of participation and belonging becomes important as a weapon against the cynicism and despair on which a fascist movement feeds. The danger of a fascist movement is that it might give the people a share in the ordering of their lives, but not in changing the insecurities. The latter is the test of the democratic aims of a movement.

SAUL ALINSKY, as the organizer of these People's Organizations, might have been expected to give a straightforward account of their development, the problems they encountered, and what the fruits of the work were. He hasn't. His *Reveille for Radicals* is a diffuse, disjointed, mawkishly written book compounded of shrill pamphleteering, which is supposed to be the social philosophy of the movement, and of handbook material for organizers who want to participate in forming People's Organizations. What obviously should have been the core of the book, a coherent picture of what the People's Organizations actually are, is just never developed.

The first part is an impassioned and overheated call to all Americans to become "radicals" and thus save democracy. But it is painfully embarrassing to read (and more still to report) the rhetorical flourishes with which Mr. Alinsky buoys this first section. He opens with what seems like an extravagant parody of the *Ballad for Americans* ("The people of America are Red, White, Black, Yellow and all the shades in between. Their hair is straight, curly, kinky and most of it in-between . . ."), but you soon find out he means it seriously.

Apart from its incredibly vulgar rhetoric, Mr. Alinsky's book fails on a deeper count. Granted that one can build a People's Organization from the bottom, how far can it go, on what kind of issues can it be successful? Can it be only a vital welfare organization, seeking to solve the face-to-face issues of a community; or can it extend further as a political organization, in the widest sense of "political," seeking to mobilize people on basic issues? Mr. Alinsky never comes to grips with the problem. Perhaps, it is because he is forced to play simultaneously the roles of Jesus and Paul.

In his clamorous opening section, he calls for a thoroughgoing "radical" program, even chastising labor leadership for being committed too strongly to the free-enterprise system. Yet, in his section on organizational tactics, he recounts how the People's Organizations, by playing on the ego and self-interest of businessmen, are able to enlist them in the community work. In one case he describes a particularly vicious strike situation where the community's largest business, "Tycoons", used goons and stool pigeons in an effort to break the People's Organizations. After the strike settlement, "Tycoons joined the People's Organizations and today they are not only the most popular and respected, and loved members of the community, but one of the chief officials of Tycoons has been elected and re-elected to one of the most important posts in the People's Organizations." The moral, apparently, is that if all people could only meet and get to know each other as human beings, they could work peacefully together. Yet can all issues be solved by persuading people to meet each other and be "good"? Our radical Founding Fathers recognized the existence of class interests and sought a means of balancing them one against the other so that no single one could become dominant.

In one place Mr. Alinsky proclaims that the People's Organizations must over-ride the vested interests of narrow groups, including Organized Labor, Organized Business and Organized Farm Blocs. These organized blocs, he says, speak only for twenty million people, leaving One Hundred and Ten Millions inarticulate. Yet Alinsky indicates that a People's Organization can be built only on the existing power alignments within the community, and on community traditions. How far can one go, then, in developing a "people's political program" from these roots? In his initial experiment in Chicago, Alinsky was able to proceed only because of the support of the Catholic Church and, later, of the left-wing union in that area. The basic pulls of both these power groups, however, are not rooted in the people's lives in the neighborhoods, but in some larger institutional commitments. If the two groups were to clash on some larger ideological or power issue, what would stop the People's Organizations from being rent apart?

Mr. Alinsky makes a variety of ambiguous claims for the role of a People's Organization; the ambiguity flows from his conflicting commitments. His own basic social philosophy is never established; all he says is that people must participate—and he can supply the techniques—in issues that concern them.

If I have been harsh with this book, it is

because the activities of Alinsky's Councils raise quite explicitly the questions of the limits of individual activity in a technologically organized and power-massed society, and yet fail woefully to define them. One of our crucial jobs is to explore the range of activities through which people can genuinely share in the basic decisions that affect them and in molding a society responsive to their economic and emotional needs. Otherwise the "people" and these "People's Organizations" may in their despair become another version of Italy's *L'Uomo Qualunque*.

Jewish Vital Statistics

THE RISE OF THE JEW IN THE WESTERN WORLD. A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE OF EUROPE. By URIAH Zevi ENGELMAN. Foreword by NILES CARPENTER. New York, Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1944. 238 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by JOSHUA STARR

DR. ENGELMAN is known for his researches in Jewish population statistics. In this book he has, however, turned to a much broader field: his account of the socio-economic factors in the history of European Jewry and his attempt to plot its demographic curve both cover a span of fifteen centuries. In each respect the author has, unfortunately, left himself wide open to serious criticism. As an illustration of the pitfalls of his first enterprise, one may take Engelman's view of the impact of feudalism on the Jews' struggle for survival.

During the early phase of their settlement on the Continent, we are told, farming was the principal occupation of the Jews. Only as free ownership of land gave way to the caste system were the Jews forced to become an urban group, and Engelman believes that this change explains the decline in their numbers down to the thirteenth century. Now there is no doubt that farmland was owned by Jews in various parts of medieval Europe—though hardly including England, as Engelman supposes. It is also clear that for religious reasons there was no room in the feudal system for Jewish lords or vassals. But does this prove that the Jews of France and Germany were ousted, in any considerable numbers, from agricultural pursuits? Engelman forgets that we have to deal not with the Continent as a uniform area but with two distinct "Europes." In the North the Jews arrived as traders and the advance of feudalism prevented

them from turning to agriculture. The story in the South was far different; in Spain and Southern Italy the diversified urban and rural occupations of the Jews were not seriously disturbed by the local barons.

The question of the impact of feudalism raises, consequently, the question why the Jews *remained*, rather than became (as the author holds), an urban group. This subject has been admirably treated by Georg Caro (1867-1912), who taught at Zurich, and Ignacy Schipper (1884-), Polish Jewish historian, both of whose contributions have most unfortunately not been included in Engelman's references.

Any attempt to deal with population trends in the Jewish past raises serious difficulties. Is it possible, on the basis of the extant material, to plot the curve of a people which migrated so frequently, particularly before the 19th century? Engelman believes that the estimated four million Jews of the Roman Empire declined to less than a million by the end of the 12th century. Stressing the economic upsurge initiated by the Crusades, he maintains further that this population rose to two million or more by the end of the 16th century, and that the upward trend continued at a greater rate until the end of the last century. As far as this reviewer can see, Engelman's theory does little more than beg the question. Common sense would suggest that estimates of a population spread from the Atlantic to the Russian border are reliable only when based on regional figures for the principal states involved. Such figures are utterly unavailable. As it happens, the census-taker is definitely not a part of Jewish communal tradition, and until a century or so ago very few of the governments ruling large Jewish minorities bothered to count their subjects.

APART from the legitimacy of Engelman's estimates, he can scarcely be excused for neglecting to consider the effect of the wave of expulsions and forced conversions that swept over a wide area during the 7th century. And to explain the increase of the Jewish population in Europe by the economic rebirth of the West is to forget that during the 13th century and later the center of gravity of that population shifted to the more backward East! No less odd is the author's omission of the sharpest numerical drop in Jewish population to our own day, occasioned by the Khmelnitzki massacres and other catastrophes of the 17th century.

Once we leave the woods and emerge into the statistical sunlight of the last two centuries, Engelman's guidance is much more helpful. Any reader inured to the peculiarities of vital statistics will find the relevant chapters rewarding. In opposition to other sociologists, Engelman takes the position that the increase in the

number of Jews in Europe during the century which ended in 1925—namely, 235 per cent—was not at all remarkable. The population of Great Britain and of Germany grew even more rapidly, and if comparative figures for Eastern Europe were available, they would presumably show this general increase still more conclusively. In discussing the migration of European Jewry, Engelman argues that the "better" elements left for new countries, but this is a moot question. Of particular interest is a table prepared by Professor L. Hersh of Geneva, which shows how the number of emigrants from Czarist Russia rose and fell according to whether harvests were deficient or abundant. In connection with the demography of Soviet Jewry, Engelman takes due notice of the important rule that, in our day, the rate of natural increase for the ethnic majority in a country is higher than that for any minority group. This phenomenon seems to be independent of persecution; and in the Soviet Union during the twenties and thirties further inroads had been made in the Jewish population by intermarriage.

The demographic decline of European Jewry during the inter-war period is measured carefully by Engelman. He brings us down to a generation confronted with machinery for bringing about statistical changes in population with the speed of light by a process that knows neither ethnic majorities nor minorities. Science has come forth as the great "levelling" power.

Puritan Into Democrat

PURITANISM AND DEMOCRACY. By RALPH BARTON PERRY. New York, Vanguard Press, 1944. 687 pp. \$5.00.

Reviewed by SIDNEY MORGENBESSER

JUDGED from the vantage point of any single discipline, Ralph Barton Perry's *Puritanism and Democracy* is not a major contribution. As a treatise on ethics, it is incomplete unless taken in conjunction with his previous work; as an exposition of liberalism it is not new, as witness Hobhouse and Dewey; and as history the findings of Perry Miller remain the more basic and accurate. Viewed in the light of present-day events the leading lessons of the book seem irrelevant. What have "reason," "intelligence" and "inclusiveness" to do with strikes, atomic bombs, Yogis and Commissars? And Professor Perry has little to add to the cry that the future belongs to the Raskolnikoffs, or at best to the Settembrinis brandishing refurbished myths. With all of this, the work remains impressive, wise and in some sense basic; for we have the

reconsideration of a faith in things normal, honest and reasonable. It is a faith in the judicious—a faith Hooker and Locke would have understood.

Essentially, Professor Perry re-appraises the leading ideas of 17th- and 18th-century America, dissects their weakness and strength, and draws from them lessons for our own day. The two central concepts, Puritanism and Democracy, are not usually considered as integrally connected. Aside from Lecky's dictum, most of the major work on the rise of democracy in America has been done in terms of the influence of the frontier and the activities of class-conscious working groups. Democratic theory today is linked with an optimistic and rationalistic interpretation of human nature, and almost diametrically opposed to a pessimistic, sinful, other-worldly outlook. Who is not ready therefore to dismiss the Puritans as a group essentially "agin" pleasure, "agin" minority expression, and to regard the Puritan theology as a hurdle in the path of a democratic outlook?

In Puritan fashion—Cromwell-like—Professor Perry beseeches us to reconsider, for we may be wrong. He reminds us that the Puritans were devoted to the welfare of the individual as they understood it, that many of the leaders of the Enlightenment in America were moved by Christian piety, that Protestant insistence upon individual conscience was essentially radical and path-clearing, that Puritan doctrines of morality and duty were not to be lightly dismissed. In a certain sense Professor Perry does for the Puritans what Herford and Finkelstein have done for the Pharisees. He corrects popular notions about the Puritans and shows them to have been high-minded moralists with serious limitations, but high-minded and serious above all.

At the same time Professor Perry cannot be accused of covering up, of refusing to call a spade a spade. The Puritan theology could not solve the ancient dilemma between an all-good and powerful God and an evil world; the Puritans had an essentially false psychology in which will was divorced from its natural context; their rules of abstinence, their "moral diarrhea" and athleticism led to an eclipsing of the virtues of temperance, wisdom and friendship; they sanctioned an ethic that sanctioned in turn an acquisitive capitalistic society. Perry admits, dilates upon, and calls our attention to these faults.

Yet one more major fault of the Puritan outlook is glossed over—their moral imperialism, their dismissal of the non-Christian as the non-honorific. Since men were not equal except as potential Christians, it is beside the point to speak of universalism within Puritanism.

If the author intended to prove that the Puritans made essential contributions to a liberal-democratic tradition the evidence is wanting.

IN HIS discussion of democracy, Professor Perry attempts to divorce the 18th-century insistence upon rights and reason from the mythology once used to bolster them. It turns out that the faith in reason and humanity that motivated, let us say Jefferson, is not essentially different from the faith of most sincere democrats today. To be sure, liberalism has to be extended to changes in the property relations of society and to a respect for universal humanity regardless of national boundaries. But this is not an alteration of ends; liberty and equality remain the goals.

As a good philosopher Professor Perry has made explicit the moral standard by which he judges. That standard is inclusiveness—the central aim is the evolving of patterns that satisfy all interests. This is to be done for the sake of the individual. At times Professor Perry seems to talk of a split between the individual and institutions—not in Rousseau's sense, to be sure, for no one today speaks of man except as a socially institutionalized animal. But his eye is more upon the integrated person in his privacy, rather than upon shared experience integrating people. It is therefore not strange that group rights and institutional conflicts are not discussed at great length. Yet it is in this realm that most of the obstacles to social progress lie. And in this realm it still continues to be well-nigh impossible to satisfy all interests.

IT MAY be in place to call attention to a possible illicit conclusion that some may draw from this book. A phrase "Christian democracy," which appears toward the end of the book, may doubly confuse those already confused enough to declare that a Christian philosophy is the necessary basis of democracy. In no sense has Christianity always sided with democratic movements; the Protestant assertion that man is directly responsible to God does not logically entail a democracy. Nor did Luther interpret it to mean that. It seems that Professor Perry is induced to speak of Christian democracy by his desire to list those ideas upon which all Americans can agree. Since most Americans are Christian it might not seem dangerous to speak of Christian democracy. But it is; it is as dangerous as speaking of "white" America. Nor can the danger be avoided by speaking of a "Judeo-Christian" America.

In his opposition to historical relativism, to the view of humanism as a religion, and in his

insistence upon the verifiability of value judgments, Professor Perry is at the same time at one and at variance with Becker, Kahler and Dewey. Although no specific problem of government is solved, his discussion of aims and goals remains profoundly important. They describe that which must be achieved, if we are to have a fairer and more sincere commonwealth. The method of achievement, however, must be more radically defined than the author envisages.

All in all this is a rich book.

Yiddish Poetry in America

HEMSHEKH: ANTOLOGIE FUN AMERIKANER-YIDDISHER DIKHTUNG. ("Continuity: Anthology of American Yiddish Poetry.") Edited by MOSHE STARKMAN. New York, "Hemshekh," 1945. 432 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by ISRAEL KNOX

THE most comprehensive anthology of modern Yiddish poetry we possess is, curiously enough, available only in English. Unfortunately, this compilation, edited in 1931 by Joseph Leftwich and entitled *The Golden Peacock*, is more a directory of Yiddish poets than an anthology. Almost all the translations were made by the editor himself, apparently in great haste, and they seldom suggest the quality of their originals. Samuel Imber's *Modern Yiddish Poetry* (1927) is much better. Since he could not obtain competent translations, Imber resorted to Roman transliteration of the Yiddish text, supplemented by English renditions in prose.

There are, of course, several anthologies in Yiddish only, but none covers the entire field. M. Bassin's two-volume anthology, *Five Hundred Years of Yiddish Poetry* (1917), is a monumental work, obviously edited by a man of scholarship and sensibility, but it goes only as far as 1910; and the editor's adherence to a theory of "pure" poetry compelled him to exclude a good deal of "social" and "national" poetry; thus he failed to give an entirely accurate picture of a significant period in American-Yiddish poetry—the period of Rosenfeld, Bovshover, Liessin, Yehoash, and others. In 1940 Bassin published another anthology, this time a superb one of Yiddish poetry in America; here, too, he was highly discriminating in his choice of poets, selecting only thirty-one, but the shortcomings of this book, though much less noticeable, are still those of his theory.

Two other anthologies of Yiddish verse exist:

one compiled by the late Zisho Landau (published in 1919), who was himself a poet of great talent and an even firmer believer in "pure" poetry; and the other by the "In Sich" group (published in 1920), a circle of intellectual poets with universal interests and a profound concern with innovation in both theme and form.

MR. STARKMAN'S anthology does not duplicate any of the others. It comprises the work of the newer poets who began writing after the First World War, and is confined almost entirely to poets who live in New York. Excepting Glatstein and Minkoff, poets with established reputations, few of them—if any—are to be found in other anthologies. Mr. Starkman does not regard himself as editor of the anthology, but rather as its compiler. He set himself the simple task of inviting each of fifty poets to send him fifteen poems, and then, from these, he selected six or eight. He also asked for bibliographies, and so the more diligent poets are rewarded with long lists of the titles of their own works and of articles and comments about them.

If Bassin and Landau erred on the side of exclusiveness and "art for art's sake," Mr. Starkman errs on the side of "generosity" and "impartiality." It would seem that his own mind was divided as to the purpose of his compilation: on the one hand, he probably wanted to bring together a representative selection of the "younger poetry"; on the other, he also wanted to preserve for the historical record the names of all the younger writers of Yiddish verse. Much of the poetry in the anthology is therefore second-rate, and the bibliographies inflated and pseudo-scientific.

The remarkable thing, however, is the relatively great amount of poetry in this anthology. It is in general a "romantic" and "nostalgic" poetry, the poetry of a forlorn generation. The Jewish world these poets left behind them possessed tradition and cultural wholeness, but it has perished in a sea of blood. The Jewish community in America is a new one, one held together largely by philanthropy and the fight against anti-Semitism; it has not yet attained cultural integrity and a "way of life." The Yiddish poet, like most contemporary poets, is caught in the malaise of Western civilization, in the rift between the intellectual and artist on the one hand, and society—in crisis and transition, without a reliable compass and clear direction—on the other hand. The Yiddish poet, besides, sees the washing away of the very soil out of which his poetry grows—an intimate environment, stable traditions, and an idiom

spoken by young and old alike. It is presumably possible for a great poet to emancipate himself completely from "environment" and "time," and produce poetry that summarizes and lights up an entire epoch. But such poets do not come often and they presuppose "lesser" poets with roots in the soil.

It can be said in praise of these poets that their "romanticism" does not dissolve in mysticism or transcendental religion. They simply write about the world they really know. Consciously or unconsciously, they regard as their natural subject matter the world in which they were born and grew up, a world now vanished. At least eighteen poems are entitled "Father," "Mother," "Grandfather," or "Grandmother"; twelve poems bear the names of the hamlets or regions where their authors were born and spent their youth. This feeling of nostalgia, this longing for the scenes of yesterday, becomes patent in still many other poems. The youth of some of these poets was not a happy one, and yet they express no bitterness and voice no social indictment. In a sense these poems are "realistic": they describe the townlet—its landscape, its synagogues, its market-place; they speak of the Sabbath and of holidays, of the joys and sorrows of the ordinary folk, of the learning and goodness of the great ones. Some of the poets, in quest of a *mythos*, a legend, have turned to the Besht (Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tov, the "master of the good name," the founder of Hasidism), and to his great-grandson, Rabbi Nachman of Bratzlav, who was himself a great story-teller. They write of these figures as if of contemporaries, with piety and yet with warm familiarity and a kind of humor and "cosmic" irony—as in Jacob Glatstein's "The Bratzlaver to His Secretary."

Others have turned to the contemporary Jewish tragedy, the wiser ones treating it in the minor key in which one might write of a dear friend who has just died. Feinberg's "Three Last Jews of Warsaw" is a ballad—heart-breaking in its cumulative effect—of Warsaw's three last Jews; as the story unfolds, it ceases to be the ballad of three Jews and becomes the dirge of at least three millions.

The least satisfactory poems are those about this country. Eliezer Greenberg's "By the Waters of the Hudson" is merely a pretext to express again his nostalgia for Lipkan, the Bessarabian hamlet of his youth. Pomerantz's "Chicago" and "Fourteenth Street" are crude and false imitations of Sandburg. Kalushiner's "Sunday on Broadway" is a fine sonnet, but there is little of Broadway in it. Regelson's "American Flag" utters noble sentiments on freedom, equality and tolerance, but it is a

rhetorical, not a poetic, utterance. (Another "timely" poem of Regelson's, "The Star of David Greets the Red Star," is sheer bombast.)

The reason for these failures with the American theme is suggested by Berish Weinstein, a gifted poet, in his two poems "My Father Is No More" and "Not Yet America." In the first, he speaks of his father's death and of the values of a communal life that was; in the second, he confesses, simply and sincerely, that he is not yet ready to sing of America because his heart and mind are still with those he left behind him who are now meeting a wholesale doom. Weinstein's honesty is commendable, and it can only be hoped that when he and others like him do become ready to write of America they will continue to be honest.

In the twenties and early thirties a good deal of Yiddish "proletarian" poetry was published. Most of it was not the product of a fresh awareness but of political dogma, and hence little of this verse has endured. Some of it, nevertheless, has found its way into this anthology where it remains as devoid of a basic social vision and the rhythm and tempo of real toil as it ever was. One of the exceptions to this sentimental and primitive stuff is furnished, however, by M. A. Sool's "My Race" (*Mein Stamm*). It is the poem of one "who now knows what it means to be a poet—now that his class is writing in blood the history of the world with every shot at the gates of Madrid." The strength of these lines is lost in a prose rendition, but they come from an intense poem with a clear idea and controlled emotion.

Only three of the poets represented in *Hemshekh* were born in America, but several others came here in their childhood. Yet

their poetry has no specifically "American" quality. The youngest of them, Chaika Abelson, writes "conventionally" but with disciplined craftsmanship and a feeling for individual words. The most talented of these poets, Chasye Cooperman, is probably the most "modern" one in the anthology. A poet of wide aesthetic culture and with a knowledge of recent tendencies in literature at large, she makes skilful use of rhyme, assonance and free verse, displaying variety in her rhythms and precision in her imagery.

To judge from this anthology, the stature of the newer Yiddish poets in America does not measure up to that of the "Young Vilna" group in pre-war Poland and of some of the Soviet Yiddish poets. This is not owed solely to "subjective" factors—that is, to the greater talent of the East-European Jews—the reason must also be sought in "objective" factors: the complex of social and national forces and the differing relationships of the poets to these forces in terms of both acceptance and rejection, hope and despair.

Polish Jewry, alas, has ceased to exist and the direction of Soviet Jewry is uncertain. No sociology and no philosophy of Jewish life can leave America out of the picture, and the future of Yiddish poetry is inseparable from the future of the Jewish community here—its sense of continuity with the past, its attitude toward Yiddish as the language of that past and of the "common folk," its concern with a meaningful present, its willingness to weave together Jewish and universal progressive values. Without some sharper sense of these factors there cannot be a vital Jewish community in America, and without such a community there can be no Jewish art and literature, whether in Yiddish, Hebrew or English.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

ISAAC ROSENFELD's first novel, *Passage from Home*, is being published this spring. Mr. Rosenfeld's stories and reviews have appeared in *Partisan Review*, *Kenyon Review*, the *Nation* and the *New Republic*.

THEODOR H. GASTER is chief of the Hebraic Section of the Library of Congress.

DANIEL BELL, formerly managing editor of *Common Sense*, is now an instructor in the social sciences at the College of the University of Chicago.

SIDNEY MORGENBESSER, a graduate of the College of the City of New York and the Jewish Theological Seminary, is director of the Hillel Foundation for Jewish students at Queens College.

JOSHUA STARR is managing editor of *Jewish Social Studies* and a specialist in Jewish medieval history.

ISRAEL KNOX, former editor of the *Workmen's Circle Call*, has written widely on Yiddish literature.

CURRENT BOOKS ON JEWISH SUBJECTS

- THE HEBREW ARABIC DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE.** By DAVID BEN ABRAHAM ALFASI. Edited by SOLOMON LEON SKOSS. Volume II. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946. 916 pp. \$12.00.
- THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL.** By MORRIS R. COHEN. New York, Henry Holt, 1946. 497 pp. \$3.75.
Contains essays, reviews, polemical articles, addresses to his fellow philosophers and chapters from other works culled from a lifetime of writing and lecturing.
- SHAARAY TEFILA: A HISTORY OF ITS HUNDRED YEARS, 1845-1945.** By SIMON COHEN. New York, Greenberg, 1945. 86 pp. illus.
An account of the "West End Synagogue."
- OUT OF ENDLESS YEARNINGS: A MEMOIR OF THE LATE PROFESSOR ISRAEL DAVIDSON.** By C. DAVIDSON. New York, Bloch Publishing Co., 1946. \$2.75.
Memoirs of the late Professor of Medieval Hebrew Literature at the Jewish Theological Seminary, written by his wife.
- STORIES FROM FAR AND NEAR.** By LION FEUCHTWANGER. Translated from the German. New York, Viking Press, 1945. 179 pp. \$2.50.
- LIGHT FROM THE ANCIENT PAST: THE ARCHEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE HEBREW CHRISTIAN RELIGION.** By JACK FINEGAN. Princeton University Press, 1946. 534 pp. \$5.00.
The light shed by archeology on the history and civilization of the early Hebrew-Christian religion; an account extending from 5,000 B. C. E. to A. D. 500.
- TO WHOM PALESTINE?** By FRANK GERVASI. New York, Appleton-Century, 1946. 222 pp. \$2.50.
The case for Jews, Arabs and British in Palestine considered by a newspaper correspondent, with a decision for Zionism.
- AN ANSWER TO ERNEST BEVIN: EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO THE PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION (House of Lords, London, February 11, 1937).** By VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY. New York, Bernard Ackerman, 1946. 32 pp. \$25.
- SPINOZA.** By ISAAC LICHTENSTEIN. New York, Machmadim Art Editions, 1946. 8 plates (portfolio) \$5.00.
Eight portraits, with sketches, of Spinoza.
- SUPREMACY OF ISRAEL.** By SAMUEL A. B. MERCER. Boston, Christopher Publishing House, 1945. 187 pp. \$3.00.
Lectures by the Professor of Semitic Languages at the University of Toronto.
- THE ART OF MAX BAND.** By ARTHUR MILLER. Los Angeles, Borden Publishing Co., 1945. \$5.50.
- THE FACE OF BENEDICTUS SPINOZA.** By SIMON L. MILLNER. New York, Machmadim Art Editions, 1946. 93 pp. \$7.50.
A brief biographical sketch of the Jewish scholar and philosopher and a discussion of his physiognomy based upon the forty or fifty portraits and statues of him reproduced in the book.
- RUFUS ISAACS, FIRST MARQUESS OF READING.** By MARQUESS OF READING. Vol. II. (1914-35). London, Hutchinson, 1945. 384 pp. 30 s.
- ARCH OF TRIUMPH.** By ERICH MARIA REMARQUE. New York, Appleton-Century, 1946. 455 pp. \$3.00.
A novel concerned with refugees and expatriates in the Paris of 1939.
- EVENT IN ETERNITY.** By PAUL EHRLMAN SCHERER. New York, Harper, 1945. 234 pp. \$2.00.
A book of lectures based on the prophet Isaiah.
- DAVID THE KING.** By GLADYS SCHMITT. New York, Dial Press, 1946. 631 pp. \$3.00.
A novel which follows the story of David as set down in the Books of Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles.
- EXPERIMENT "E": A REPORT FROM AN EXTERRMINATION LABORATORY.** By LEON SZALET. Translated by Catharine Bland Williams. New York, Didier, 1946. 287 pp. \$3.50.
The horror-filled experiences of a Polish Jew in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.
- STAR OF THE UNBORN.** By FRANZ WERFEL. New York, Viking Press, 1946. 645 pp. \$3.00.
A novel set in the Eleventh Cosmic Year of Virgo (spiritual time) 100,000 years from now in which only two of our present human systems have survived, the Catholic Church and the Jews as a special, isolated entity.

the news is

in the
spotlight...
up North
or
in the
sunlight...
down South

"Tortoise Shell" - Revlon's

"special occasion" color... in Nail Enamel and Lipstick.

THEATRICAL
COSTUME
DRAPERY
DISPLAY
DECORATIVE

FABRICS BY DAZIAN'S INC.

ESTABLISHED 1842

142 WEST 44th STREET
NEW YORK 18, N. Y.

BRANCHES:

BOSTON • CHICAGO
LOS ANGELES • ST. LOUIS